MÄNNERBUND AND SCIENCE



ALFRED BÄUMLER

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BOOKS

Männerbund and Science

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Alfred Bäumler

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Foreword

When I present these speeches and lectures from four years ago today, I am not doing so to look back. It seems to me that the demarcations that have been made here at certain points in relation to bourgeois society have lost none of their significance.

I have tried to address the young man in the German student; many a serious eye has given me an answer. The political aspect does not lie in the subject of the speeches, but is visible behind them. They can only be fully understood by those who also have the situation in mind in which they were given. Each of the ideas presented had a direct political connection. The question is whether these thoughts, detached from their current political meaning, can be preserved today, as if floating, and develop a new political meaning.

The title is merely intended to designate the two themes around which my lectures have grouped themselves in a particular situation of the sciences and the state. Here I consider the Männerbund as it were by itself, but leave no doubt anywhere that it gains life and truth only through the state, just as the state only gains life and truth through it. Friendship and comradeship are only genuine where the seriousness of a common task prevails. The cultivation of an autonomous spirit of comradeship, without reference to state-historical tasks, is a liberal matter.

Berlin, November 1933

A. B.

The Meaning of the Great War

I

Lecture given at the Representatives' Day of the Hochschulring Deutscher Art. Schloß Boitzenhurg, 7th October, 1929.

We are on the eve of the day of remembrance of Langemarck. Wherever young Germans and men come together to discuss serious matters, they must remember this day. For all thoughts and resolutions that do not exist in the face of that day are useless, let us never forget it: the dead no longer think and act, but their thoughts and actions were not yet finished when they died. They are now powerless, and only through us, the living, can their thoughts and actions still come to light. It is entrusted to us, and the burden this places on our shoulders is more than just a moral responsibility. If we forget the goal for which they gave their lives, we are not only acting irresponsibly – we are committing sacrilege. The obligation we have towards our dead is not a moral one, but a religious one. Not remorse, but shuddering and horror, not censure, but disgrace falls from us if we do not obey the sacred command of pietas, or faithfulness. But it is also something other than the awareness of fulfilled duty that comes to us when we consecrate ourselves to piety. If we really feel the bond that unites us with the dead, if we really know ourselves to be the executors of their will, if we are the doers of their deeds – then something of the radiance that surrounds them will shine around us.

You have been praised a lot. There is much thoughtlessness, much irreverence in this praise. Has anyone ever considered whether the survivors have a right to shower others with their praise out of the light of the sun? I believe to hear the call from the graves: "We are not interested in praising our attitudes and

deeds, nor in indignation at our opponents, but only in the real thing. Do not praise us, rather show us what we have fallen for." Our love for the dead must not consist in repeating the thoughts they had in their minds when they were strong, if we still speak abstractly and generally today of the fatherland and of the fulfillment of our duty, then we deny what has happened in the meantime, then we forget precisely the death of our comrades, then we forget the unique event to which their death gives greatness. Then we continue to think as if nothing had happened. But something has happened! There is something between us and those words, as they come to us from the volume of war letters of fallen students: their death and the event of the war. We are unworthy heirs if we simply repeat those words. For the world in which we live is no longer the world in which they lived. It is changed because their death and this war have entered it, we can no longer speak as they did when they fell, because we are richer than they were, made richer by the sacrifice they made. This richness consists in an obligation: it is sacrilege for us to speak as if this sacrifice had not been made, as if the world were still the same as it was before. The world that has seen this is no longer the old world. If the war in which our comrades fell is to have any meaning, then it means a change in the world. To fall in the brave belief that the world is turning – that is a death that is no longer meaningless. To know that one's own life and death are an expression of a world turning point lifts a person into the realm of greatness.

We must prove ourselves worthy of this new richness. This does not happen by praising and speaking, but only by letting the event itself speak through us, we must thoroughly renounce subjectivism, we must stop relying on our subjective opinion. Even a "good conscience" can do the wrong thing. Our time is so seductive in its diversity, many different voices speak within us: which one should we follow? Only realities can save us, we need

realities, only realities are the immovable guiding stars of our actions. I do not need to deal epistemologically with the concept of reality that I am using as a basis here. You will understand me when I say: a reality in the sense I mean here is the Great War. We do not have to give our "opinion" to this reality, we must first and foremost be silent before such a reality. All conjecture, all criticism, all bickering must remain silent when it comes to the question: what does this war mean for us? It is a special thing about historical realities: they are all the more difficult to see the closer you are to them, and like the peaks of the high mountains, you cannot see them from every temporal location.

It almost seems as if the time is now approaching when we can talk about war. The reflexes of the experience have been written down. But this war as a reality of our history is only now slowly entering our field of vision, and the word that corresponds to this reality is hesitantly coming off our lips. So it is not too late when we talk about the world war today, but rather too early. And if we can dare to do so at all, it is primarily because the time that has passed since its end is rich in political and historical experience. The years of the World War were years of an experience for which there is no equal; the years of "world peace", however, have been a time of experience for us Germans such as we have never had in history. If we look at these years not in terms of what we lost in them, but in terms of what we learned in them, then we must regard them as one of the most valuable epochs in our history. Our people experienced the world war naively. Only in the eleven years that have passed since has it become political, has it become aware of itself.

We have been able to experience this awakening, this political becoming of our people – perhaps it is the power of this experience that enables us today to talk about what the world war means for us and our people.

So we cannot speak subjectively about the real meaning of the great war. It is not a matter of a "meaning" that we can give to the event after the fact; anyone who thinks so lacks reverence for the dead. They did not die so that we, perhaps caught up in error, can now attribute a meaning to the event that it does not have. We may only speak of something real, not of something merely imagined. From the context of the dead, guided by them, we must seek to divine the true, the objective meaning of the world war, neither "theoretically", nor "aesthetically", nor "morally" may we speak of the world war when we seek its meaning, but only realistically-historically, what happened in those years?

This question does not coincide with the problem of the loss of the war. Even the outcome of the war is irrelevant to this question. This question would be just as gloomy and threatening if we had remained victorious, what would have happened at that point in time, which happens to be marked by the numbers up to n.

What was the meaning of this outburst of boundless rage against the people of Central Europe? What was the meaning of this war of annihilation against the "barbarians", which was waged against us by almost all the major states of the world? What was the meaning of the courage, the bravery without measure and the endurance without limits with which the German people withstood this onslaught?

The reality of the world war is only revealed to the historical gaze. This is the view of the great historians. But the pathos from which the historical gaze emerges has its origin in the heroic soul. Historiography is the continuation of the heroic song into the realm of prose, where the heroic sense is missing, history becomes a mere list of dates and small events, of psychological oddities and coincidences. In many places today, efforts are made to write history, to invent philosophies of history and to justify the

teaching of history by anxiously avoiding that from which history flows and on which all historical knowledge is based: heroic enthusiasm. This enthusiasm cannot be replaced by a "civic attitude". With the attitude of the repeatedly assured citizen, history can only be written as a "development", namely as a development towards this very citizen. But history is not a sum of developments, but a context of struggles.

History only gains its meaning through the heroic element; but the reverse is also true: the heroic only gains its support through its relationship to the historical world. When the conditions of life are highly rationalized, when people live in the sharp light of a monitoring consciousness, then the original heroic can no longer express itself as it could in earlier epochs of culture. In these ages dominated by consciousness, there is a need for a content on which the heroic sense can build itself up, from which it can nourish itself and with the help of which it can grow. Otherwise it is in danger of running wild, of becoming playful and purposeless, or of turning into a cult of the heroic without substance. The heroic sense only remains straight and healthy when it is bound to the realm of history and its tasks. For this sense is not an exceptional state of exalted souls, but the state of mind from which the most fruitful deeds and most admired achievements of our generation have emerged.

If we want to see reality in history, then we must also be able to see the reality that surrounds us historically, we must not judge it morally, we must not see individual people and their actions; instead, we must become aware of the powers that wrestle with each other. It might sometimes seem as if they are only persons and parties who are striving around. But behind these people and parties, insofar as they have power, there are always historical powers. I would like to briefly describe the forces that are essentially involved. Two systems of life, two cultures are at war

today. There are many names for them, I am deliberately not using one. Because I want you to see these systems of life from a different perspective than usual. I want you to forget all the buzzwords and take the contrast as seriously as possible. The best way to understand this contrast is not to turn to ideologies, but to say simply and realistically: it is the contrast between right and left, because these terms say nothing, they are good: they point to realities. Systems of life, forms of life are not made up, but represented in reality. In the following, I therefore contrast two historical realities, not two ideologies. The ideologies that belong to these realities are not unknown to you, but if I were to contrast two ideologies, then the conclusion of my speech would have to be: which of the two one chooses is a matter of worldview. I will not come to this liberal conclusion, because I am not talking about ideologies, but about ways of being, ways of feeling and acting, and my conclusion will not be: now choose! but my conclusion will be: reflect on who you are!

The two life systems overlap today. One is free from mixing, the other is not. Material culture is at the center of the first life system. The word "material" is not to be taken morally here! Here, too, gods are worshipped! There is the idol Mammon, there is the Moloch, -who devours the youth. Economy and society is the watchword. The state becomes an organization for the protection and promotion of good business. Security, namely security of the accustomed living conditions, of the accustomed pleasures, is the highest good. These pleasures also include the so-called "spiritual" ones: Literature and theater, science and art. What is essential is enjoyment of every kind. One misjudges this system if one makes a fundamental distinction between material and spiritual pleasures. It is quite possible for this system to appear spiritualized. There is also an attitude of enjoyment towards the spirit, an attitude that need not be devoid of grace. Indeed, in a certain sense one could call grace the dominant trait of this system. What is

meant here is not the simple, unneeded grace of the young man. Material culture, where it rises to perfection, where it has penetrated into the smallest things of daily life, is determined by woman. The man has only a secondary role within this culture. He can achieve representative types, but as soon as it comes to a decision, he subordinates himself to the superior culture, the more decisive taste and the stronger will of the woman. Within this system, the woman reaches her height as the seductress and dominator of the man; when in this system the woman paints herself, makes herself up, she does not do so out of any aesthetic tendencies, she not only helps nature a little, but it is symbolically meant by her: she wants to look like a mask, like an idol. She does not want to look like nature, but like something that has magical, prostrating power. Woman only fulfills her duty, says Baudelaire, when she strives to appear magical and supernatural; she should be astonishing and full of charm: as an idol she must adorn herself with gold so that she may be worshipped.

This system finds its purest expression in fashion, which is not a ridiculous invention and folly, but an expression of the essence of a certain culture that we cannot adopt. As long as our women's fashion is still dependent on Paris, we have not yet found our own way of life; anyone who considers such things to be "external" is ignorant of the laws of cultural life.

The emotional background of material culture is that of a dark, hopeless, never-to-be-satisfied sensual desire.

Here, man feels defenceless at the mercy of his impulses; he is selfish and lonely and openly expresses this to himself and in private. Graceful despair, desperate grace is the best case here; the worst case is despondent, greedy materialism. The union of skepticism and grace, enjoyment of life and melancholy – that is the soul of the urban state of life, the state of life that unfolds in the centers of urban sociability. In its perfection, it is found where

the most perfect city is, the city par excellence, the archetype of all cities. This city is called Paris, and the French are perhaps entitled to say that there is only one city. Urban culture will always look to Paris as its unrivaled model. People do not believe they can be city dwellers, "urban" in the deepest sense of the word – and independent of Paris. The representatives of the urban spirit usually openly admit that Paris must always remain our model, and that we can at best only achieve a somewhat lesser imitation of French culture, of Romanesque urbanity. Anyone who wants to get an idea of this urbanity through literature should read Heinrich Heine's Letters from Paris or Thomas Mann's "Parisian Account".

The opposite way of life is that of the man. The focus here is not on the economy and pleasure, but on the state and work. "Work" denotes the world of the man. It is characteristic that the work of the greatest warrior and the work of the simplest laborer can be named with the same word in German: the poet speaks of "grosser arbeit" at the beginning of the Song of the Nibelungs, and by this he means the sword deeds of the heroes. The world of material culture is a world of pleasure; the world of work is a world of action. The urban way of living is not essential to the life system of this deed, indeed it can become hostile to it, since it leads with a certain necessity to making life easier, safer and more comfortable. For the urban way of life, the walls of the city that enclose the houses mean something sacred. In this way of life, on the other hand, says that it is not the walls but the men who make up the fatherland. The symbolic realities of this world are not the house and the drawing room, but the men's assembly and the Zeldlager. I contrast them as the heroic with the urban.

A perfect material culture cannot be achieved within the heroic way of life. The heroic man is materially undemanding. I would like to demonstrate the contrast with a world-historical example.

The culture of the Achaeans who inhabited Mycenae and Tiryns was heroic. The Minoan culture on Crete, on the other hand, was urban.

It is impossible to imagine the advantages of these two ways of life combined: the Achaean chieftain, after destroying Knossos, can carry valuable and beautiful things to his castle. But he remains in his castle; he does not rebuild it into a Minoan palace. There is probably an enrichment of the Mycenaean lifestyle with urban elements, but not a "synthesis". Liner of the two styles must remain the leader. Strangely enough, there is always only the danger that the heroic lifestyle is weakened by the incorporation of urban elements – the reverse process is never observed. An urban culture always rests within itself. It can be destroyed, but it will never give itself up. On the other hand, we see again and again how heroic peoples lose themselves to urban cultures: we see the Greeks after their heroic youth and manhood melt away in the lusts of the Mediterranean Sea, we see the Barbary tribes of the north during the centuries of the migration of peoples perish in the same lusts like snow before the sun. And we see, once we have opened our eyes to this fate, our own millennial history as the same process of the softening of a heroic structure under the temptations of urban cultures and urban spirituality. German history is the history of the urbanization of a people that resists this urbanization at its core. It shows us the slow bowing of a heroic people under living conditions in which it can never reach the highest, in which it only slowly perishes, wasting its rich gifts in the wrong directions.

This judgment of German history may sound pessimistic. It is not, it is pessimistic when one says: the German has no national feeling, the German has no state consciousness, the German is apolitical. I consider all these assertions to be short-sighted; we Germans are by nature neither without national sentiment, nor

without state consciousness, nor apolitical. But our national feeling, our state consciousness is of such a height of tension, of such breadth and greatness, that no one form is easily enough for it. And it is not because we are without state consciousness, but only because our original state consciousness has been shackled by urban culture in the course of Western history, that we are today the poorest nation among the great peoples of the world. To see history as it is is not pessimism, but realism. Realism, however, demands that we move away from the euphemistic depictions, as if our history had been an ascending one up to the present day.

At the beginning of our history is the clash with a people that was itself heroic in its origins, but which ultimately fell to the fate of the city like all the peoples of the Mediterranean. The word urban is derived from urbs Rroma, the city that formed the center of the empire, the center of late antique civilization. The clash between Roman-urban civilization and Germanic-heroic power is not a unique event in our history: urbanity is constantly gaining control over us in new forms, and the original power is constantly finding new ways to break through. Research has long since shown us that the North had its own high, peasant-heroic culture. We are so far removed from our origins that even this research result cannot yet be accepted, because we are used to defining "culture" as the urban way of life par excellence. Urban values have become second nature to us, we can't even read our own history anymore!

I will only hint at the struggle between the urban and the heroic in our history. The first great epoch of our history, which is almost forgotten today, which is only taken as a preparatory period for a later one, while it should be our greatest pride, our only consolation, is the German imperial period from Otto the Great to the end of the Hohenstaufen dynasty. Time and again attempts have been made to deny the Germans a sense of statehood,

especially with regard to this heroic epoch of our nation. Time and again the emperors have been blamed for moving to Italy. There were probably historians who sensed a longing for urban culture in these moves across the Alps, and only recently has a famous book on Frederick II attempted to portray an urban Caesarism as the high point of German medieval history. But Frederick II was not a German by upbringing, not a northerner; he was Sicilian, he belonged to the Mediterranean. His mind aspired to the Orient as Caesar's had once done. The German emperors, on the other hand, who climbed over the Alps, did so as unconscious bearers of a Germanic idea of empire. They should have stayed at home, they say, and founded a smaller but solid empire in the north. This criticism completely misjudges the world-historical situation of those centuries. The empire of Otto the Great was the first political foundation of the north, the first indigenous Germanic empire. (Charlemagne's empire was not, it still had universal foundations). This first empire of the North could only prove its greatness through deeds. We have to understand the ever renewed departure to the south as a move and reach for the highest, as a chivalrous deed. The German emperors' concept of empire was not a static one; they did not think in terms of countries and borders, but a dynamic one, thinking in terms of deeds, conquests and forces. Nothing is more characteristic than the fact that the walls of a city to permanently enclose the emperor's court. The empire is not concentrated around an urbs, but it is where the seat of judgment of the German king is, where the kaiser and his army are.

This heroic empire collapses in the 13th Century. In every respect, the fate of Europe changed in the eighteenth century. At the Battle of Bouvines, Friedrich II defeated the Welsh with the help of the English and French. In the same decades, French culture made a triumphant entry into Germany: the Romanesque style, which was essentially Germanic, gave way to the Gothic

style, the German people began to live in the cities and to turn inwardly to urban culture. Everything that the German of today tends to be proud of, the urban culture of the late Middle Ages, already shows the features of our historical doom. Of course, how much manpower is still in these first cities! As long as the townsman defended his walls himself, he was great, what a truly heroic phenomenon is the German Hanseatic League, what a warlike image some Franconian and Swabian towns present at times. It is only natural: the original system, the race must prevail. But in the cities it is forced into a false affliction, and this compulsion must finally take its revenge in the course of centuries. The development of German urbanism up to the present day shows that the outer urban way of life is necessarily followed by inner urbanization.

The transition to actual urbanization took place in the 16th Century. Once again, the heroic spirit of the north becomes visible in the Landsknecht armies of the century, which are fed entirely by Germanic blood. The Landsknecht – that is the warrior man of the north in a time that has become urban: something splendid but rapidly passing, something hopeless, a contradiction in terms.

The German bourgeoisie is thrown back into powerlessness by the war, the devastating outcome of which is a consequence of our weakening through urbanization. The principality becomes the sole ruler. This principality, however, romanizes itself again in a process of centuries, it goes the same way that the bourgeoisie went before it and therefore comes to the same end. Let us think back to the time immediately before the war. The 8th Estate is still in power, it is still surrounded by military symbols, the King and the Grand Duke still wear the sword. True heroism is alive everywhere in the army. That is why this army is the object of dislike in urban Europe. Nowhere, however, it is shocking to see, is there still an

awareness of what this army means, that it represents a way of life, and with which ways of life it is not compatible. This heroism is the natural disposition of the people, it is simply there, it cannot be killed – although everything is done to kill it. The spirit of social advancement, the spirit of decoration, the spirit of outward appearance penetrates in many places. Germany before the war shows the image of an outwardly military, inwardly already completely urban life. A fatal error: people believed they could combine the life forms of the heroic spirit with the life forms of wealth.

The form of the Männerbund is inseparable from the heroic way of life. The lion with his loyal followers, the military leader with his band, for whom he is both role model and educator, form the learning of the heroic way of life. The German army was the last form of a heroic male alliance. It was opposed by two formally related but fundamentally different associations: the priestly men's association of the Church and the men's association of Freemasonry. This was Germany's task: to maintain the heroic men's league as a world-historical figure independent of these powers. Instead, the army was increasingly viewed from a civilian, purely "militaristic" point of view. Everywhere there was still that wonderful relationship that can only exist between a soldierly leader and a band of men who trust him. But this relationship was not the consciously cultivated basis of the system. The system would be tailored to dazzling performance, to decoration. It became ever colder, ever more matter-of-fact, ever more soulless. Despite the resistance put up by our people's natural disposition, social urbanism eventually triumphed over heroism.

August of the year 1914 came. No man will forget the day when his people became silent; no one who lived through it knows anything that can be compared to that moment. And then, after that moment of solemn silence, the army that the people trusted

set out. And then came the catastrophe of the Battle of Marne, for which the army was not to blame. Only then, after the catastrophe, did the most monstrous thing happen. Line leadership, which no longer overlooked anything, kept the army, kept the people in the position of not only the defender but also the aggressor for another four years. During these years, the German people grew enormously beyond their leaders. Without realizing it, without wanting to, these leaders had strayed from the deeper traditions of this people. But a power spoke from the people that was older than these centuries. The men's league reestablished itself everywhere with tremendous force. On a thousand fronts, the Führer and his followers fought the old Germanic battle.

What is militarism? Militarism is heroism with a guilty conscience. Germany was "militaristic" before the war because it was not heroic enough. It had an army that was slowly bourgeoisifying; but it had no idea of the task of denaturalizing its forms of life, its forms of work, of living, of administration, of education. The bourgeois world became master of Germany in the year 1918 because it had previously become master of its interior. Since then, there has only been one choice for Germany: complete integration into the victorious bourgeois Europe as a domestic of the lesser right – or withdrawal from the bourgeois system of life; in Germany, being "politically left-wing" means approving this victory, i.e. siding with urbanism.

For the left, the Great War as a war, as an event, is meaningless; as a success of the enemy's weapons, on the other hand, it makes sense because it means the victory of urbanism. Today, the great issue of the left is the destruction of the non-Urban classes and the urbanization of the working class. For the right, the war makes sense as an event. It still lives in the heroic world, it still knows what war and victory are. But they do not live in the heroic world

with certainty, clarity and determination. It does not yet know the magnitude of the decision that the world war has confronted us with. It is not a question of saving what can still be saved after this collapse, it is not a question of preserving, but of conquering our old way of life under new conditions – or of perishing in a way of life that is alien to us. By the "old way of life", however, I do not mean the way of life of the last century, nor that of the 18th or the 16th, but that which found expression in the first empire of the North, in the first great state of Europe, which is inherent in the depths of our being, and which must be created anew out of the world of modern labor.

The world war is not just another war in our history. It is the beginning of our end – or it leads to the third epoch of our history. The first epoch of our history is the pre-Roman, the Germanic. The second epoch is the Roman one. The world war marks the beginning of the post-Roman era of German history; we must free ourselves from the narrow view of history that is based only on centuries. When I say that the World War is either our end or the beginning of a new epoch, I do not mean that I am in doubt about one or the other. My either-or is a pedagogical one: it is intended to make people aware of the magnitude of the decision. What we have experienced and accomplished in this war is an unshakeable reality. This reality cannot be shaken and this reality must be matched by another reality: the same people who have endured this reality will create the other reality, the empire. Again and again our people have rebelled against the tendencies of Romanization. At the end of my speech, I would like to expressly recall these revolts, which you have all quietly thought about. One such revolt was the founding of the German Order of Knights and its activities in the East. The founding of Prussia was such a rebellion, the act of Luther was such a rebellion. The state of Frederick and the discovery of our ancestral Greekness was such a rebellion. The founding of the Reich by Bismarck is also such an

act. It restored much of what the past had broken. We have to honor Bismarck as the great restorer. But we would be mistaken if we also wanted to see him as a guide to our future. He created the ground on which we stand, but nowhere did he betray an awareness that Germany cannot exist without turning back to the sources of its power over the millennia.

The world war therefore takes us beyond the intellectual and political world of Bismarck. It reminds us of the heroic song of our race, it calls upon us to fight against urbanization, to heroize our lives through work. But he does not urge us to fight for bourgeois private property.

It is an essential feature of the image of the heroic form of life that it places the highest value on youth as the heroic age of man. Achilles and Siegfried are youths. The urban stinginess transfigures the skeptical, knowing age; the heroic form of life transfigures the youth who does not shy away from death. A people understands what connects us to the young men who perished at Langemarck and in so many other places. Another people understands the hope that we place in our young men today. Flax other people understands Hölderlin's hymn to the bound stream, which begins with the words:

"What do you dream in sleep, youth enwrapped,
and hemmed in by the cold banks, patient one!
And are you oblivious of your origin,
you son of the Ocean, friend of Titans?"

II

When the philosopher undertakes to talk about an event of reality, such as the war, and even about that immense event that we call the world war because it cuts the history of Europe (and not only Europe) in two, he can do so in two ways. He can speak as a metaphysician or he can speak as a philosopher of history. The metaphysics of the liege is about life and death. It deals with the valuation of life, with the question of what significance death has within human existence, and it can lead on to the distinction between two systems, one of which places life above all else, the other of which finds the culmination of life itself in the sacrifice of life. As a metaphysician, I want to speak of life in general, and as a philosopher of history, I want to speak of the life that lies immediately behind us. As one of the great events in our history, such as the migration of peoples, the founding of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, the Reformation, the religious war of the)7th century, the world war stands before our eyes today. Perhaps you are missing moral philosophy from the list of philosophical areas from which this event can be treated. Morality alone only makes sense insofar as it concerns the individual and his truthfulness. But the war as war is not an event in the life of individuals, but an event in the life of peoples.

There is an encounter between the individual and the liege, but this encounter does not fall within the moral realm. In the face of the death of the individual, in the face of the wound and the mutilation, the question arises: why? the question: must it be? And the same question arises in the face of the pain of those who stand at the graves of war. This "why", this "must it be" always arises in our hearts when we come up against the hard ground of human existence. The question hovers on our lips when nature destroys human life, when a destructive disease consumes human existence,

and it arises even where death appears according to the unalterable laws of natural human existence and separates us from what we loved, what was connected with our individual existence into a mysterious unity. Here the individual stands before an abyss, looking down into a dizzying depth. In the face of the real death of the individual, not only moral philosophy is silent, but also metaphysics and the philosophy of history; silence reigns before death. This silence lies over every grave: it is none other than over the grave of the "grave" of one who, under the favor of fate, was allowed to complete a seventy-year course of life. For in the face of the inexorable harshness of death, the duration of life is not decisive: it can be superficiality to think that the pain of a son of so many years over the death of a father of 70 is "less" than the pain of a father of 70 over the death of a son of so many years. In the outermost sphere of human existence, where it is about the whole, about that being and non-being which is set with us – in the face of eternity – distinctions such as "greater" or "lesser" have no place.

The historical philosopher cannot inquire into the absolute meaning of the lie, which the individual asks for in his quietest hours, but only into the meaning which the lie has for the historical community in which we live. It follows from the foregoing that we must answer this question.

We cannot give our word as individuals, but only as members of the historical community of destiny to which we belong and into whose existence the war has entered.

I am not talking about a meaning that we should put into the Great War, but about the meaning that this war has for us – regardless of whether we fulfill it or not. So I am not talking about "giving meaning to the meaningless", but about a meaningful question that is put to us. If the philosopher did not have the well-founded conviction that this monstrous event also carries a

meaning in itself, then he could not speak of this meaning here. For the philosopher is not the one who imposes a meaning on what is in itself meaningless, which it does not have but "should" have, i.e. who imposes subjective opinions on the facts, but the philosopher is the one who understands the meaningfulness of the real with amazement.

This is not the place to define the elusive concept of historical reality. But I have the opportunity to give you a direct understanding of the meaning of this concept. Today we commemorate the dead friends and comrades of Langemarck. In remembering them, the reality of the Great War looms before us with terrible clarity. Imagine if we were to say to the dead comrades: the war in which you fell was in itself without meaning; we want to try to give it meaning, wouldn't the word get stuck in our throats? They did not fall for us to attach our private opinions and our private good will to their deaths. They fell for a reality, and only if we feel bound to the same reality through them may we speak of them and their death. Germany was the name of the reality for which they fell. It was not the empirical Germany as it was, but the more real and truer Germany that lies in the depths of our history that they confirmed through their deaths. We must prove ourselves worthy of the real sacrifice they made for a reality. Their death and the reality for which they fell are one and the same: for in falling they testified to the reality of the Germany they saw.

One historical fact stands unconnected next to the other. Just as the Great War points back to the distant! centuries of our past, so it points forward into our future. From the graves of the past the question breathes: "... and you?" This "and you" has an indescribable power. It is the unbreakable link that binds us to the war, a link that is just as real as the self-evident fact that the fathers and mothers, brothers and sisters, kin and blood relatives of the

war's dead are still alive; we are not worthy of the history of our people, which includes this war, if we forget our dead. The philosophical "idealist" speaks of a responsibility of the free personality towards an "idea". The philosophical realist has a different concept of responsibility: he does not stand in unconditional freedom before a self-created idea, which he has to "realize" without there being an objective measure of how far he has come with this realization, but he feels bound by a reality with certain standards and requirements. The obligation we have towards our dead is a metaphysical, not a moral one. It is not for us to "give meaning" to their deaths, but for us to give meaning to our lives by remembering the supra-empirical meaning of their deaths.

The relationship of commitment and loyalty that we have to our dead can be disturbed in two ways. Through the rejection of the war in which they played, or through a false justification of this war. If we feel connected to our dead and to the reality that they sealed through their lives, then we become sensitive to every false tone, to every error, even the most well-meaning. we recognize that it is not possible to understand the war from the standpoint of a moralistic or an empiricist view of the world. The moralist and the empiricist must fail before the reality of war – regardless of whether they condemn or praise this reality. Death, war, heroism cannot be grasped by moral categories. A moral justification of heroism is just as impossible as a moral justification of the ultimate sacrifice, the sacrifice of life. During the war there was much talk of "duty", and this word was interpreted morally. It has rarely been considered that this word has another meaning: the meaning of unconditional obligation – not to a distant "idea", but to the reality that has produced and sustains us, the meaning of a supramoral, concrete obligation and attachment. The obligation towards the dead is of this kind. Our relationship to them can no longer be a moral one; it lies in a different sphere.

The inappropriateness of the moral justification to the reality of war explains a phenomenon that is perhaps not unfamiliar to you. Wherever heroism and war are morally justified, a fatal tone interferes, we hear something of falsity, not subjective, but objective falsity. People often mean well when they try to morally justify the hero's actions, but this does not do them justice. No man can induce another to sacrifice his life for moral reasons, whatever they may be. The "moral" reasons are always foreground reasons. In the moral tone there is a superficial, a "dashing" justification for heroic death that sends shivers down the spine. The war can only be understood as an event in the life of the people, and as an event in the life of the individual it can only be understood in terms of the community to which this individual belongs. This community, however, is not a moral, social one (which cannot demand the sacrifice of life), but a concrete one, a reality which, in the extreme case, demands real life, and may demand it because it has also brought forth this life. The error of the moralistic justification of the law therefore lies in the unobjectionable transition from the sphere of the individual and morality to the sphere of the community and history.

Hence the discomfort we feel at every moral justification of heroic death – but hence also the embarrassment attached to morally justified agitation against war. The mistake is formally the same: one passes unquestioningly from the sphere of moral principles valid for the individual into the sphere of the life of peoples and states, which is not subject to the known laws of civil law, but to the unknown laws of fate. There one justifies the giving of life morally, here one justifies the keeping of life at all costs morally. But morality is only concerned with actions within life, it cannot go beyond life, i.e. it cannot demand the sacrifice of life, but neither can it weigh up the whole of life and claim that it is immoral to risk one's life. where the whole of life is concerned, death is also concerned, and the concepts of morality no longer

reach into this sphere.

The rejection of war from the standpoint of morality is impossible, because morality can only make demands on the individual, but war is never the work of the individual. If one argues against war on moral grounds, one is confusing the spheres: one is transferring concepts that are valid in the life of the individual to the life of communities whose existence is not subject to the laws of morality, but to the laws of fate.

It is not only on the path of moralism, but also on the path of empiricism that the meaning of the lie cannot be discovered. The moralistic and empiricist errors are usually combined. If one thinks to justify the war by moral concepts, then one usually points to the empirical form of the community that leads the war, and thinks that the war is about the "preservation" of this community as it is. But a great war, in which a people uses its highest power, cannot be led to merely "maintain" an existing community. The very fact that it broke out meant the dawn of a new era, an increase in standards, an increase in the awareness of destiny, and thus an increase in the demands on the form of the community. The ideology of the war may still be disputed today with terms such as "preservation of the Reich" and "defense"; that was not what the young generation, who set out with enthusiasm, was concerned with; they did not fall for the empirical Germany, not for this laissez-faire Reich, but for an inwardly greater, freer, purer Germany, for that Reich which they carried within them and in which they believed despite all empiricist skeptics. They did not believe that any "national" ideology would do justice to the liege. National empiricism, which always sees only what exists and what once existed, misses the immense reality of the Liege, just as all empiricism misses the depths of our existence.

Empiricism also appears on the side of the opponents of war, playing the decisive role here alongside moralism. It is already

empiricism if, instead of viewing war under historical categories, instead of understanding it as an event, it is attributed to the characteristics, moods and decisions of individual persons. It is empiricism in the tendency to reduce world history to a collection of biographies of famous – or infamous – men. – The psychologization of historical events is one type of empiricism used by the opponents of war. The realistic depiction of individual war scenes is the other. The side of the demonic and horrific is emphasized alone, with the heroic side ignored, but that is not enough: the horrific is viewed with a coldly observant gaze, it is photographed, and it is only through this empiricist treatment that it receives the horrific rigidity that makes this kind of picture so appalling. It is impossible -that a dead person, -who is photographed, offers a pleasing sight, if one could photograph the dead of Marathon, there would be no "beautiful" picture. From this it does not follow, however, that the fight at Marathon was a "crime", but that history cannot be photographed. Anti-historical empiricism reaches its climax by creating the impression that it can photograph history. But historical greatness eludes the camera. The camera is a typically empiricist organ. Not the lens, only the human being can give an idea of what history is. Wars belong in history; if you take them out of history, they have no meaning. Nothing is easier and cheaper than to prove that a war has no meaning: it is enough that one has no sense of history oneself.

With this I have indicated that the metaphysical consideration of history necessarily leads over into the philosophy of history. Philosophy of history can only be pursued concretely from a certain historical place, for the philosophy of history is not more general than the science of history, but it is more concrete than the latter. The science of history will one day establish that the Great War represents a turning point in the history of the West, and not only of the West. It will perhaps establish more precisely

that it represents the end of that epoch which we call the bourgeois epoch according to its dominant type. But these observations are not concrete enough for the philosopher of history. Philosophy of history is only possible from a certain point in history itself, and for us this point is Germany. I can therefore only speak truly philosophically about the meaning of the Great War within German history, and only from this point can you follow me. This does not exclude the consideration of a wider sphere, but only from Germany can we overlook this sphere. The immense event of this war opens up views to us that have not been seen for many centuries. Any relativization of the war to any historical event, any comparison with a war of the last centuries distracts us from its meaning. This mighty war must lead us to a height of transcendence.

Anyone who thinks that life and history can go on afterwards as if nothing had happened, anyone who thinks that we can still view German history today in the same way as it was viewed before this war, is not gripped by the immense reality of this event. The time when we can talk about it is only approaching when something monstrous happens before our eyes, then we freeze, then there is a moment of silence before the noise and movement that tend to follow a catastrophe arise. This silence now lasts into the twelfth year. As a fact of our history, the Great War is now slowly entering our spiritual circle of vision.

Today we celebrate a historic day of remembrance: the day of the establishment of the German Reich. For two generations, this empire built by Bismarck was regarded as the finally conquered political form of the German people. Proof of the greatness of this achievement can rightly be seen in the fact that the building has largely withstood the storms of the last)5 years. However, nothing else illustrates the historical significance of the Great War more clearly than the fact that that empire has been moved a long way

away from us as a result of the war. We can no longer see in Bismarck's empire, whose foundations have lasted to the present day, the form that corresponds to the nature of the German people. It is not the external collapse of this empire, not its defeat, that is decisive. What is decisive is rather the inner content and the spiritual and political form of this empire itself. I cannot describe in detail here the bourgeois character of Bismarck's empire, which hid behind military forms and emptied these forms. But I can indicate what I mean by a symbolic contrast. The statesman who founded this empire had enough to do, once it was established, to keep it in existence. He never thought that it would not be able to exist if it were not filled with its own content, if it were not supported by a people, which is completely certain of itself and of the historical position in which it stands. He was content with tradition. Uncertainty was -the inner character of this empire, which emerged so securely on the outside. No other nation in the 19th Century experienced something that corresponds to the deep contrast between the two representative Germans of the century, the contrast between Bismarck and Nietzsche. The German bourgeoisie passed Nietzsche by, and also adhered to Bismarck in intellectual matters. Nietzsche sensed this: his vehement protest against the Germany of his time stemmed from his realization of the danger that lay therein: here was the "Reich" and there was the "spirit", here stood Bismarck and there stood Nietzsche. It was not possible for them to come together, it was not possible for Nietzsche to become the educator of the youth who would one day rule the state of their people. This is based on a world-historical, not an accidental contrast between two men. Something cannot be right when the greatest political and the greatest philosophical genius of a people live side by side, alien to each other, even mutually exclusive. And -that something was "not right" must have been felt by anyone who grew up as an intellectual in the Germany of the conflict between Bismarck and

Nietzsche.

At the time of his friendship with Wagner, immediately after the victory of 1870/71, Nietzsche and Wagner dreamed of an imminent rebirth of the German spirit. They believed in a regeneration from within; the work of art of Bayreuth, the Wagnerian music drama, was to be the foundation stone of the new epoch.

What a difference between our hopes and those hopes of regeneration in Bayreuth! The reality on which they built back then was a work of art; the reality on which we are building is the indescribable deed of our people in the world war. This deed was more than a "military" achievement. It was an act of the whole nation, an act that opened up the enormous possibilities that lie within us. The same power that here had to take the tragic path of destruction can also take the path of reconstruction. Only since the war have we known what we are. Our last great event before him was the Reformation. Since the Reformation, Germany has not had another moment in world history that could be compared with it. It was a mistake to believe that the day we are commemorating today, January 1st, was an event of intrinsic greatness. January, was an event of the intrinsic greatness of the Reformation. It was an important day, and we truly have reason to commemorate it; but it was not a day that contained within it a yardstick for the future, it was merely a day that presented us with the most difficult problem of our existence. We have not solved this problem, we have not even understood it – the world war showed us that. But it also showed us a new standard of greatness, a standard that we can no longer forget if we do not want to deny our dead the reverence they deserve.

What did they fall for? They did not fall for a dynasty, but neither did they fall for a unified economic body, for maximum exports, or for increased prosperity. They fell for the empire,

which fell in the tenth century, which was refounded from within by Luther in the 16th century, and which the 19th century saw Nietzsche standing before the inner eye.

Talking about the meaning of the world war means talking about the past and the future. Because the past and the future belong together: a nation that denies its past has no future. Line Future cannot be delivered today. Without standards of greatness, nothing great can become; but the standards of greatness lie in history. The fact that the World War directs our gaze not back to the decades, but to the centuries, has a tremendous meaning, and that is why we may call it the Great War. It gives us back standards that already seemed lost, standards that reach beyond the present and alone guarantee that we can grow into a greater and freer future.

The Great War takes us back to the sources of our history. The last source is our people. The word "people" is used so often today, and so often without any sense of the mystery it conceals. The people is not something that appears every day; it only becomes truly tangible in the great moments of its history. The people are there, says Lagarde, where they are sought without reflection in days of need. Today the people are allowed to speak too quickly, but the people speak slowly. Lagarde: "When it comes to individual laws and individual administrative measures, the people remain completely silent, even if they are approached man by man and receive answers man by man. The people as a whole think only about the whole." – The people are a living whole. Life slips away from any attempt at numerical recording. A people sustains itself through birth and upbringing. We call the total number of births of a people during a certain period of time its youth. This youth has to grow into the history of its people through education. Growing into the history of its people does not mean necessarily approving of the existing state of things, but rather learning to

understand the standards that a people has developed in the course of its history as an expression of its nature. Youth is in need of education, but it is not a dead object of educational influences. The youth is the most living part of the people, if it is the essence of the living to have instinct, then the youth is defined by instinct. Line instinctless youth would be a youth without life, how dreadful was the lonely life of that man who cried out for youth, who devoted his entire philosophical work to the essence of instinct, and to whom no one came because his people lacked youth. Nietzsche's "Untimely Reflections" are addressed to a youth that entered history an age and a half later.

I know very well that it is not without danger to speak to the youth of their instinct. Do not believe that instinct can replace work and knowledge. It is not possible without work and knowledge, it is not possible without hard work to achieve the one individual. Age has a necessary place in the field of work, knowledge and experience.

People today sometimes act as if instinct must be identical with formlessness.

But it would be a state of decay and degeneration if instinct did not find its way to form. Instinct and form are dependent on each other: formless instinct is dangerous and can become destructive, instinctless form is empty and therefore without value, if the instinct for greatness is there, then the task of giving this instinct the form that is worthy of it is also there.

The Academic Fraternity

Lecture, held under the title "The renewal of the student house" at the conference of representatives of the Hochschulring Deutscher Art. Boitzenburg Castle, 17th October, 1930.

On the day on which the German Reichstag was dissolved, on this memorable day in our history, I happened to come to the Dresdner Studentenhaus after the lecture at s o'clock in the evening. There was hardly any room in the dining room, some of the tables were occupied by students playing cards, but the rest of the place was filled with the cheerful merriment of a public restaurant: people were eating and drinking, laughing – nowhere did I see a serious face or notice a serious conversation.

Line hour later, on my way home, I passed the house of a Dresden corps. The tones of one of the most exuberant Kneiplieder, as they are sung in the fidulitas, penetrated my ear sharply and clearly. It was 9 o'clock in the evening, and no one will blame me for saying to my companions with bitterness: "So this is what the German student looks like on the day that has brought us the most important political event since the signing of the Treaty of Versailles.

It is not in the nature and character of German youth that I seek the reason for the humiliating experience I have just described. I mistrust all those who vilify the youth today because they no longer follow their slogans. In the very hour in which we are gathered here, one of the most eloquent defenders of existing conditions, Mr. Thomas Mann, is speaking words in Berlin against the youth who voted on September 4th, vituperative words against instinct and against enthusiasm. No, I did not doubt the German youth when I went home that evening, nor did I doubt the German student body. But I found the experience symbolic of

the situation in which the German student body today. This youth, this student body, lacks a form in which it can exist, live and work; it lacks a way of life, a way of existence of its own kind. German youth lives in exile. It is scattered everywhere, it appears here and there, but never in a way that corresponds to its importance and power. Therein lies a danger: it could happen that the countless individuals, groups and little groups languish in the desert, that in time they become a victim of those powers against which they have now rebelled with splendid vigor, and which have actually only now become aware of the danger threatening them. In the same year in which the liquidation committee of the ruling bourgeoisie signed its death warrant, the Young Plan, the German youth is faced with the task of organizing itself. The two events belong together. The year 1930 has spoken the German youth, which grew up in the post-war period, mature. The German youth leaves the house of its fathers – it founds its own house.

I want to talk about this house this evening. And I am talking about this house in the form it will take on the floor of the university. That is not the only form this house will take. I could just as easily talk about the form this house will take on the ground of the German Gymnastics Association, for example. As different as the circle of people is that is involved here and there, as different as the house of students will be from the house of gymnasts – the form of life that finds expression in both is the same; the individual tasks are different, the great task is the same: the reconstruction of the German men's association from the German youth.

Is the German youth supposed to lack the federal way of life? But isn't it bundled in all corners, isn't it the "Bund idea", of which one has spoken so much that today one is no longer even allowed to speak of it? The canine idea! How significant that the Bund was immediately transformed into a real covenant, which,

even if it does not fulfill "all desires", is still much better than a mere thought – even if it is a covenantal thought! What a German fate it is that allows us to transform everything into a thought – even the state, this greatest of all realities, is ultimately replaced in Germany by the idea of the state. A state is not created by mere thoughts, nor by mere sentiments; it is a product of forces, and the force that actually constitutes it is that which emerges in a league of free men.

It is not said that in a state that is not allowed to have an army, the men's union must cease. The union of free men can take various forms: we are on the way to discovering new forms. We commemorate those men who have already sought such paths. How important Friedrich Ludwig Jahn is to us today, how much we love the founders of the Urburschenschaft, how much more important they are to us than the humanist educators of the caliber of the cautious and intelligent Humboldt. How dear to us is the memory of the early days of the youth movement and the memory of the Freikorps. All these men organized forces; they not only deliberated but acted, how inconspicuous is Jahn's exodus to the Maidenhead, and yet it was the founding of an empire. How inconspicuous was the windbreaker of the youth movement – and yet it was the visible, living protest against the umbrella, against the bourgeois need for secularism. Jahn's movement and the Urburschenschaft were suppressed by the police, the youth movement died of sentimental individualism. It did not find the way from the Bund to the state, but that means that it never produced a true Bund. There is a union only in relation to the state; the union is nothing without a political idea.

Why do we have today a chaos of empty or sentimental small associations instead of a large German men's association filled with self-confidence, strength and enthusiasm?

Desire and will are alive, as is proven by the myriad of small

associations; the powder keg is there, the spark is missing. Let us try to recognize: why do we not have a German men's house, why do we have gymnastics clubs but no German gymnastics ground, why do we have student houses and corporations but no academic men's house?

The male union of early times, from which the original state emerges, an entity of immense power and strength, unfolds against a world of enemies. Without overcoming enemies, without victory over chaos, there is no state. In the last few centuries, when the founding of a "confederation" was approached, it was all too easy to imagine. It was thought that uniting the "well-meaning" was enough. But under the keyword "association of the well-meaning", things are possible that have nothing to do with what we want, that have nothing to do with the state, indeed work against it, as a widespread association with a secret character proves. The true alliance is not a moral association for any purpose, but a reality that presupposes a specific, real, historical opponent. "Every great activity," Ranke once said, "grows out of sympathy with the general opposites that always divide the world; it unfolds in the midst of the struggle between the prevailing powers." A German men's alliance, which has greatness, can only arise in the lamp against a "predominant power" that is opposed to it. It will always be the product of a world need. This "prevailing power" is not a mass of chronically ill-intentioned or malicious people. It is too easy to shift the boundary line to the "moral" sphere: the seriousness of the struggle disappears. No historical power is evil. World history is not the battle of the good and evil principles, but the scene of the struggle of relatively legitimate powers against each other. Man does not lose his insecurity and fear by considering himself absolutely good, by thinking that he is fighting on the side of the good, but by knowing where he belongs, that he knows in which association he is destined to fight.

If the hour has struck today – and it is my firm conviction that it has struck – the hour in which the German Männerbund recreates itself from the depths of our being and essence, then in this hour the opponent will also have to stand clearly before us, whom the Männerbund must overcome before it can be, in whose defeat it is actually constituted. This opponent is the bourgeois way of life. At the moment when we Germans have recognized that to become bourgeois, that to become "urban" means to fall away from our law of life, at that moment the German Männerbund is also reborn.

The struggle against bourgeois society and the foundation of the covenant are the same in our case. Previous attempts have failed because they were undertaken on the ground of the bourgeois way of life. On urban soil, the men's alliances must melt away like snow on red-hot stones. It's no use writing heroic wishful thinking and not knowing what to do tomorrow. It all comes down to actions. The men and the virtues needed to create the covenant are there. But the enemy has a whole system of institutions, an arsenal of temptations at his disposal. From this he is constantly gaining strength, and so his way of life is confirmed again and again by those who contradict it in essence.

The contradiction must now be organized. Not the individual can contradict, only a system of life successfully contradicts a system of life, only one way of being can cancel out another way of being. The opponent is happy to listen to heroic declamations in an emergency. He only becomes restless when the traditional way of being, which is only apparently something external, is called into question by "small, deviant actions" (Nietzsche). For at this moment it is no longer concept against concept, ideology against ideology, but reality against reality, one educational system against another educational system. The decisive factor in a covenant is that it carries its members, – that it holds, educates

and forms them, whoever belongs to a covenant joins not only a system of opinion and attitude, but a system of life. The difficulty today consists in joining such a system of life, while at the same time another, opposite to it, is in full force. How tremendous is the difficulty when the power of this opposing system is so great that it is no longer felt at all, that its recognition seems to be a matter of course! Up to now, when people have called for an alliance, it has been in the sense that there is nothing, everything is chaotic, we must create something. That is a fatal mistake! There is something there, something very powerful, a system of life to which we are addicted; we will only create something if we recognize and fight what is there.

I call what is there the life and education system of society. Many ideas today claim to educate man; in truth, however, he is educated by society. Society today is so powerful that it subjugates even those institutions that are not originally social in nature, such as the family and the state. Today there is neither family education nor state education, but only education by society. I am using the word society here without defining it more precisely. By society I mean the state of life that culminates in the urban "good society" that sets the tone. The ideal of society is the educated and propertied private individual.

Let's look at the path of a young German today, a young man with a heroic disposition, through the state of society. The family is no longer an educational power. The true educator is the bourgeois position. Bourgeois society has dissolved the old estates into social classes. But a social stratum no longer possesses true educational power. The same educational power reigns through all social classes: the power of society. In place of the old estates, the educational meme has been replaced by social uniformity, which is expressed in the value placed on money and education. The goal is the same for everyone: earn a lot, be well-dressed and

have a say.

On the basis of the social condition, the family is now only a moral union between free persons. It is not seen in terms of race, the national community, nature or history. The relationships between all family members are interpreted in terms of social morality; the relationship between husband and wife, lords and ladies, siblings and relatives is not seen as an objective and moral one, but as a subjective and moral one. This deprives the family and clan of their weight, they lose their power and thus their educational influence. Insofar as they still have any influence at all, they use it in the service of society: a good childhood prepares for an effortless career in the "good" society. The state, with its greatness and its demands, lies outside the sphere of vision of this family that has fallen prey to the spirit of society. In the Frederician state, the state determined society, the king as commander of the army was also the highest educator, and this educational power penetrated even into the aristocratic family. Today, society determines the state, and the family also becomes part of society. Finally, even family life in the narrower sense, the division of rooms, etc., is sacrificed to social considerations.

The young man who grows up today does not receive an education from the family in the sense of the state; on the contrary, this is where he experiences the first determining influences in the sense of society. If he is destined to be a man, he initially grows up isolated and alienated in his environment. He misses something without being able to name it. As long as he is a boy, he is still building his own world. Encapsulated in Indian stories and war adventures, he lives his life. But then comes the moment when he comes into contact with the big world, when he opens himself up to the society he has only from the outside, next to whom he has lived until now, suddenly confronts him directly. He enters the salon filled with buzzing conversations. Women,

younger and older, take notice of him, and now and again a man may even pay him some attention for a short while; personal relationships and psychological dexterity are decisive in this setting. At this critical moment, the young men separate into two groups: some realize more quickly or more slowly what is required here: they dress properly, they use the right terms, they praise the right books, they flatter the right men and approach the right women. They know how to get invitations, they know which world view to wear in the buttonhole in this or that salon, they have understood the role of women in society, there is no longer any obstacle to their career.

There is a novel in which the path of such a young man through society is described with mastery. It is a classic French novel: Flaubert's "l'education sentimentale". Another example is the novel by Maupassant entitled "Bel Ami". These novels show how women determine the fate of young men entering society. They have grown up on a soil that does not recognize the covenant form of life. Here, the heroically inclined young man turns away from society; he looks for friends of the same age and older friends, he looks for comrades and leaders, masters and role models, he looks for the covenant, what will a young man experience who is thrust out into the social world with such a constitution of heart? He will become insecure, he will wear himself out in a vain lamp, he will search fruitlessly, build aimlessly, and finally degenerate, either by sinking below society or by rising within it.

The position of the young man who carries a heroic heart in his breast is the most terrible there is today. He must become a seeker of happiness, after property, education and the beautiful. He must strive for women, or he must remain lonely, resign himself or consume himself in futile attempts. He lacks the covenant form of life without which he cannot thrive. All forms of life based on the relationship between man and man die under

the breath of the social spirit. For society has the ideology of "humanity", it knows only "people", not man and woman; in society only people move, here there is no difference between man and woman, between youth and age. A dance hall in which the sexes and ages mingle is the image of a unifying society. Today there are a thousand places where men and women can meet: in addition to the salon and dance hall, there is the coffee house, the tennis court, the theater, the concert hall, the lecture hall, and so on. But there is not one place where men stand next to men, where men come together, the young with the young, or the young with the older for no other purpose than because that is the way it has to be. Only at board meetings and other serious matters, such as the founding and liquidation of companies, are men together. But then they are not men, but "exponents of the economy" or something similar. Everywhere else the relationship between man and man is atrophying, how loose is the relationship between pupil and teacher, how incredibly loose and superficial especially that between university student and university teacher. Where does the relationship between master and journeyman still flourish? What flourishes is the relationship between colleagues and business associates, which falls completely into the sphere of the social. How stunted is the relationship of friendship today! There are certainly individual friendships, but friendship as a life relationship is not able to flourish, it is doomed to die out on the ground of society. Because friendship is something other than a personal love affair. Friendship as a way of life can only flourish in relation to the covenant and the state. There is no friendship without a fatherland, but there is also no fatherland without friendship, because the connecting link to the state. Without the state, which is the covenant, there is no education for the state and by the state. No term is more treacherous than the term "civic education"! It unconsciously expresses the truth: it is an education for bourgeois society, which today identifies itself with the state.

Talk to a Greek about civic education! Man stands next to man, pillar next to pillar: this is the battle line, this is the temple, this is the sanctuary, this is the state.

The modern world is a world without friendship. Properly understood, this is an exhaustive characterization of this world. Let us follow the path of our young man further: what does the other man appear to him as? As a means to an end, as a business friend, as a colleague – in other words, as something indifferent, or as a rival in the competition for a woman. This contest has the peculiarity that both always lose, for the victor loses as well as the vanquished – fine time. Weak natures are completely pushed out of the world of male relationships by eroticism. They disappear from the scene after they get married, or they perish in erotic relationships. The erotic relationship takes the place of the friendship relationship. That seems little, it looks like a mere difference between two psychological types – but it means much more. For the relationship of friendship has a relationship to the state, the erotic relationship does not. In his speech on the German Republic, Thomas Mann defined democracy as an erotic affair. It can indeed only survive where woman and the relationship to the pasture predominate, never where friendship prevails, because the German is essentially of a warlike nature, because he is a man, because he is born for friendship, therefore democracy, which in its ultimate consequence leads to women being allowed to judge men, can never flourish in Germany. (I remember Mrs. Lüders, former democratic member of the Reichstag, who voted against the amnesty of the so-called Feme prisoners). It is, of course, possible that democracy will nevertheless prevail. Although it cannot fully assert itself, it retains enough power to prevent any attempts to develop the male alliance. This was the situation in Germany until the year 1930.

If you want to study the feminization associated with

democratic society, then study the ideology and practice of the Social Democratic Party in Germany. It is no coincidence that this party is also a propaganda office for the spread of erotic relationships: it supports camps for adolescent youth in which boys and girls are mixed up, it has founded a workers' sports club that is supposed to replace the German Gymnastics Association, and which generally only shows men and women mixed together at large events. This party has realized that a gathering of men without women is dangerous. It has not yet realized how ridiculous it is when it nevertheless occasionally tries to gather its "men" – it has yet to discover the ridiculousness of the Reichsbanner. Observe the advance of women in the democratic republic, and you will know what the mere fact of the men's league means. It is no coincidence, for example, that the same "social" democratic party seeks political and intellectual affiliation with France: in France there is a men's league and no desire for it. French culture has the security, the beauty and the sceptical weariness of an ancient state of civilization in which women dominate. In France, the army could never represent the people and the state as an educational confederation as it does here. The Frenchman is a born civilian, as a racer and admirer of the French people who belongs to the German left recently wittily pointed out. (Sieburg, "God in France".) The word civilization is the highest word there. Our highest word, on the other hand, is the state. The state presupposes the family and the clan, the woman as mother, but it is a matter and the work of man. The talk of "understanding" is only foolish and poisonous because it is also based on the intention of depriving us of our own male identity. We are weaning ourselves off the state-centred way of life, making us insecure and weak through urbanization.

We left our young man at the moment when he was faced with the choice of sinking into philistinism or eroticism. He is looking for a way to the state, but he is enchanted, untraceable. What

untold efforts have individuals made in recent years for the state, why has it all been in vain? There has been a lack of a lasting form that would have stored up and passed on this work. Lectures and conferences can never replace the House and the Federation. That laborious work, for example, has not been able to prevent the German student body and wide circles of German youth from still being in danger of meaning economy when they say state. For this is the culmination of the education that society gives young men: that it makes them worshippers of the "economy", of material prosperity. Society tends towards prosperity, the young man who has become a slave to society wants to live well. The soldier lives unpretentiously with his friends, the lover needs money. Society first awakens the need for material culture and then holds those in whom it has awakened to their desires. For these desires can only be satisfied by money; money, however, is managed by society.

So the young man has become a pacifist without realizing it. For society has a need for security, it wants business to be conducted calmly and safely. The state is only there to ensure income and money transactions. Everyone earns as much as they can, that is the motto.

Society's need for secularity is then the final consequence of its esteem for the wise and possessive old age. Society gladly accepts young people when they come in tuxedos and join in its parties, i.e. when they fit in, but it is suspicious of youth as such. It senses enthusiasm and lofty goals in them, and that means rebellion and upheaval. That is why it is part of the ideology of the democratic society, calling young people "inexperienced" and "stupid", advising them to be clever and patronizingly showing them the way to earn money.

The moralistic-humanistic world view with which bourgeois society justifies itself must be replaced by a new one. The new philosophy of man is not based on the abstraction of

"personality", but on the concrete human being who belongs to a particular race, a particular ethnicity and a historical condition; who is not a "citizen" per se, but a man or a woman, a virgin or a mother, a youth or a man. Marriage is not a union between two abstract "personalities", but between a man and a woman of a particular people. The family is not a socio-moral fact, but a part of the clan and with it a part of the people, as far as these things are concerned, I refer to Darre's book on peasantry.

"Society" has been replaced by the people. The people live, feel and think in an unhumanistic and "social" way. It does not mix up the sexes and ages, but separates boys and girls, men and women. It lives, where it is still alive, in objective and moral forms. How alien the soldier and the soldierly man stand in society! He does not understand it and it does not understand him, but how well the soldier fits in with the people. Every great soldier was still popular, how popular our old army was and still is today!

The family is not the "rhyme cell" of the state. The state emerges from a principle that is originally opposed to that of the family. The nation grows organically; the state, however, does not arise organically, but is created artificially through the deeds and the union of free men. Only where this union takes place are the family and the nation healthy. If the developing man does not find the place he needs to unfold, if he has only the choice of becoming a sober businessman, a womanizer or a pimped-up family man, this will be the ruin of the whole.

I have indicated the premises; now I draw the conclusions for the particular case and the particular situation.

Two houses stand opposite each other in German university towns today. The Korporationshaus and the Studentenhaus. I don't need to say anything about the student house: today it presents itself completely as a creation of society, of economic

thinking, of "social" attitudes. Everything that could be reminiscent of a men's house has been carefully avoided here; we have before us a welfare institution, a "state-affirming" institution in the sense of affirming the subsidies that the state gives. That is one side; let us not overlook the other side: the student house does give something to those who cannot join a corporation for internal or external reasons. It is little, but it meets a real need to some extent.

On the other side stands the House of Corporations, some say: that is the house you were talking about. But I must answer: Your house may well have emerged from the German youth's longing for the Männerbund and still has its firm foundation in this longing today – but it is not the house I was talking about. For in the course of its history, the corporate house has deviated more and more from the idea of the Männerbund. In many places it has completely, and in some places almost completely, succumbed to the spirit of bourgeois society. I don't need to describe this to you: you yourself know how unsoldierly, how social the education in the house is, you know the role played by social dress and attitudes, the role played by connections, joining in, dancing. The "Bund" is not a real Bund, but a place of preparation for society. And finally, you also know in which manifestation the connection between the corporation and bourgeois society is most obvious: in the Altherrenschaft. There may still be a covenant here and there in which the youth asserts itself vis-à-vis the old men – in many cases, the Federation is steered away from bourgeois society by means of financial dependence on the old guard. This year's decision by the Lösener S. L. to remain politically neutral will remain a symbol of this shameful fact.

So it is impossible for me to say that the academic men's house is there. The Korporationshaus, as it still stands today, and the Studentenhaus, as it was built in recent years, relate to each other

like the old Bismarckian Empire and the Republic of Weimar. Certainly, the bourgeois spirit of Bismarck's empire was different from today's, but it was already a social spirit, don't tell me the war: we have led it from a substance that still lay deep beneath the foundation of Bismarck's empire. In Weimar, only Bismarck's opposition created its own constitution and constituted itself as a government. Only when this opposition has left will the Bismarck empire be completely dead and there will be room for the new empire. And that means for our question: only by dissolving the Korporationshaus and the Studentenhaus, as they are today, will the academic men's house come into being.

The Origins and Structure of German Physical Education

I

Lecture, held under the title "Philosophy and Physical Exercise" to the working group of gymnastics and sports teachers in Saxony. Dresden, 30th May 1930.

According to an old saying, astonishment is the beginning of philosophy. I assume that the topic of my lecture "Philosophy and Physical Exercise" has already aroused astonishment in many of you – and thus the prerequisite for a philosophical treatment of the topic would be given. After the amazement comes the question of why. Why do we connect the concepts of philosophy and physical exercise and why are we amazed at this connection? The first question: why do we connect the concepts of philosophy and physical exercise? concerns the subject matter, the second question: why is this connection not something we take for granted, concerns the mental situation from which we approach the answer to this question. It is necessary that we first come to an understanding of the intellectual situation from which the subject was born before we begin to deal with it.

None of the men who have written about physical exercise in the last 150 years (since Guts-Muth's epoch-making "Gymnastics for the Youth") has failed to recognize the relationship between the theory of physical exercise and the sciences. Over the course of time, the theory of physical exercise was systematically based on the science of the human body: first on anatomy and physiology, then on medicine, biology and hygiene. Finally, the attempt was made to relate it to the science of the soul, to psychology. No one will deny the value of the connection between the theory of

physical exercise and the specialty of psychology.

Sciences that act in front of people. The question is not whether this long-standing and fruitful connection has meaning and justification, but whether these specialized sciences can dispute the (entire) theory of physical exercise, whether they are capable of comprehending and justifying physical exercise in the full breadth and depth of its reality. Our answer to this is no. The aforementioned special sciences only lay out sections of the human organism; it is beyond their duties and possibilities to answer the question of the whole human being and the meaning of his activities. But it is the whole person who is at the center of physical exercise. The question of the meaning and nature of physical exercise can therefore not be answered by referring to the specialized sciences, which include psychology. It leads us into a layer of problems and methods that is fundamentally different from the layer in which we find answers to questions such as: how does our body function? what can we do to support and promote its growth and functions?

Today, attempts are being made from three sides to penetrate the layer of problems that cannot be solved with the means of the specialized sciences: From a metaphysics of life, from an aesthetic point of view and from the standpoint of morality. Line Metaphysics of Life is the basis of Ludwig Klages' attempt to interpret the body and its activities with the help of the concepts of polarity and rhythm. This attempt, undertaken with a strong philosophical sense, has already had a considerable influence on the theory and practice of physical exercise through Klage's student Bode. Admittedly, its area of influence is limited; it is restricted to gymnastics in the narrower sense. This is no coincidence: Klages' metaphysics of life is also limited to a specific field. It only knows the individual and his experiences, the states of tension and release, intoxication and fatigue, but has no relation

to the community. It is a metaphysics of individual life. This corresponds to the strongly individualistic character of rhythmic gymnastics. It is an individualism that is related to aestheticism. Perfect self-expression is the goal of rhythmic gymnastics. The moving body becomes a complete expression: we have already entered the aesthetic realm.

Physical exercise can and must also be viewed from an aesthetic perspective. In the past, this was done by relating the body and its movements to an absolute ideal of "beauty". Today, when we look at the body aesthetically, we look at its overall expressive power. Can the aesthetic point of view now be regarded as fundamental? No! If one looks at physical exercise from the point of view of expression, then one also sees it from the point of view of the individual ("I express myself"), and from that point of view one cannot do justice to the moment of community. The aesthetic point of view cannot therefore serve as a philosophical justification for physical exercise. The reference to a collectively represented expressive movement, e.g. by a dance group, makes this completely clear, because the collective representation does not correspond to a real community.

The fact that the aesthetic point of view cannot be essential for the consideration of physical exercises also results from the fact that the highest form of aesthetic representation through the body is dance. However, dance and physical exercise are already different in their origin. In its origin, dance is of a cultic, religious character, whereas physical exercise is of a profane, state character. In dance, the individual presents himself as such or as a member of a group; in the latter, the individual does something as such or as a member of a group, solves a certain task alone or in a group. Dance is always an aesthetic representation, physical exercise is a piece of real community life. – Of course, I am talking here about artistic dance and not the almost extinct folk dance, which is

primarily not a representation, but rather an expression of communal life, and therefore nothing should be viewed purely aesthetically. Folk dance stands independently between physical exercise and aesthetic artistic dance.

Whether we start from a metaphysics of life or from the beauty and expressiveness of the body – in both cases the body as such is affirmed, its independent value recognized. The situation is different when we turn to the moral-philosophical treatment of our problem. Here we are immediately concerned with the question of whether the body and its activity may be recognized as a sphere of value. Moral philosophy, like the philosophy of life and aesthetics, is not based on appearance, but on attitude, not on a reality, but on a spiritual will. Nothing seems easier than a philosophical justification of physical exercise from the point of view of morality. By moral philosophy I mean here the doctrines of German idealism and neo-humanism, which are generally accepted today on the nature of man. But nothing is in truth more difficult than a justification of physical exercise from an idealistic philosophy. For this philosophy can only ever give the body, its appearance and its activities a somewhat secondary role. It cannot take the body impartially as a reality that contains an unfathomable mystery for itself, but always understands it as a means to an end. Fichte expresses the idealistic basic attitude towards the body when he says in his System der Sittenlehre: "All care for my body should and must be based absolutely on the purpose of making it a suitable instrument of morality . . ." Here the body always remains a mere instrument of the moral will, the "external", which is an instrument of the internal. This disdain for the body remains technically intact even where one expresses oneself more cautiously than the honest Fichte did. If, for example, one regards the care of the body as an essential moment for the development of the "personality" ("physical culture"), then it is a mere triviality.

The instrumental character of the body is not abolished, for "personality" is understood here in essentially idealistic-moral terms, and thus the body is already pushed out of the center and transferred to the periphery. The fact that it is then recognized on the periphery does not change the decisive fact that it is not counted as part of the center, but remains merely external and serving. "You must maintain the resilience of your body in order to be able to meet the moral demands that the development of the personality makes on you" – this is always the ultimate meaning of the classification of the body in the ethics of the personality.

Since the idealistic justification of physical culture proceeds according to the scheme of means and ends, it can apparently also justify the moment of community with physical exercise. For a community, e.g. the whole of the people, can also be put in place of the personality. In this case, the underlying idea is that the physical training of its members is necessary for the development of a powerful moral community. Physical culture – or better: physical education and physical care – is therefore not only a requirement from the point of view of the individual, but also from that of the community. This justification lifts us out of the narrow sphere of the individual. But the demand still retains its instrumental character: here, too, physical culture is seen as a mere means for something else, for the preservation of public health and national health. Of course, such a demand is just as sensible and justified as the statement that the individual personality is only capable of acting if it does not neglect its body, but strengthens and exercises it. The question here, however, is whether this kind of justification of physical culture alone can serve as a foundation for the theory and practice of physical exercise. But this question must be answered in the negative. For we must ask ourselves: what do we demand from a philosophical justification of physical exercise? Is it enough for us to be shown some purpose, however justified, of this activity?

To answer this question, let's put ourselves on the gymnastics field. Let us mingle with the cheerful crowd cavorting about: are we doing justice to the life that is stirring there as long as we still regard it in some form or other as a mere means to something else? Certainly, the activity we see there also pursues a good purpose, it also has an aesthetic side; but to understand it, these points of view are obviously not enough, we are looking at a piece of life: what meaning is inherent in it? What is it that moves the members of a place so lively, what makes them take their coming together and working together as something serious, what gives their activity a certain dignity in their own eyes, even a kind of consecration? It cannot be the purpose, because it is neither visible nor directly experienced. It is something added, something in the distance, even if it is real. Here, however, there is presence, existence and life, which feels joyful and serious at the same time as something valuable. This joy is not something derived from the satisfaction of a purposeful activity; rather, it is original, and to me this original pleasure and self-affirmation, which gives every good gymnastics course its character, seems to be an absolutely decisive moment in determining the nature of physical exercise. moment. For this joy is an expression of the autonomy and independence of what happens here, it is an expression of freedom from all (however correct and important) attitudes and considerations.

A truly philosophical justification of physical exercise must do justice to this character of the gymnastics field: it must not subordinate the free activity of the body to any purpose, but rather it must integrate it into a whole. It must understand it as a phenomenon of life that belongs to a more comprehensive phenomenon of life, and from this understanding it must find the justifying theory.

Despite several approaches from different sides, we do not yet have a philosophy of physical exercise, and are surprised by this

conceptual connection, because the unified substantiation. There is no doctrine that does justice to the reality of physical exercise. The reason for this lies, firstly, in the excessive attachment of theory to the individual sciences and, secondly, in the prevalence of philosophical idealism without a body, which makes it fundamentally impossible to arrive at an unbiased appreciation of the body; where, on the other hand, the body is correctly understood, one stops at the experience of the individual body and, without wanting to and without realizing it, falls into a pleasurable aestheticism. The philosophy of physical exercise must comprise two parts. The first part contains the doctrine of man, a philosophical anthropology, a philosophy of the body, which is at the same time a philosophy of the soul. It also contains the doctrine of the movements of the body and of exercise. The second part deals with the community, with the forms of community within which physical exercise has a place, and with the relationship of these forms to more comprehensive and larger ones.

By turning to the first part, we are entering the realm of an age-old problem. The relationship between body and soul, between body and spirit, and even more generally between nature and spirit, is the fundamental problem of every philosophical doctrine of man. It is highly significant that the beginning of modern philosophy (with Descartes) is characterized by a new definition of this relationship. The problem of the body (and thus also of physical exercise) emerges for the first time in Descartes with the sharpness we know today. For here, for the first time in philosophical terminology, the mind is sharply separated from the body; for the first time we are confronted with the dualism of nature and mind, necessity and freedom, which recurs in German idealism and still widely dominates our views today. The body appears in space and time, it is subject to the laws of nature; the spirit, on the other hand, the principle of self-consciousness and

identity, is independent and free and the master of the fine body. From the point of view of this dualism, a sufficient philosophical justification of physical exercises is not possible, because here the body has the inner, animating principle because it lacks a soul, indeed, one could say that on the basis of this philosophy there is no such thing as a body. There is only a "body". And body is the opposite of the disembodied spirit. Once the distinction between a spirit and a non-spiritual, lifeless body has been made, there is no return to unity. All attempts to regain unity become unclear mediations and syntheses. Once body and spirit have been separated, only the standpoint of materialism or spiritualism remains. Man then appears as the intersection of two realms: a material and a spiritual one. Insofar as he belongs to the former, he is the subject of anatomy and physiology; insofar as he belongs to the latter, he is the subject of psychology and moral philosophy. Everything that is said about physical exercise from the point of view of this division must remain inadequate, because we are dealing here with something to which a deeper meaning cannot in principle be attributed.

The contrast we have to start from is not body and spirit, but body and soul. The body is spiritless, the spirit is incorporeal; but the body is never incorporeal – if it is, it becomes a body; thus at death the body is transformed into a body – the soul is never without a body. It is characteristic of the togetherness of the two that we can speak of a "physical world", but not of a "bodily world". The body is bound by the soul, the soul is bound by the body. Life and movement are the expression of its soulfulness. There is an organic sense of unity that is only possible for the living. This organic sense of unity is to be sharply distinguished from the unity of consciousness. It is an unconscious feeling of unity^ and it is the contrast between this unconscious feeling of unity and the unity of consciousness that we must put in place of the contrast between body and spirit.

The unity of soul and body also corresponds to a uniform way of looking at both, a certain method. This method is symbolic. By relating the soul to the body and the body to the soul, we interpret, we grasp them symbolically.

Through exercise, the animated body reaches the peak of its possibilities. Exercise turns it into what it is designed to be. It perfects nature by leading nature back to itself on a higher level through the realm of compulsion. Physical exercise leads to the exercise body, i.e. to the perfected body that is powerful in itself. This return to the body is of the greatest importance. The moment of exercise separates physical exercise in the true sense from play. The return of exercise to the body as a skill of the body distinguishes physical exercise from work. In work, the effort exerted does not return to the subject, but flows out into the work, as it were; it becomes an objective entity. In physical exercise, it returns to the subject. The body "works" for itself. The exercise may be as difficult and as beautiful as it wants to be: it is still only a moment of passage to bring the body to its "highest possibility" and to its highest manifestation.

There are two ways in which the purpose of physical exercise can be missed. If the exercise and with it the performance dwindle to nothing, then all that remains is a mere pleasurable enjoyment of the body: gymnastics is in this danger; if, on the other hand, the performance is not treated as a moment of passage but as the ultimate purpose, then the body is devalued into a body. Then the body is no longer exercised, but the body is moved and trained in the service of a purpose.

The art of gymnastics is in this danger. If one succumbs to this danger on the gymnastics field, then the spirit gives way to cheerfulness, then it descends on the members like a frost, then everything is performed coldly and soberly, and only ambition and pride have free rein. Performance is certainly not a purpose outside

the gymnastics field; but it is only a relative purpose, and making this relative purpose absolute means making the gymnastics field a community of ensouled bodies. Once this ensoulment has taken place, it is difficult to defend genuine physical exercise against the systems of gymnastics. Because these have vitality for themselves. And yet this vitality is abstract and poor next to the rich life of a real gym.

The second part of the philosophy of physical exercise is about community. Specifically speaking, it deals with the court, the competition and the celebration. The court, the training ground or workplace – because the hall should fa always be seen as a surrogate – is more than just an indifferent piece of land. The court has a certain character, which it receives through the community of members, and it is not at all indifferent in which mood the members tend to enter "their" court. The square is, as it were, an emanation of the practising community, and if this community is in form, then its square is also loved and honored. The square thus becomes a symbol of the common life of those who visit it. The discovery of the square as a place where a community can romp and practice is one of Friedrich Ludwig Jahn's great deeds. Completely different from the "square" in this sense is the neutral sports ground, which does not serve any particular community, on which people do not regularly practise together, but from which individuals or groups "train" towards a specific goal.

The principle of community, which forms the basis of physical exercise, is best developed in view of the unique nature of sport. Sport lacks the principle of community as an essential un-organizing principle. Sport is individualistic. This can be seen in the fact that top performances in sport can basically be achieved outside of any community, in complete solitude: all that is needed is a stopwatch and a reliable witness. The exercise as well as the

performance may well have spectators, but is fundamentally always the activity of an individual, or of a group (in terms of performance) considered to be one person. The decisive factor is always the objective, measurable performance, i.e. ultimately something quantitative. This quantitative intensification of sporting performance is the cause of sport's own disastrous addiction to records.

Competition also plays an important role on the gymnastics field, because it must occur wherever performance occurs. (This is why it is absent in gymnastics.) But competition in the field of sport – apart from the popular sport of soccer and, for example, boxing – amounts to an abstract "measuring of oneself". The competition consists of performances competing and trying to outdo each other. It is not the living person fighting against the living person, but performance against performance, number against number. The cheerful competition between the members of a gymnastics club or the competition between gymnastics clubs is something quite different: here man fights man, talent, will and luck on the one side against talent, will and luck on the other, practice fights living against practice. The competition here is a form of community life itself, not merely a detour to victory in a number, but rather the number is only a detour to reach a serious and lively competition. A competition in which there are achievements, and yet the actual reality is the fresh opposition of forces, and all this in cheerfulness and friendship – that is the community as it corresponds to Jahn's creation.

The principle of physical exercise is not life "in beauty", not the desire to stay "healthy and slim", but a fresh and happy life in the community of the people. The daily gymnastics lesson, chopping wood, gymnastic exercises in the bedroom or in the garden – these may be useful things, but they are not the physical exercises that concern the philosopher. These are functional

activities prescribed by the hygienist. The philosophical problem only begins where the concept of purpose falls away, where we ask about the meaning of appearance; here we repeat our earlier distinction on a new level. When the hand is separated from the body, then it is no longer a limb, but a dead body. And when the body separates from the body of the whole, it is no longer a body, but an isolated body. Thus the individual is only a dead "body" that detaches itself from the living body of its people. Physical culture" has no principle of community and is therefore non-living: for if fifty people care for their bodies together, each with his own, this is not community life, but individualism in herd form.

When the members of a place come together to practise, this has a meaning not only through the purposes connected with it, but also through the reality of the meeting itself. This ultimate meaning of physical exercise can be compared to the ultimate meaning of school; there is more than an inner relationship between the square and the classroom. The schoolroom is not an extended nursery or an enlarged family room; it is something of its own, the place where the child enters a new world, the world of the public, ultimately the world of the state. The gym is not an extended private exercise yard either, but a place that has a relationship to the public, at least in its original sense, which it later lost. The most important point of comparison between the schoolroom and the gym seems to me to lie in the following: The schoolroom is also a place of exercise, it is also a place where many different purposes are pursued. But the schoolroom is still something other than a place of exercise and preparation, the being together of teacher and pupil is still something other than a mere means to some end. This togetherness is something in itself, it is a phenomenon of public life that has meaning in its own right. There is not only work going on in a classroom, there is also an atmosphere. And where the school is in order, this atmosphere is

similar to that of a gymnasium: I called it serious and cheerful. Serious – because something is demanded and something is achieved, cheerful – because cheerfulness appears wherever the existence of the community takes pleasure in itself and expresses itself carefree.

The physical education teacher who understands his sports field properly occupies a particularly prominent place in the school. Or he should occupy it. His nature and his activity make it easier for him to transcend the point of view of purpose. He has a more direct relationship to mere existence, to a happy appearance, and he could fulfill the high office of calling the school at which he works back to life and to the community again and again. This applies to every school, not only to elementary schools, but also to secondary schools and universities. If physical education is only understood as a kind of applied hygiene, then the teacher of physical education is merely a subject teacher, but if it is understood in its relationship to the community, then the teacher of physical education is least of all a "subject teacher".

For a long time now, our culture has been in danger of drowning in events that are all about purpose. Modern man is divided by purpose, he no longer comes to being. That is why our lives are so joyless: the hallmark of modern culture is gloom; when we celebrate festivals, they lack form, sensual appearance and uninhibited cheerfulness. Everything has become "inward" and therefore everything "outward" is soulless. The opposite principle is at work in physical exercises. They restore the principle of visibility in the midst of our culture, which has become all too inward, all too spiritual. And where better to demonstrate the beneficence of this principle than at a festival? Our time fails at its festivals because a festival is precisely about the transition to visibility. It would no longer fail if there were no longer a school that did not gather its members at least once every three months

for a celebration of physical exercise. At such a festival, the school would see itself, it would rejoice in itself. And so there would have to be festivals at which a town made itself visible, and finally festivals at which the whole people appear to themselves. Such festivals once existed – among the Greeks, in Olympia. It is not the usual bow to the Greeks that I am making here: the theme of "philosophy and physical exercise" is the Greek theme, because the Greeks are not only the people of philosophy, but also the people of gymnastics. But you have to think of the body, not the body, the living competition, not the abstract number, the celebration, not the "sporting event". The celebrations in Olympia were an event of the Hellenic people. These celebrations were the only occasion on which the Hellenic people, divided into tribes and city-states, became aware of their own unity. As an event of the people, this celebration was a political event. It was neither a "work of art" nor a social and sporting "event": it was a celebration similar to the great festivals of the German gymnastics school: not a performance in front of a feverish crowd, not an abstract achievement, not a fight for an abstract victory title – the victory was a gift from the gods, the winner was honored in his hometown in a cultic way, we cannot compare that with our concept of victory – but the fights were in a direct, emotional connection with the people watching. They were not a means of creating excitement, tension and sensation, but something in themselves: the festive confirmation of a real community that became visible in this high moment.

If physical exercise as a serious, meaningful activity cannot be detached from the community, and if this community is the people, then we must call the ultimate meaning of physical exercise a political one – this word, of course, taken in a deeper and purer sense than we are used to taking it, we must remember that this word too is a Greek one. Physical exercise is something popular and popular. The governments of the Holy Alliance have

very correctly sensed this democratic aspect of Jahn, they have recognized the political character of the state is recognized as the common physical exercise of men. Without the association of "free men bound together in friendship", the state is merely a mechanical body. The youth that unites in groups has a relationship to the state when it engages in physical exercises in the spirit of Jahn: not only because of the purposes associated with them, but also for the reason that in these exercises it becomes visible as a real part of the people – and what is the state other than the people appearing in an orderly fashion?

II

Lecture, held before the student body.
Jena, 12th July 1932.

Let's call what we're talking about here the re-integration of the human being. Integral does not only mean uninjured and pure but also whole. The whole human being is the human being brought back to his wholeness, not a fantastic, imaginary, purely inner human being, but the human being who appears, who presents himself, who fills the space and takes hold of it. The re-integration of the human being includes the recovery of space, the reintegration of the human being into space; we have been expelled from space for too long; the inner sense, the sense of purpose, has dominated over the outer sense, the sense of space. We thought we could abstract from the spatial appearance of man. But only the "human being who appears in space and grasps space is the real, whole human being. The newly awakened sense of physical exercise in our time is a historical phenomenon of the first order, a sign that the re-integration of man, the reclamation of space, has begun. This regained sense of space does not mean that people have become more rational, that they have finally learned to think "hygienically", but rather that we are coming out of an age of technical mastery of space, of the "external" conquest of space.

However, the age that technically subjugated space removed man from the space immediately surrounding him. It became an age of the world economy and the internationalism of values. The code name for this internationalism of values became the originally aristocratic word education. The subject of "education" is to be understood as a pure "inwardness", a purely "spiritual" personality. In the imaginary space of this personality, all values can experience an equally imaginary fusion. Here everything is

unreal, fantastic, and this unreality reaches its climax when the demand of "body culture" is added to all this. The pure inner being demands the care of the body; the body, which carries its meaning in itself, must be justified by the spirit. The educated personality struggles in vain to acquire an attitude. Attitude is not only something "internal", but also something spatial and external. Posture only arises where the inner and the outer are at the same time. You can "adopt" a line position, but not an attitude. Modern man is the man without posture, or the man of an artificial, actor-like posture (pose). He has no posture because he has no relationship to the space immediately surrounding him. He has conquered space, he has lost the next space. To place man in the right relationship to the space that surrounds him is what I call the work of education. Education is therefore bodily and spatial in contrast to the purely "inner" education that spreads out over time.

If you want to know what is attitude and what is not, then compare the statue of a Greek athlete with the image of a modern sports winner, for example with the photograph in front of Geisow's booklet "Deutscher Sportgeist". A magnificent character; but the appearance? Helpless, self-conscious, ugly. It becomes strikingly clear that an attitude cannot be "adopted", that an attitude is not something arbitrary, but the result of a coherent system of life and education.

The purely spiritual personality, which is not originally space-filling, cannot originally be man or woman either. Rather, it is presented from the beginning as a "human being" that modifies itself into male or female. This "humanistic" thinking is an expression of the abstraction in front of space. In "reality, man and woman fill the space in very different ways, and therefore also have very different folds. There is no such thing as a linear human education, there is only a male and a female education. "Along the

lines of the body", as Nietzsche says, we thus return to that clear and genuinely "human" separation of the sexes that was characteristic of all great and healthy times. And in the same way, we return to the separation of the ages by this guideline. In the fog of "inwardness" everything flows in confusion; the whole human being is either man or woman, young or old.

However, we are led even further along the lines of the body. The purely spiritual personality can imagine that it has created itself, that it is an unborn being. The bodily real human being, who does not deceive himself through "pure inwardness", is permeated by the feeling of being cattle, of having ancestors whom he resembles in body and soul. Those who think from the body soul also think "hereditary-biologically", they see themselves as members of the great lineage of their clan and their people. Body-soul thinking and individualism are mutually exclusive. The human being, as a being that fulfills his dreams, must necessarily be seen as part of the community. The guiding principle of the body necessarily leads us away from the isolated human being and his fictions, back to the living, real human being, to the human being whose attitude corresponds to the forces of his race and his nationality.

2.

The separation between an inside and an outside, which basically have nothing to do with each other, is essential for the prevailing image of man, and thus for the entire race. It is characteristic of the prevailing state of civilization when in science "the establishment of the purely factual" is valued above all else, then in this cult of the factual the same direction of dead body thinking is present as we have come to know in the doctrine of man. One forgets that to work scientifically is not to operate an

apparatus that produces established facts, but that to work scientifically is to participate in the spirit of science. This spirit is strict and demands proof of facts in many places. But to regard the proof of facts as the essence of science corresponds to an unscientific and unphilosophical conception of science; we call this conception positivistic. The positivist believes that the demands of science are satisfied by measuring and determining; he eliminates intuition and risk-taking from science. The result is that which is devoid of spirit and soul. The kind of operation that prevails at our universities today.

However, this positivism does not stop there, it gets worse. We know what we owe to inwardness. Science is not enough, education must also be added. And so the outward, positivist enterprise is supplemented by the educational gain, which one supposedly gains by engaging in science. This "gain" has become doubtful to the German youth, who are turning away from both the scientific enterprise and the education supposedly associated with it. However, they must not allow themselves to be determined by today's prevailing view of science to disregard the heroic deed of knowledge. Rather, it must learn to see through the prevailing system of positivism with the addition of inwardness in all areas, and thereby put itself in a position to build a new, closed system of life.

Our view of community life, especially of the state, is as positivist as our view of science. The law is seen as a system of independent rules that the judge must, as it were, operate.

The basis of all state law, the constitution, is absolutized according to its positive letter. It is forgotten that a nation lives from the unwritten constitution that is born with it, but not from a written constitution. State life today is also divided into an external and an internal: on the one side there is a rigid apparatus of jurisdiction, administration and police, on the other

a lone individual who is strictly tested for possession of the constitutional civic attitude. It is the same scheme: positivism with the addition of inwardness – on the one side a dead state body, on the other a fictitious, purely inward attitude. One has no idea of the soul of an unwritten constitution, of the life of the state. A living state is something other than a mechanically governed body of regulations, officials and citizens; it always belongs only to your people, to a bodily-soul whole.

The popularization of the concepts of law and state is paralleled by the emptying of the concepts of soldiering and the army. Law and state are understood as an event for the protection of individuals, the army is seen as a mere "unfortunately necessary" means of defense, in extreme terms as a particularly costly police force. It is overlooked that the army not only has the function of a means, but that it consists of soldiers, that being a soldier in a male nation is a way of life that cannot wither away without the nation itself withering away. Militarism does not arise where there are soldiers who serve with body and soul – our people and soldiering belong together – militarism arises where the living army is replaced by a military apparatus which is ultimately directed and administered according to dualistic criteria. Militarism does not exist where the soldier rules, but only where the civilian determines the spirit of the army with his fear, his demands for security, his considerations of prestige and profit. We call the soldier who has degenerated into a civilian a "military". Militarism presupposes the military. For the military, the troop consists of "human material"; it is a body moving according to mechanical laws, not a living body whose soul is comradeship. Militarism is a consequence of that positivist view of existence which only recognizes "things" and "facts", causes and purposes – and an attitudeless inwardness.

If you want to get to know the spirit of positivism, combined

with an ideology that is devoid of existence in its purest form, then you have to study the sports movement of our day. From a historical point of view, the sports movement seems to me to be the last great movement to have taken the wrong direction within our nation. Through the sports movement, a fundamental German instinct has been steered in the wrong direction. Let other nations be proud of their sport: we Germans, to whom Jahn spoke, should know better. In Jahn's German gymnastics origins we find no positivism with inwardness added, as is the case in the sports movement. There, everything is cast from a single mold. Jahn's movement, on the other hand, is not a beginning, but an end. It is the last offshoot of the liberalist epoch, the last manifestation of liberalism.

Let's look at what is at the heart of sport: the peak performance of the individual. Who would say anything against the tension, against the discipline that such a performance requires? It is quite another thing to turn top performance into a system, to invent an ideology for it, to morally glorify things that are self-evident and sober. This leads to an untrue, self-aggrandizing way of thinking, the bottomlessness of which corresponds to the bottomlessness of the entire system, which is geared towards abstract peak performance. Maximum performance is the only goal. But this goal is purely formal. It carries no value, no content in itself. And it is characteristic that it finds its expression in an exact number. This is a symbol for the transition to the realm of mere quantity.

On the one hand, we find the peak performance of the individual (and the team), and on the other, the audience as a bunch of passive, more or less knowledgeable spectators. The whole thing is then an "event". These events involve an enormous apparatus of clubs and committees, an extensive bureaucracy. All in all, a fictitious context in which often enough everything revolves around the vanity of individual "greats".

The athlete lives in a world of fictitious relationships. This world lacks the seriousness and gravity of reality, it also lacks the splendor and beauty of the real one. Alfred Peters (Psychology of Sport, 1927) has correctly seen that both the play instinct and the lunging instinct degenerate into mere personal stimuli within the sporting world. The position from which Peters views sport is alien to me. However, it will be difficult to object to the critical observations of this well-trained observer. Peters recognizes sport as a surrogate. It arises from a "passion drive already corrupted in economic life and a sensationally degenerated 'play drive' ('pleasure drive') in reaction to the overstretching of the compulsory character of the puritanical idea of a profession".

Comparing sporting activity with serious fighting is nonsense. Sporting activity lacks precisely that which is part and parcel of real struggle, above all the element of danger, uncertainty and risk. The sporting "struggle" takes place in an atmosphere of idyllic coziness. The "opponent" is not really an opponent at all: he is the lone competitor for the prize. In the cases where something really daring is done (ocean crossing), it is not a matter of sporting achievements, but of individual bold adventurers for whom one can have respect. But the "fight" that ends with a feast or an erotic adventure, the "fight" in which one is in any case an honorable loser, and in which one stakes one's life in the same way as someone who boards an airship or a train – such a fight can only be associated with a real will to win by a hopeless private individual.

The individualism of sporting activity is clearly evident. You practise, you try to get the best out of yourself. Competition is also just a means of comparison. Sports ideology calls this "training of the will". It reinterprets the external, formal character of this training of the will in a positive way. But there is no real training of the will, apart from the goal. If the goal does not have a value

in itself, then the whole training of the will is worth nothing, because it comes to nothing. This is the case with sports training of the will. At the same time, it follows that the sporting enterprise is unable to grasp the depth of the individual's character precisely because of its formalism. In this respect, nothing is more significant than the ideological and political "neutrality" of sports associations. The practical internationalism of the Olympic Games corresponds to an inner internationalism: neutrality here, as everywhere else, is only the word for a hidden political position on the line of least resistance, whereby the "resistance" is to be measured by the "leading" press, which is so important for the sports business.

Some argue that sport is individualistic. It necessarily leads from the "I" to the "we", from individual performance to team performance, from the individual to the community. In the competitive team, any particular will to win must be subordinated to the common will to win. In praising this community, one can only see one thing: that it is only ever a fleeting community of purpose. The purpose is to achieve maximum performance together, to achieve this purpose one joins together in practice sessions; once the practice session is over or the purpose is achieved in the competition, everything falls apart again. A sports club is and remains a "club", a civic institution, it will never have the strength of a student corporation or a company. It consists of civilians who have joined together for a specific achievement.

There is neither real camaraderie nor a real symbol, a flag, but at most a temporary camaraderie and a discreetly worn club badge. It would look ridiculous if a sports club wanted to march: each individual inspired by the will to "peak performance", physically and mentally trained to the last – and yet they can't march! Why? Because private individuals can't march.

When I look at the young men of today, I find two attitudes

(there is no need to talk about those who have no attitude at all): one attitude is that of the mother's son, of the homme de femmes, the man who lives his life mainly in female company and keeps himself accordingly. This attitude can appear in changing styles, for a time tired elegance was fashionable, today tanned elegance is preferred, one loves to appear as a sports cavalier. This means that sport does not have the power to shape an attitude, but rather that its power only goes so far as to give a certain shade to an alien attitude.

The appropriate attitude is the soldierly one. The German will always make an impression abroad – this is just an example – as a soldier, appear as a type and be respected as such. I fear that if he tries to do so by other means, he will still be easily beaten by a real Frenchman or Englishman.

In addition to the international sports movement, we have another movement that is specifically German in its nature and rationale: the gymnastics movement. While the sports movement is positivist and rationalist, the gymnastics movement is decidedly irrationalist. Under a new religion it does not -er Germans, no matter what it is about. Gymnastics wants to express a new religiosity, it strives towards a new cult. It is a cult of the unconscious forces, those forces over which the will is not master, that move rhythmically and freely. One could speak of a cult of Mother Earth – it is no coincidence that the theory of this gymnastics rediscovers the importance of the earth's gravity for natural movement (Bode). In terms of contemporary history, the gymnastics movement is to be understood as a counter-attack against an era of masculinization in a very specific sense. The human being should be returned to the rhythm of instinctual life. The symbol of this is the realization that his centre of gravity lies in the region of the pelvic girdle and not in the region of the shoulder girdle, where the ideal of super-masculine firmness had

shifted it. The system of movements and exercises changes completely in the light of this realization. It cannot be denied that gymnastics acted like a dew wind. It had to come to break the torpor into which bourgeois gymnastics had fallen. I hope and wish that the German physical exercises will no longer lose the more correct view of the body and its movements that is present in gymnastics. However, this is in no way connected with the religion and philosophy of gymnastics. I cannot take seriously a person who seeks his "fulfillment" in the intoxication of dance and praises this fulfillment as a religion (for whom?). Rhythmic intoxication as a state of life seems a little low to me – especially for a man. In general, gymnastics seems to me to be of more value for women's exercises. I can only see men turning to gymnastics as an escape from becoming a man. Those who do not succeed in detaching themselves from their mothers turn to gymnastics with particular intensity. They protect the false, positivistic ideal of militaristic gymnastic rigidity in order to be able to escape the role model of the real soldier all the more safely.

Today is no longer the time to fight against this ideal of the past, nor is it the time to shoot arrows against gymnastics; we have come so far that we can learn from gymnastics, and above all we have to learn from it that the process of becoming a man is not equally simple and straightforward for everyone; we have to learn that we have to learn that we have to learn from gymnastics, and young men must not be forced into a ready-made ideal of masculine posture, but that the young man and the man must also grow, "grow" of course not only according to the rhythm of nature, but also grow under the strict discipline of a role model, under the hard demands of certain achievements, of a service. However, it is a different matter whether these performances are seen as an absolute, geometric framework which, impersonally as it were, forces everything to conform to it, even if the life of the movement dies in the process – or whether they allow the living

individual free scope. (Body against "body".) Gymnastics can help us to gain a new attitude, to replace positivistic rigidity with lively firmness. The young man should become a man, he should detach himself from his mother – but not in such a way that he loses all memory of his mother.

From a purely technical point of view, much of what is done in sport and gymnastics is healthy and good. It is not what is wanted – it is how it is wanted that is wrong. What is wrong is that everything is geared towards one's own "body". The individual cannot get away from himself. Within the modern dance movement, the old view that the dancer is there for the spectator is ridiculed. But one cannot get away from the idea that the dancer's movements must be there "for someone": one believes to have done who knows what when one declares that the dancer's movements are only there for himself, that they must be "felt" by himself. For the people, this whole individualistic spook is nothing but "strain". The "how" is wrong here: Physical exercises only have a meaning if they are not directly "for" the individual, but if they benefit the individual indirectly, but appear directly as part of a whole of life. Talking about the meaning of physical exercise therefore means something completely different from what was previously understood by it: it means talking about the whole of life in which physical exercise occurs at a certain point.

3.

In the hygienic culture of the present day, including the sports movement and gymnastics, an era is coming to an end that makes the isolated individual the object of conscious concern, be it concern for the body or concern for the spirit. Physical culture" arises from a specific attitude of consciousness, an attitude towards the highest value of one's own personality, an exaggerated idea of

the possibilities of consciously shaping the life of the individual – which is still present even where the individual wants to shape his existence out of the "unconscious"! A world view, say the representatives of the hygienic-sports culture, is behind us: we reinstate the whole person in his rights. But what an abstraction this "whole" human being is! It is not man in the fullness of his life relationships, man in the community, man as a political living being, but man as a private person who cares for his body and "trains" it for some purpose, who takes part in exercises and competitions, who dedicates himself to a gymnastic school for the purpose of loosening up and enhancing his personality. It makes no difference whether one pays homage to individualism in a positivistic-sporting or irrationalistic-gymnastic way. The gymnastics movement has the advantage that it has achieved something in the field of theory, which is certainly no coincidence. The dualism of sport: here the purposeless physical performance – there an untrue, moralizing ideology has been overcome here. The living human being, the body-soul is discovered, the human being is recognized as a spatial phenomenon, his movements are recognized as a whole. The whole field of physical exercise has been renewed and fertilized by gymnastic movement, just as it has been loosened up and enriched from a technical point of view by the sports movement. However, the gymnastic movement could not lead to a deeper renewal because its approach was directed towards the individual. A book like Gläser's "Körperinn" (Sense of the Body) reveals the isolation into which people are led in this way. One only listens to oneself, one has an extreme heightened sensitivity for oneself, one is blind to the fullness of community life. The futile attempts that are now being made within the lay circle to penetrate the sphere of politics and the state only prove the unfruitfulness of irrationalistic individualism from another angle.

There is only one doctrine of physical exercise that does not

take people as isolated individuals, either rationalistically or irrationally, but rather approaches the whole problem of physical exercise from the point of view of people as political beings: this is the doctrine of Friedrich Ludwig Jahn. The unique significance that Jahn has due to this starting point alone does not seem to me to have been appreciated nearly enough – otherwise Jahn would not still be mentioned in the same breath as the Enlightenment philosopher Guts-Muths. I feel connected to the spirit of Jahn when I now attempt to give a basic outline of German physical exercise.

To this end, I must first ask you to drop your familiar classifications and terms. You are used to classifying physical exercise according to technical forms. You speak of games and popular gymnastics, of apparatus gymnastics, of swimming, rowing and skiing, and of the application of these things in sport. In order to understand my classification, you have to turn your head around and start from something that you are not used to considering, and yet which is the most important thing: the human being and the way people are together. Don't look at the exercises! Nothing would be gained by changing the exercises. I have not only rejected individualism in theory – I also reject it in practice by not starting from the individual when classifying physical exercises, but from the life of the whole, from the life of the people and the state. The "whole person" here therefore means the person in their relationship to the people and the state.

The previous, purely technical classification of physical exercise presupposes the existing state of society. This state of society shows individualism in its disintegration.

Hence the cultivation of the individual ego through sport and gymnastics, hence the political neutrality of both movements, which can only flourish on the basis of the existing state of affairs. A Reformation of physical exercises is only possible on the

condition that the existing social state changes, the state in which a small number of luxury beings exist at the expense of the whole, without connection to this whole, without representative, representative power.

I assume that we are moving towards a great simplification of our state of life. This should not be misunderstood in the sense that we are simply restricting ourselves and everything else will remain as it is. Rather, we will have to go back to the elementary forces in our people, we "will have to build a new building from the intact foundations. When you read Jahn today, you have to marvel at the strength and purity with which he has gone back to these foundations everywhere. It is the great fault of the German Gymnastics Association that it did not take on the great obligation that Jahn's legacy imposed on it. Today we see the German Gymnastics Association wavering helplessly back and forth, opening itself up to all the currents of the times, to sports as well as to gymnastics, we see it politically undecided – in short, we see it lost in today's society. No new impetus comes from the DT; it does not even occur to us that, for example, the degeneration of modern ballroom dancing also has something to do with the wrong organization in the Deutsche Turnerschaft. Jahn's reference to women's own nature and task was not heard. There are women's departments in the DT that do exactly what the men do, except that the weights and measurements are somewhat smaller. There is no thought of making the difference between men and women, both natural and social, the basis of a division of physical exercises. And yet this is the only way that leads to a living system of physical exercise.

German physical exercises

Popular	Political
Children, Girls, Women	Boys, Young men, Men
Joy of playing games	Fighting spirit exercise
Dance exercise (frolics)	Gymnastics competition
(In groups)	(In teams)

Performance is not anxiously measured, it is demanded in the exercises of the boys and men (that goes without saying), but it is not the "purpose". The purpose of male physical exercise is the development of manhood, male coexistence on the gymnastics field. Similarly, competition is not a means to the highest performance for the individual, but an expression of the life of a team. Gymnastics does not have the "purpose" of physical training – this purpose is achieved by itself – nor should it only be a "preparation" for military service – this purpose is also achieved by itself – but it is the purest expression of male joie de vivre, which only unfolds in vigorous activity and comradely coexistence.

I would like to use the term "gymnastics" for the physical exercises of the teams alone. Women's physical exercise should focus on games and dance. The physical care of girls and women can also be achieved in this way if games and dance are properly organized. It is the principle of my classification that the hygienic moment does not occur in isolation, but is linked to immediate life and action. An undreamt-of field is opened up to women's imagination and activity when their physical exercises are no longer private and accidental, but are linked to the popular expression of cheerfulness and sociability. So I am not thinking of popular dance performances within the framework of the existing situation with its social dances, etc., but I have in mind a situation in which the sexes only meet at festivals and parties. which are

organized by women's organizations within the framework of German physical education.

Popular	Political
Celebrations	Festivals
Games and dances	Marches and competitions

The sexes take part in each other's parties and celebrations. Swimming, rowing and skiing belong to an area that lies between the two divisions and is organized jointly by both.

The German Gymnastics Association of the future must provide the most important national political education. It is organized according to age groups. Each individual association is at the same time a real boys' or men's association. In addition to the head of gymnastics, there is a head of gymnastics. The task of the Dietwart is to take care of national and political education. Next to the gymnastics director and the head of the board is the chairman, who is responsible for the business side (but not all the representation). All three must be gymnasts.

I never once quoted the Greeks. Not because I thought it was unimportant or inappropriate, but because I believe I spoke in such a way that a Greek would have understood me.

Suppose a Greek came to a foreign city. He is shown this and that, finally he says: I have seen and admired much – but where is the place where your young men wrestle) For the Greek, this place does not mean a place of physical care and physical training, not a place comparable to the baths, but a center: a center of culture and of the state. For such a center is where the male youth of a country is educated. But one is not educated through the care of the body and through physical training, one is only educated where an image is erected in the middle of the square. we Germans

have such an image, "we just don't know it, we haven't erected it yet. But we will erect it one day: the image of the Young Man of Langemarck.

The State of Intellectual History in the Mirror of Mathematics and Physics

Lecture, held before the student body.
Dresden, 30th November 1931.

Every individual scientific result has a relationship to the image we form of the world. In this respect, there is an interpretation in every individual scientific result; through this image ("world view"), through this interpretation, the individual science is connected with the intellectual-historical situation. The physicist's equations remain unchanged; at most they are complicated or simplified. But these equations also have a meaning; we read the well-known equations today with different eyes than we did in the last century. Back then, they appeared to us as formulas of inexorable necessity; we believed that they enabled us to control events down to the smallest detail: the equations are still valid today, but they have a different meaning.

Recently, there was a kind of feuilletonism that loved to pounce on mathematics and physics in order to relate everything possible and impossible to them with the help of analogy. What was not done when the reports on the theory of relativity reached the "public! There was an impressionist and an expressionist physics, and it sometimes looked as if every halfway decent movement within poetry or painting had to go hand in hand with an upheaval in physics; those who did not allow themselves to be blinded probably sensed that there was something exciting in this sudden emergence of physics, but even ten years ago it was not possible to say what was going on with any degree of clarity. Small periods of time with their changing moods and tastes cannot be attributed to the transformation of the basic views of science. This relationship is there, but it only exists between the great spiritual

systems, which extend not over decades but over centuries. If it is possible today to detect a profound change in the situation of the lens sciences, then this is a sign that a new epoch is dawning.

Philosophy has been associated with the sciences since its origins among the Greeks. From Descartes to Kant, there has even been a personal union of Linzel scientist and philosopher, as in ancient times. The relationship between philosophy and Linzel science is decisive, and it is precisely the major periods that mark themselves out in this relationship. Kant's philosophy, as we have always seen, is closely connected with Newton's physics. Hegel's philosophy, on the other hand, protests against the science of its time: Hegel draws on Keppler's physics. Hegel and his school's contempt for empiricism and the methods of science resulted in a return to Kant. Neo-Kantianism followed the methods of the individual sciences very closely and became a critical "theory of experience". Since then, the relationship between philosophy and the linear sciences has remained unclear. It would be a sure sign that deeper upheavals are taking place if it could be established that the relationship between philosophy and the linear sciences is beginning to enter a new stage.

I am not speaking of the state of the individual sciences, but of the situation in which they find themselves, and which is only a symptom of the general situation of the history of knowledge. To speak of the state of a science means to look at it in terms of its quiet and steady development, in terms of what remains, what has been achieved and what is still to be achieved; to speak of the state of a science means to look at it in terms of its problems, and that means in terms of its basic concepts. Mathematics, which was already a leader in the field of economic growth, also led the way this time: on the way to the fundamental crisis. It has thus asserted its old honor. Weierstrass had just seemingly given it its final unity and formal rigor as the science of finite quantities – then Georg

Cantor's set theory emerged – the science of the infinite. This introduced an element of unrest into the seemingly secure building. This unrest grew when the antinomies of set theory emerged, first those of Burali-Forti (1896) and later those of Russell-Zermelo. According to Adolf Fraenkel's report, these antinomies made a "devastating impression" on minds such as Dedekind and Frege.

The antinomies of set theory are not merely an internal mathematical matter; they are on the borderline between mathematics and logic. The situation is as follows: if the laws of traditional logic are applied to infinite sets, "which mathematics as the science of the infinite cannot do without under any circumstances", the most serious difficulties arise. For a quarter of a century, efforts have been made to overcome these difficulties. The two directions that have been taken can be described as logicism and intuitionism. The question is: should logic be subordinated to mathematics, which would mean a rejection of traditional logic with regard to its application to infinite sets – or should mathematics be subordinated to logic? Brouwer, the intuitionist, states the proposition: logic is based on mathematics and not vice versa. Example: we have a pile of chalk pieces in front of us. Here the disjunctive judgment is possible and correct: among these pieces of chalk there is either no white one or at least one white one. According to Brouwer, this judgment is not valid on the basis of an a priori principle (theorem of the excluded third, tertium non datur), but it is valid because it is possible to take one piece of chalk after the other and examine it for its color, whereupon the disjunctive judgment as above arises quite automatically.

The disjunctive judgment therefore only has the character of an enumeration, a logical sum. The principle of "tertium non datur" is only justified as the final result of a possible verification.

However, such a verification is only possible for finite sets. It must not be applied to totality, whose elements we can never even think through. "Let us consider, to take Brouwer's famous example, the decimal fractional development of the number π=3.14159... and if we ask ourselves whether the digit sequence 0123...9 occurs in it at all, then, according to the usual view, the disjunctive judgment applies here too: such a sequence either never occurs or occurs at least once. According to Brouwer, however, an existential statement of the form 'such a sequence occurs at least once' is meaningless as long as such a sequence has not been found, i.e. constructed; in other words: the judgment 'such a sequence does not occur anywhere in the decimal fraction development of π is not capable of negation."

Here there is an abstract logical principle that applies independently of all counting in detail – and a "constructive" process through which the sequence in question is actually found. "According to Brouwer, mathematics consists in mental constructive processes; the laws of logic are merely derived from these mental constructions. They have no original validity, "in particular, the logical laws for infinite entities are different from those for finite."

So what is the situation? Through set theory, mathematics has become the science of the infinite. In doing so, however, it breaks with its past: because previously mathematics prided itself on being in the closest relationship to logic, now it must dethrone logic. There is now a limit to logic – an unimaginable thought for the classical way of thinking.

Russell and Whitehead took the opposite approach to solving the antinomies of set theory. They left classical logic as it was, but by means of their "types theory". The solution to the difficulties is sought here by reducing mathematics to logic. Here, for example, the number 2 is abolished as a mathematical quantity,

i.e. as something inexact, and replaced by a purely logical definition. A logic is constructed which mainly contains the following terms: 1. the negation not, 2. the logical connections of two propositions and, or, if – so, 3. each (or all), there is, 4. identical. These terms are then used to define the number 2, whereby only the specified basic terms should occur: "the number of the term f is 2 should mean that there is an x and there is a y such that x is not identical with y, x falls under f, y falls under f, and that for each z the following applies: if z falls under f, then z is identical with x or identical with y".

According to this doctrine, mathematical propositions are "neither empirical nor synthetic a priori, but analytical".

What does this dispute about the primacy of mathematics as a constructive process or of logic as an analytical process mean? Here we come up against the problem that will immediately occupy us again in the field of physics, the problem of reality. Classical logic and mathematics believe they are dealing with absolute facts. Experience plays no role here, there are no limitations based on the nature of man, on the nature of our planet, there is no appeal to the limits of our cognition as a human one. "A theorem proven by us must, if there are beings from another planet who think and do mathematics, also be correct for them." This view can be saved and asserted by way of logicism. It is abandoned by intuitionism. Here the respective state of our knowledge is a decisive instance. From a classical point of view, this means abandoning all absoluteness and certainty, it means accepting "non-objective facts". It means playing chance, existence and time into a system of validity that was previously considered absolute; we abstain from any judgment. The judgment lies, in my opinion, in the fact that in physics we can likewise observe a turn of this kind towards intuitionism.

As we know, the theory of relativity does not represent the

beginning of a new physics, but the final phase of classical physics, which here reaches its final, simplest and most comprehensive formulation. Strangely enough, this theory already contains that disturbing element which we have just encountered in mathematics and which we then encounter in quantum mechanics. The theoretically most important and boldest achievement of the theory of relativity consists in the destruction of the concept of absolute simultaneity, why does Einstein abolish this concept? For a reason that must at first appear ridiculous to the untrained, namely because of its simplicity. The reason is simply that we cannot determine the simultaneity of two events absolutely, because the finiteness of the speed of light sets a fundamental limit to our determinations. A concept whose possibility was a priori certain to us, absolute simultaneity, dissolves in relation to physical observation because we cannot realize it. There are no apparatuses that could allow us to designate two events as simultaneous – because our real measurement is ultimately dependent on the speed of light. An empirical datum, a reality, and thus at the same time a coincidence, has thus become fundamental for us; our physical conception of space and time must be guided by an inconspicuous datum, which previously appeared to be one among many.

The empirical datum is thus already given a tremendous dignity by the (special) theory of relativity in relation to any system of relationships in absolute space and absolute time. Of course, the "empirical datum" is not to be understood here as the next best observation. The magnitude of the speed of light and the fact of its constancy – these are empirical data, the establishment of which required the development of an enormous mental apparatus. So when I speak of "reality" here, I am not doing so in the sense of a flat empiricism that believes it can "observe" everything.

The observations we are dealing with here are the result of the most complicated considerations and apparatus, the boldest a priori hypotheses, and we therefore cannot simply abstract the a priori from these empirical data. Nevertheless, the speed of light, the deflection of the light beam near the sun, remains an empirical datum. The problem is not: pure empiricism or a priorism, but the problem is: the system of absolutes and the system of reality. Aprioristic elements are also contained in what is called here the "reality system".

The great upheaval in physics, which corresponds to the upheaval in mathematics caused by set theory, occurred almost simultaneously with this in the year 1900 through Planck's quantum theory. The event was so tremendous that it took decades for its light to fully penetrate us: it is only in these years that the consequences are being drawn from it, and it is a strange tragedy that the venerable creator of this great doctrine closes his mind to the philosophical consequences of his discovery.

It is a huge step from Newton's mechanics to Einstein's mechanics – and yet the latter is only a completion of the former. It retains the basic axiom of Newton's world: that "everything" in the world happened according to strict laws, that events were determined down to the smallest detail. This basic axiom has been shaken by quantum physics. Not as if the old physics has become "wrong" as a result. Its calculations, its values remain the same. But the picture of the world has changed: these numerical values do not belong to a strictly causally determined "world", but must accept a reinterpretation. In his inaugural speech in Zurich in the year 1922 Schrödinger raised the question of whether we should regard Einstein's gravitational equations as elementary laws, and he answered: no. The paradox is that while the numerical values are not strictly causally determined, these equations can nevertheless remain valid. Their meaning is no longer that of

absolute "laws", but merely that of statistical formulas. The most exact thing we know, those equations that allow us to calculate the movements of the stars with incredible precision for centuries in advance – should say nothing other than a very high probability in the mathematical sense! Reason: "Probably in no natural process is the number of individual atoms that must interact to produce an observable effect as enormous as in the case of gravitational phenomena. This would make the extraordinary precision with which planetary movements can be calculated centuries in advance understandable from a statistical point of view." Schrödinger agrees with the Viennese physicist Exner that it is quite possible that the laws of nature are entirely statistical in character. "The absolute law of nature, which is still generally postulated as a matter of course behind the statistical law, goes beyond experience. Such a double justification of the lawfulness of nature is in itself improbable. The burden of proof lies with its proponents, not with the doubters of absolute causality. For to doubt it is by far the more natural thing to do today."

What does this mean in principle and in general? It means that the old basic concepts and laws of natural science have been given a limited scope. They now only apply to medium size ranges; they no longer apply to the very large and the very small world. In exactly the same way, we have just found the scope of logic restricted by intuitionism. The so-called "unbreakable" laws of nature are only valid for medium scales, and in these only because the number of interacting atoms is so immense that we can make safe statistical assumptions. It is a basic principle of probability theory that the greater the number of "cases" considered, the more certain we are. The old physics believed that it had found absolute laws because it investigated phenomena whose inner structure, with all its irregularities and coincidences, it did not know. From the statistical laws it found, it deduced a strict determination. It is practically irrelevant whether the laws of nature are absolute or

statistical in character – but for the picture of the world it makes a huge difference. Reichenbach rightly calls the realization "that the old basic concepts of natural science are only applicable to medium size ranges" the "Copernican turn of our time".

Let's take a closer look at what this is about. It is about determinism, the scientific concept of causality, which can be formulated as follows: if the state of a closed system is known exactly at one moment, then the state at any later point in time is determined by the laws of nature, i.e. I can calculate the state of the system at that moment from the state of the system known to me at that moment. We can visualize this as follows: mechanics deals with the movements of material points. "If the masses and the exact values of the initial position and initial velocity as well as the forces acting on them during a period of time" are given for all points, then "the final positions and final velocities" of all these material points "can be calculated with arbitrary precision" (v. Mises). This means that the old mechanics assumed that we could calculate the path of a mass point because this path was determined. Modern atomic physics, however, has proven this assumption to be a mistake: the material point of mass has dissolved before our eyes into the microcosm of the atom, the events on a small scale do not obey the laws that we assumed for them. The causal law is not wrong, but at certain points the ground is removed from it, as it were, it runs dry, it is no longer suitable (at such points) for describing real events.

According to classical mechanics, the simplest motion is that of a single material point; according to quantum mechanics, it is that of a simple periodic wave (Planck). According to wave mechanics, an exact description of a single specific material point is not possible. The location and momentum of the electrons cannot be precisely determined at the same time. To determine the position of the electron, it is illuminated; a quantum of light

hits the electron and changes the situation: the electron changes its momentum. "The more precisely the position is determined, i.e. the smaller the wavelength of the light used, the greater the change in momentum. Thus: the more precisely the position is determined, the less precise the momentum" (Bergmann). Planck calls this Heisenberg "uncertainty relation" "something quite unheard of in classical mechanics". "It has always been known that every measurement is subject to uncertainty; but it had always been assumed that the accuracy could be increased without limit by a proper refinement of the measuring methods. Now there is supposed to be a fundamental limit to the accuracy of measurement, and the most curious thing about it is that this limit does not refer to the individual quantities: Position or velocity, but to their combination. Each quantity in itself can, in principle, be measured with any degree of accuracy, but only at the expense of the accuracy of the others."

Again we come up against a limit, again the layman will know nothing more banal than the determination of this "accuracy limit", and again this determination reveals itself to us as a reference to reality and chance. For this accuracy limit is a fact, a random value.

But there is another side to the new physics. In classical physics it is assumed that we can observe the system of material points per se. It was believed that we could abstract from the effects that connect the object with the observing subject. However, the observation of a system "in itself" does not exist. "Modern atomic physics," as Heisenberg put it, "is not about the nature and structure of atoms, but about the processes that we perceive when observing the atom." The observer necessarily changes the observed system. "You can only do physics with observation processes, but not with the object of observation alone." – The object of observation cannot be detached from the conditions of

observation. There is no abstract observer in relation to an abstract system, but there is only one single context of reality. In this context of reality, however, no two moments are the same. There is therefore no "repetition" in the exact sense of the word. Even the physical observer does not step into the same river twice. The Heraclitean word suddenly takes on a deep new meaning through modern physics. Even in nature, which is described as "inanimate", nothing is repeated; every natural process only occurs once. It was the physicist Ernst Mach who expressed these thoughts decades ago; and it was the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche who, as a student of Heraclitus, renewed the same thought without any knowledge of physics in his "will to power".

In the absolute system of nature, an experiment is repeated exactly. In the deeper sense, repetition would not be necessary: a single experiment is theoretically sufficient to find "the law". The arrangements of the experiment contain a question to nature, the outcome provides the answer. Nevertheless, natural scientists have repeated their experiments again and again. This repetition becomes crucial in the new system, which has lost its absolute character; we know that there is no strict repetition, i.e. we never get exactly the same value. Gauss had already applied the theory of probability to the scattering of values. What Richard von Mises proposed at the Präger Congress goes far beyond this: "the results of the repeated measurement of a certain physical quantity with an unchanged experimental arrangement form a collective." The Gaussian error theory still assumes that we can achieve a "correct", absolute value, but that we cannot achieve it because of the "errors" that necessarily creep in. Now, on the other hand, there is no longer any talk of errors; the result of each individual experiment is recognized as such, none is less than the other. Each counts as much as a throw at the dice. We know that it is not a number that is defined by the repeated experiments, but an

infinite sequence of different numbers. Probability theory is now applied to this sequence; the result is not a fixed number, but a mean value, or, as von Mises puts it: "A theory is confirmed by the experiment if the calculated value agrees with the 'true value' of the measurement, i.e. the expected value determined by the object and arrangement of the measurement, which, strictly speaking, can only be determined after an infinite number of measurements."

I repeat the formula of determinism: "if the present state of a closed system is known exactly in all its determinants, then the future state of the system can be calculated from it." Modern physics teaches us to see with unrelenting clarity what we actually knew, but did not properly appreciate in its scope, namely that an ideal case is described here. The realistic modern physicist says: if I know the state exactly, I can deduce the state 8 – but I never know the state "exactly". The prerequisite of the general Naufal law cannot be realized. It is highly paradoxical: our measuring methods have become more refined, and precisely because they have become so fine, we have to say: they are not fine enough; they have reached the limit of accuracy; due to the nature of things themselves, e.g. the nature of the light beam, every attempt to get closer to things in a non-influencing way fails.

If, however, the presupposition falls, then the consequence also falls: we can now only infer the occurrence of state 8 with probability; if one wanted to say that the approximated state should at least determine the approximated state 8, then we must reply with Reichenbach: we do not even know whether the state is even approximately realized. The application of the causal concept to events thus means an overstretching; we can no longer speak of a general context of laws of nature, but of a context of probabilities.

This would have to lead to a reshaping of the concept of truth.

I am only hinting at the problem. Reichenbach believed he had to conclude that we must now assign a primary position to the concept of probability as opposed to the concept of truth. Truth would have to be defined as a borderline case of probability. I consider this conclusion to be logically inadmissible: truth logically precedes probability. Nevertheless, Reichenbach's radical conclusion is instructive, it expresses what is going on in modern physics: the turning away from the absolute system, which was finally saved once again by the theory of relativity, and the turning towards randomness and reality. Sentences with logical certainty and statements of reality are suddenly far apart. In the absolute system of physics there are statements of reality ("laws") with the character of absolute necessity, comparable to that of purely analytical propositions. The epistemology of this absolute system was given by Rant, whose main achievement was to allow the force and unconditionality of the logical relation of cause and consequence to flow into the real relation of cause and effect by means of transcendental deduction. Now this fiction falls away, and we must say: "Either the statement is connected with strict certainty, in which case it is of a purely logical nature (i.e. analytic) and says nothing at all about reality, or it means a restrictive statement of real content (i.e. it is synthetic), in which case the statement can only be asserted with probability." (Reichenbach.)

When I talk about a turn towards the real and the accidental, this is to be understood in the philosophical sense, just as it is to be understood in the mathematical sense when I talk about "probability" here. The reference to randomness and reality in no way excludes order. It only means that order, as we understand it today, has the character of randomness in contrast to the order of strict regularity that has been claimed up to now. The term "random" is therefore used by me in the sense of Leibniz, who contrasts eternal truths with accidental truths.

In philosophical terms, giving chance a place means giving time an influence. If we look at the examples cited from mathematics and physics, it always depends on a realization that can only take place at a certain point in time. For the deterministic system in physics, time does not actually exist. The temporal sequence does not bring anything new: what the experiment has proven once, it is believed here, is valid regardless of time and place, it is "general and necessary". As soon as we can no longer hold on to this, time, and thus reality, emerges. It is highly characteristic that Reichenbach has already attempted to introduce the opposition of past and future and the concept of present (admittedly in an unpsychological sense) into physics. Time also appears in the strictly determinate world and its theory of knowledge. But here it is merely, to speak with Kant, a means of schematism. The time scheme transforms the logical sequence into the causal sequence. Time is only an aid, it only serves to make the pure category of understanding applicable to reality. Two phenomena not only follow one another, but one occurs through the other; the later state of the system is "dependent" on the earlier one. Time has elapsed between the two states, but this is basically irrelevant: what is decisive is the dependence of one state on the other, just as in the logical realm the dependence of one proposition on another. So time is there here, and yet it is not there either, which is clearly expressed in the fact that a (quasi timeless) experiment suffices.

Now, on the other hand, time plays a decisive role: each observation has its own independent value, but each observation takes place at a specific time. Time no longer appears as a mere schema, as a mere timeline, but is contained in every datum used to calculate the mean value, just as every single throw of the dice that takes place at a certain time is included in the calculation of the "result" is taken into account. The replacement of strict causal determination by probability thus expresses a new relationship to

time, a more impartial one, as it were, a more appreciative one, in which time is no longer merely a serving schema.

We also found that the concept of time enters the realm of mathematics with intuitionism: here it even destroys the validity of the logical axioms: experience, the finding of a certain sequence in the infinite sequence of digits of the decimal fraction -r, i.e. a certain moment in time, becomes decisive, we can no longer make a statement without regard to time.

It is clear that the abandonment of strict determinism means a turning point of still incalculable significance. Max Born tells how he was asked whether the time of occultism was coming? The door seems to be open to everything. And not only in the direction of occultism, but also in the opposite direction. Those thinkers who today make themselves advocates of the new physics represent a strictly non-metaphysical philosophy. They speak of a deification of nature, and the last of the dethroned gods is called "the law". The law is also anthropomorphic; the new image of nature is no longer an "image". Absolute sobriety reigns here; there are only facts and conceptual connections between facts. Reichenbach says that disenchantment and disenchantment are the basic traits of natural research, and not only of natural research, but of the present. And he believes that we may regret the loss of emotional values, but we do not regain them as a result. From this point of view, it is possible to define cognition as a clear assignment of signs to objects. It is possible to speak of a new scientific method of philosophizing, which is characterized by the fact that it consists only "in the logical analysis of the propositions and concepts of empirical science" (Carnap). – We are grateful to men like Schlick and Reichenbach for showing us the methodological tendencies of mathematics and physics, but this clarification is not yet philosophy. Philosophy has long been familiar with this "modern" attitude: it calls it positivism. According to modern positivists, the

turn in the individual sciences corresponds to the disillusionment and rationalization of our existence. This theoretical and practical rationalism could be summed up in the formula: less and less content, more and more calculation. Without realizing it, these modern positivists fall into Auguste Comte's three-stage scheme: he distinguished between a religious, a metaphysical and a scientific stage of humanity. The modern positivists distinguish between an age of theological thinking, an age of causal thinking, which is just behind us, and the present age of statistical thinking. By this statistical thinking, however, they believe they must understand a "metaphysical, imageless thinking. These positivist thinkers become fantasists because of their aversion to metaphysics; they dream of an order of the world that is no longer an order, but consists only of facts and calculable relationships. The truth is quite different: the Causal Law contains the formula for a system of order. It is anthropomorphic, it creates an image of the world – but without such an image man will never live. Philosophy must always be anthropomorphic. Positivism has as little prospect as occultism. The image of the world, to which the idea of strict determination belonged, is being replaced in our day by another image-world – not by imagelessness. Man cannot live in a world without images; he is human because he has an image of the world. The view of probability corresponds to a dynamic image of the world.

The equations remain, but they are interpreted differently. The word for interpretation is no longer causality, but probability. This does not mean the transition from causal interpretation to mere calculation, but the transition from causal interpretation to a different interpretation. The absolute nature of a law is replaced by the probability of a tendency. This ("closer to nature") interpretation could be called a dynamic one, whereby the word "dynamic" is used in the opposite sense to Planck's usage.

Finally, we must consider the causal interpretation of the world in the larger context in which it has come to dominate and has asserted itself to this day. The supreme prerequisite here is that all events are determined and this determination is recognizable. We can predict the path of a material point, its trajectory is precisely determined. The world is thus, so to speak, brightly illuminated down to the last corner. Nowhere is there anything unpredictable; through our equations we control the world from the smallest to the largest. The significance of the universal law of causality therefore lies in three moments: 1. this law makes the world appear simple, clear and transparent; 2. it equates the present with the past and the future and therefore makes it possible to control the future. From this follows 3. absolute security. There is nothing unforeseen, there is no reason for any fear. In the past, this view of the world was called profane per se, but now we recognize with a keen eye that it also had its God: the law of causality, which the atoms served in strict determination.

The other side: the autonomous human being lives in this causally determined world. Universal causal law and universal moral law belong together. On the one hand, the material point, whose path is prescribed – on the other hand, the immaterial ego, which determines its own path.

If even today Max Planck, who as a physicist brought about the great revolution, does not want to give up the causal view of the world as a philosopher, then it is quite clear from his arguments that he does not do so because he does not want to give up the opposite element: the absolutely free ego, time, causality, freedom of will. Kant's successors, above all Hegel, sought to abolish this opposition. They replaced it with a dialectically constructed unity. This unity was "dynamic" – although Hegel did not use the word, the young Schelling used it all the more frequently. Hegel's deed, the after-effects of which still affect us

today, was ultimately that he made spirit, freedom, into something dynamic. (However, this did not overcome the old world view; Newtonian science and causalism were victorious over a philosophy of "dynamics" that had no connection with the linear sciences. It does not float in the air, it does not contradict what we observe and know, but the new concept of the dynamic proves to be real also on the basis of the methods of the Linzel sciences. Thus, what was not possible in the ;g. century: the agreement between philosophy and science. In the second half of the century, this agreement was bought at the price of philosophy renouncing itself. The greatest philosopher of this time, Nietzsche, who developed a dynamic philosophy in the "will to power", therefore stood alone.

Hegel still sought to overcome the opposition of a universal abstract law and an equally universal abstract freedom through a "synthesis". This overcoming remained within the scope of the humanistic world view, which included the concepts of causality and freedom. The basic idea of the humanistic world view is the absolute nature of the human spirit. This absolute spirit corresponds to an absolute world. In terms of epistemology, this is represented by the belief in unconditionally valid general propositions of a formal and material nature. The latter include the causal theorem. Humanism thus corresponds to a double system of absolutes: the material world of absolute determination and the ideal world of absolute freedom. On the one hand, the world as an ideal case – a fiction; on the other hand, the human being, as humanus, the ideal case of the human being – a fiction.

This double absolute system has collapsed. Such a statement does not arise from a mood, is not just an opinion, but must be made on the basis of the contradictions to which it leads in mathematics and physics.

The topic demanded a continuation into the field of

descriptive natural sciences, and further into the humanities. The methodological problem is already visible everywhere and indicates the great turning point. A new hope for philosophy can be drawn from this situation. Philosophy does not consist in a popularization of the results of science, nor in a systematization of pious wishes, but is kept alive in connection with the methods of science.

The Theoretical and the Political Man

Lecture given to the student body.
Dresden, February 27 1933.

There is a deep contradiction in the nature of our time: our values and concepts are based on the image of a purely theoretical human being, while our reality is highly activist. The man of our time is the most active man who has ever lived. This activity must not be dismissed with fleeting remarks about the "restlessness" of our time. An activity that has not yet understood itself appears as "restlessness". The issue is not to vilify this activity, but to recognize it as an expression of something deeper. It is impossible to understand the working man, the man of toil and seriousness, from within the prevailing conceptual world; it is impossible to understand the political man from within this conceptual world. I will not establish here the relative rights of the theoretical and the political man, I will not contrast two psychological "types" and attempt a "synthesis" or a balance, but I will justify and develop the following thesis:

The theoretical human being, from which the circulating concepts of value are derived, is a fiction. There is no theoretical man – which does not mean, as I will show, that "there is no science". Man is essentially a political being, i.e. he is not a being who first contemplates, considers values, and then acts; he is not a being whose existence is determined by the fact that he participates in a higher "spiritual world" – then most people would be excluded from being human – but he is an originally acting being.

Under the rule of the fiction of the "theoretical man", incredibly primitive judgments are made today about political realities. Today's educated people have a certain arrogance

towards politics. People act as if the political activism of our day requires an apology. But only those who are too lazy to test their concept of man against historical reality need an apology. I consider this examination to be the first task of the philosopher in this age. I consider it the first task of the philosopher, to speak with Nietzsche, to correctly assess the relationship between the authority of values and the authority of the forces at work. (Jenseits von Gut und Böse, Aph. 224.)

Through its political activism, our people are showing at this time that they have a more correct relationship to the living forces and to historical realities than the circle of educated people who, blinded by the delusion of the theoretical man, look down arrogantly on elementary movements. The destruction of this delusional image of man is the prerequisite for the unification of those parts of our people who today stand at odds with each other as the "educated" and the "uneducated".

The humanistic-idealistic philosophy of education is based on the idea that a superstructure of the spirit, the bright world of consciousness, a world above the "horror of the times", in which there is no arguing and fighting, but where quiet contemplation, understanding and cognition have their place, rises above a substructure of hardship and work, of contradiction and conflict. And the prerequisite is that there should not be that struggle, that hardship of work, that division of the political struggle. Man is only fully human where he plays. Far from it is the question of whether he does not become fully human where he commits himself. Man is destined for the spirit: this is interpreted as follows: for "participation" in spiritual values, for contemplation of a world of the spirit, and finally for a "realization" of spiritual values. However, action is not the realization of recognized values. It is not made that easy for man. The person who truly acts is always in a state of uncertainty, he is "without knowledge", as

Nietzsche says. This is precisely what makes action into action, that it is not covered by a value. The agent exposes himself, his part is never the securitas, but the certitudo. I would like to refer to this uncertainty and uncoveredness with the word commitment.

In the system of the "theoretical" human being, spirituality is sought in participation. Here it is humane, it is noble to participate in the spiritual world. Contemplation is noble, purely "spiritual" productivity. In this system, people who work and act are considered second-rate. This is the reason why an idealistic pedagogy will not be able to cope with the reality of the labor camp. This pedagogy does not see the destiny of the working, politically active person. One only sees its peculiar spirituality when one is no longer distracted by the idea of "participation", when one recognizes the spirituality of commitment, which is independent of the degree of historical education; independent of the innate or acquired capacity for contemplation.

The system of the theoretical man can be characterized by the following sentence: the theoretical man behaves objectively, the political man behaves "unobjectively", how do we arrive at this opposition: objective-unobjective? how is objectivity measured? Line assessment of human things from the point of view of absolute objectivity is only possible if there is an absolute location, i.e. a location outside of reality that is to be assessed. For as long as we stand within reality, we cannot be "absolutely" objective. This is in fact the case: the system of the theoretical human being pretends that we have a fixed position in relation to all reality, thus also in relation to the acting human being – this is precisely the position of the merely observing, the theoretical human being. Political behavior is seen as a deviation from the theoretical position of one man's ("objective") behavior. From the very beginning, there is a suspicion of political people. The sphere of

action is ostracized, political means "party-political", and party-political means "unobjective".

This circulus vitiosus is unavoidable as long as one assumes that science is a creation of pure consciousness. In the system of the theoretical man, consciousness is regarded as the fixed point outside reality, as the Archimedean point from which reality can be recognized "disinterestedly". The theoretical human being as the human being of pure consciousness corresponds to the theoretical object, which is adequately recognized untouched by a subject. The word consciousness is intended to designate the center of a reference system that guarantees absolute neutrality, a reference system that exerts no influence on what is to be observed and ascertained. Something is established "scientifically" here means: it is related to nothing but pure consciousness. This means: it is not related to anything, because pure consciousness is merely a function, not a location. In pure consciousness, the human being as a living, interested human being is set equal to zero, so to speak "scientifically" means to speak within a reference system whose center is equal to zero. Because consciousness is uninterested, impersonal, inhuman, it enjoys the highest trust in the system of the theoretical human being, because it is therefore "impartial" and "neutral". (It is assumed without further ado that consciousness has an excellent relationship to truth, that it is not man as a whole who relates to truth, but only the intellect, which determines what a "fact" is.)

To behave theoretically means to act as if one were not a living, interested human being, as if it were possible for a human being to place himself in the pure nothingness of pure consciousness. A year and a half ago I spoke here about the intellectual situation in the Linzel sciences. Today, Heisenberg's "uncertainty relation" also reminds physicists that, independently of a sensually organized subject a process cannot even be observed. Little

things that were ignored under the rule of the image of the theoretical human being lead us today, especially in the so-called "exact" sciences, to revise our ideas of science. Not only consciousness but also the subject is always involved. The cognizing subject certainly has a distance to that which is to be cognized, but this distance is not infinite; if we were nothing but consciousness, then we would have an infinite distance to things. Line such infinite distance would guarantee that we recognize the object absolutely, untouched, i.e. without any relation from us as living human beings. If there were a pure consciousness, then there would also be a non-"distorting", absolute cognition. But our real cognition is not the cognition of a pure consciousness. Nor is it the clouded cognition of an absolute consciousness. The distancing from the object into the infinite is not only practically impossible, is not only an inherent "incompleteness", but cognition consists from its origin in something other than a mere relation of consciousness to things. It is a prejudice that cannot be justified by anything, that consciousness stands in an excellent relationship to truth. The living human being does not cloud cognition, but makes cognition possible in the first place. The cognizer and the cognized are not separated by an infinite distance; between them lies a finite distance, a distance in time. Between them does not lie the distance that exists between the timeless and the temporal, but they are both related to each other in time, in the real context of things. Even the scientifically cognizing person does not stand in the here and now, but in the here and now. Recognizing does not mean relating this world to an other world, even if this other world has evaporated into a "transcendent should", but rather recognizing originally means: to be interested in something, whoever would be completely uninterested in "pure" consciousness would no longer be able to recognize in the human sense.

This does not deny consciousness as a function. It is merely

saying that at the center of the reference system that we call scientific knowledge can only be the whole human being who has consciousness, but not a "pure" consciousness that is also a human being with hands and feet for the purpose of operating apparatuses, writing and calculating.

The scholar, the researcher, the scientist – they are not identical with the "theoretical human being". Conventionally, we think of it this way: there is a theoretical person (a "truth-finding act"), and the scholar, the researcher are special forms, namely the active forms of the "theoretical person in general". But being a researcher, being a scholar does not mean: being the modification of a general theoretical behavior, but it means something specific. Science is the result of a specific activity. It is not a product of contemplative behavior, not a product of an absolute consciousness, but a product of the scientific mind. This is not a tautology; when I trace science back to the scientific mind as its origin, I am expressing the fact that science has its origin in a specific activity.

One cannot speak of science without speaking of the way of thinking (Kant: "Denkungsart") from which it emerges. The rehabilitation of the mind is the first thing that is necessary today. The spirit has not been unjustly discredited since it descended to the intellect. Spirit is not identical with intellect or consciousness. Rudolf Hildebrand teaches us in a famous article in the Grimm dictionary that the word "spirit" was only applied to the "thinking in us" in the first century. Originally, it denoted the living, life-giving, directing and acting in us – in other words, the active (popularly: "what kind of spirit has entered you that you do this?"). It is not pure consciousness that is the source of knowledge, but something comprehensive and original, the spirit. It is the spirit that compels the intellect to produce science. Science, too, has its origin in enthusiasm. The true researcher and

the true scholar are filled with scientific enthusiasm, but they are not representatives of a general "theoretical attitude". It is a bold, daring spirit that has given rise to the sciences. The same spirit has produced technology, of which we all too often see only the destructive side, but which in its essence is entirely positive, constructive, "constructive". Not every race, not every people has this spirit; some races and peoples do not understand this spirit at all, but always mean only the intellect. It is primarily the peoples of the north, the Germanic peoples, who have become productive in science. The Greeks, who brought forth the concept of science that is still valid today, are the Germanic peoples of the Mediterranean. It is no coincidence that we know the Germanic peoples as a warlike race. They are a people of discoveries and conquests. It is no coincidence that we speak of scientific discoveries and conquests. All real discoveries require the courage to go to extremes. There is something warlike in the behavior of the scientifically discerning mind. What is a problem? An opponent whose pursuit the mind immediately takes up. You wrestle with a problem, you try to overcome it. Every insight is a victory, every result a battle won; anyone who does not take a belligerent approach to problems, who does not "go after them" with tenacity and cunning, with determination and courage, should not speak of cognition. Take the old saying seriously: sapere aude! If you want to do science on a grand scale, you have to go after things, you have to have a grip on things. One must have become aware of a problem in order to be able to tackle it? Certainly! But who can tell us whether we have not only become aware of this problem because we want to tackle it? There is no recognition without the courage to recognize the "theoretical man" – that means: "scientific attitude", "scientific mindset", "will to truth". But basing the knowledge of truth on the will to truth is just like basing the creation of a work of art on the will to the work of art, or the creation of a lime on the will to the lime. There

is as little a scientific "attitude" as there is an artistic "attitude". There are only researchers and artists; in science, too, it depends on the linden. Artistic attitude is another word for impotence; if a poem is said to be "deeply felt", this is the criticism of the bungler; when it is said of a scientific work that it speaks of an "honest will to truth", this is the praise of the layman – or one who presents himself as a layman. More often, of course, the opposite option is used by declaring that there is no will to truth.

The real critic does not ask about the will to truth. He asks: what has come out? Has it been done right? Is it factually correct? The word "factual" here does not mean: does the work fulfill the requirements of a mystical absolute objectivity, but rather the word has a much simpler, more sober, so to speak craft-like meaning. It means: does the work meet the requirements that "we" place on a scientific work, is the author at the height of the work already done, in short, has the author mastered the scientific technique? These questions point to a system of practices whose mastery is the first and indispensable prerequisite of scientific activity. These practices are not only the art of using a library, etc., but much more: a whole system of actions and grips. It is not those who call the "will to truth" their own, but those who have mastered this system who are there for science.

In this sense, it is technology that opens up and provides the material. You can master technology without being gripped by the spirit of science. This is the bottom line difference between science and art. The technique of science can be learned to a completely different extent than the technique of art. – Methods stand between spirit and technique. They are the spirit of science in action. They designate the directions in which the mind moves. It is not recognized with the help of a general "recognizing attitude", but is recognized with the help of methods. It is the method that "asserts" the facts. In themselves, the facts are mute, just as the law

is mute if it is not enforced by a power. I would like to point out the double meaning of the term "assert": theoretical (validity) and practical (assertion).

What is fruitful in the sciences, what has a revolutionary effect, what creates a school and holds a school together? It is not the "facts", nor individual theories, but the methods. Theories emerge from methods. The word method does not merely denote a formal activity of the intellect. This formal activity is already recognized with the word technique. Methods are the manifestations of a creative activity; the spirit of the discoverer lives on in them; they only arise through the commitment of the whole person. The great methodological trends in the history of science also denote "spiritual" currents. Purity in science does not mean disinterestedness, but it means creative rest, productivity.

The layman thinks that the "higher up" a theory is, the better it is. This lay opinion is closely connected with the fiction of the "theoretical man"; those who live in science smile at this opinion, and if they do not express it publicly, it is precisely because they are subject to the general prejudice. The value of a theory is not characterized by the fact that it encompasses or explains "as much as possible" or even "everything". Appearances always remain outside a theory, no theory explains all facts. Rather, every theory has a certain power. Line theory does not reflect, but has a certain power. The theory is a theory of a certain number of "facts" that it brings into a context. The scientific dispute is about the question: which theory is the more powerful in relation to the facts? The assessment of the theories against each other in terms of their power is the critique.

The history of science is structured according to the invention of methods: Parmenides, Heraclitus, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche – just as many names as methods. And so too in the individual sciences. I am particularly

reminded of the importance of the methodological dispute in modern history and economics.

The main characteristic of the theoretical man is his "innocence". The terms "theoretical" and "factual" have a moral character. He who wants to recognize the truth is allowed two things: observation and the establishment of "facts" – and the use of logic. Any activity other than observation and reasoning tarnishes or destroys "innocence". In the system of theoretical man, one tries to develop sciences purely "deductively". I am reminded of mathematics and jurisprudence. One takes refuge in the innocence of pure logic as a daughter of pure consciousness. Science then emerges from the courtship of this pure logic with so-called experience. The real emergence of science from the great methodological stakes is ignored; there is only empiricism and logic.

Why is the theoretical man considered innocent? because he is neutral ("tolerant"), because he opens himself up to all sides, because his disinterestedness is considered as much as "universal interest". The idea of this innocence is based on the other idea that neutrality and objectivity are the same thing. It is misunderstood that objectivity can only exist within a method; if one accepts everything, one cannot be "objective" in the scientific sense; scientific objectivity only exists where something is methodically brought to bear. However, this always happens in a certain direction, scientifically relevant are "facts" and "facts".

The term "fact" only exists within a system of validity. As long as a fact does not have a fixed place in such a system, it exists only as a problem. Objectivity has nothing to do with neutrality; real objectivity only exists within a system of action, i.e. within a method; anyone who wants to create something, even in science, cannot hover "above" things. The cognizer does not live on a high tower; if he did, he would recognize nothing; he who opens

himself up to the whole world will not enrich science with any knowledge. The truly cognizing person only opens himself up to what he wants to recognize.

All great achievements of science, measured against the ideals of the "theoretical man", are "one-sided" and therefore guilt-ridden. Each individual method is equally culpable because it is not "universal". Only a universal method would be free of guilt. But is it the sense of the methods that they are only parts of a universal method? Does science mean that all methods "complement" each other to form a universal method, that the results of all methods taken together would result in an ideal, absolute science, as it were? No! There is no "complement" of methods to an absolute knowledge. Science is completely present in every great method. The scientific spirit relates to the truth through the methods. As soon as one seeks to "supplement" one method with another – that is the peculiar law of knowledge – the relationship to the depth of reality, which is fixed in every true method, is lost. Every method denotes a relationship to the whole of reality; if one robs it of this claim, one robs it of its meaning.

A general law of our existence appears in this peculiarity of cognition. The living human being is an interested, active being. There is no life and action without "tendency". Living existence is essentially tendentious. There is no such thing as directionless action. Action, whether artistic, scientific or political, always takes place in a certain direction. In the case of artistic action we call this direction style, in scientific action we call it method, in political action we call it party, to act politically means to take sides. If a politician is said to be objective, this can mean two things: firstly, that he is not a politician; secondly, that the direction he takes has great power over "things"; political objectivity only exists within a system of action, i.e. within a party. Actions that are detached from such a system of action have the

same meaning as "facts" outside a methodical system of validity. If a civil servant does his duty every day, he does not yet act politically; he acts politically when he classifies all his actions within a certain system of action. Actions in the true sense of the word only exist within a system of action that brings them to bear, or in which they become politically effective.

The system of parliamentarism is the political system corresponding to the fiction of theoretical man: it signifies innocence in politics. In the consistent parliamentary system, the mysticism of absolute objectivity reaches its climax. The parliamentary system simulates a political reference system at the center of which stands a pure, innocent body politic. In theory, the parliament consists of nothing but individuals, the "representatives of the German people". (Art. 20 RV.) Each of these individuals is a cognizant person who acts to the best of his knowledge and conscience, an expert. The resolutions of the body consisting entirely of experts bear the character of absolute objectivity. Parliament thus occupies the place that consciousness has in the system of theoretical man. The moment of directedness is completely denied. This denial already lies in the separation of the legislative and executive powers. The legislative represents reason, the executive the will that depends on reason and merely "realizes" it. The will, the administration, is covered. There is no such thing as an original will, an original action and will. There is no independently acting, purely political power, there is only a body that makes decisions on the basis of common understanding, whose decisions are "implemented" by a merely executive power through administrative channels.

This system is the expression of the depoliticization of our entire existence. There is no more impressive fact than that the political fact of the party, which dominates reality, is not mentioned at all in the constitution. It only appears in the "Rules

of Procedure" of the Reichstag, i.e. in a harmlessly "factual" place. It is not concealed in the constitution by chance, but excluded by inner necessity. According to theory, parliament is not composed of parties, but of individuals who, according to Art. 21, are representatives of the whole people, subject only to their conscience and not bound by orders. This Art. 21, which contains the whole philosophy of liberalism, denies that in political reality the individual can only ever assert his knowledge and his will within a system of action. The image of the innocent, theoretical man prevails so unreservedly that the glaring contradiction between this image and factional coercion is silently accepted, although it is not hidden from anyone that the administration, for example, cannot be apolitical either, that it always depends on who is "administering". And the innocence of Parliament is such that it can justifiably be compared to the innocence of a virgin with about eleven children. I expressly point out that I am not pronouncing a moral judgement, but rather characterizing a system: the lords are the parties that Parliament has, without the basic law of the state knowing anything about it.

In practice, the existence of parties is recognized – but even then, the idea of the theoretical man remains dominant. It comes to the fore in the opinion that the citizen is obliged to universality, in the opinion that all parties together have, as it were, the political truth, and that therefore, as an "objectively" thinking political person, one must "accept" all parties. It is the same idea of the obligation to universality as in the field of cognition. Thus, consistent parliamentarism even surpasses the epistemology of neutrality and universality by recognizing a point of complete neutrality outside the supposedly apolitical body of the legislature consisting of individuals: the state court.

There is as little universal politics as there is universal knowledge. No researcher has the truth at his disposal, no

politician has the whole of the people at his disposal; whoever considers the disposal of the truth in science as well as in politics to be the ideal appropriate to us, should bow his knee and leave science and politics. Submit to the authority that has the truth at its disposal – or leave yourself to despair. Neither the researcher nor the politician are "imperfect" because they do not have the whole at their disposal. As long as the accusation of imperfection is leveled against them in this sense, the false ideal of universality and neutrality is taken as a basis. "One-sidedness" in the sense of these ideals belongs to the essence of action and knowledge, because it belongs to the essence of man. Justice is the law of every form of activity. We must therefore not say "one-sidedness", but directionality. The tragedy of our existence does not lie in the fact that we cannot be universal, or that we can only "approach" universality, but it lies much deeper and has a completely different meaning than that of failure or moral guilt. Every action, in science as in politics, is a grasp of the whole. The question posed to every epoch is: who is to represent the whole? The question of who is the essential question, there is no escaping it. There is no politics without a name, just as there is no science without a name. Recognition and action do not differ in the same way as confident action and egoistic self-seeking, nor do they fall together under the concept of "expert" action, but rather under the concept of risk. From the recognizer as well as the great methods and the great empires bear the names of those who dared to do them.

For good reason, I used to say commitment, not "decision". The researcher, according to Max Weber, is an expert with a decision for a worldview. That is operation with worldview supplementation. Max Weber separated purely logically comprehensible and purely empirical facts on the one hand from practical, ethical or ideological evaluations on the other.

Purely theoretical behavior on the one hand – activity on the

other. This separation is false, which can be demonstrated by the fact that there is no real activity on the "other" side. All action is seen here as taking sides in favor of certain values. These values are somehow given, recognized. They are cultural values, values that are attached to "cultural goods", what is the decision in favor of such cultural values other than the decision in favor of a decision? Namely, for a decision made earlier and carried out by others. But cultural values are in reality products of active power, not products of the recognition of values. The productive person is completely forgotten here! To act does not mean: to decide for..., because that presupposes that one knows what one is deciding for, but to act means: to take a direction, to take sides, by virtue of a fateful order, by virtue of "one's own right", without the possibility of a cover". To act means to commit oneself without certainty, only with certainty. Linguistically, it is also possible to use the word decision for this action. But I avoid the word decision because today it is used exclusively in the sense of Max Weber. The decision for something that I have recognized is already secondary.

Decision as a necessary evil is the ultimate concept of liberalism. Although the decision is made for recognized values, it is still equated with the fall from grace. Decision here is always tainted with the stigma of irrelevance. Or there is no objectivity per se, which is then followed by a decision; there are scientifically relevant "facts" and "conclusions" only within a system of methodical activity. It is not the doer who is guilty, but the non-doer. Purity lies not in restraint, not in caution, but in the nature of the activity. Today's discussion, with its distinction between political and party-political, spiritual and non-spiritual, factual and tendentious, is at an impasse, for it presupposes that purely theoretical behavior is possible for human beings at all. The discussion cannot revolve around whether to will and act, but always only around the content of willing and acting; it cannot revolve around whether to take sides or not, but only around the

direction in which sides are taken. In this sense, I describe the opposition of political and factual as highly unobjective, i.e. inappropriate to the nature of man. This lack of objectivity reveals the hubris, the arrogance that lies in the assumption of a purely theoretical human being. We are not contemplative beings who make ourselves guilty through action and commitment, but rather we are active, acting beings and make ourselves guilty by denying our essence, guilty through neutrality and tolerance. For neutrality and tolerance can only ever disguise the reality of our condition. Under their cover, the directions continue to exist. Our task is not to conceal, but to reveal. In revelation, every direction shows what it is, it provokes a counter-attack and ultimately succumbs to the fate that called it. That is our lot – we cannot escape it by refusing to call upon fate. It comes after all, nolentem fata trahunt, volentem ducunt.

The resolution passed by the Rectors' Conference in Halle on the occasion of the events in Braunschweig on December 4th is a classic example of the prevailing way of thinking. It states: "It is far from the minds of the German universities and their rectors to force young students to take up employment in the university with the problems of political life. Rather, it considers it self-evident that teachers and students should take an active interest in the fate of the German fatherland. On the other hand, with the emphasis of their responsibility towards the state and science, they fundamentally reject the introduction of party politics into the university."

Students are therefore allowed to engage in politics with their minds and hearts – but they are not allowed to engage in politics. Ia and no united! You, gentlemen, are only allowed to concern yourselves with an imaginary German state, not with a truly desired one. truly an example of the theorization of our thinking! But also an example of the politicization of our thinking?

Certainly not! On the contrary, this resolution is decidedly political. Abstention from politics, neutrality, can have a twofold political meaning, and it always has one of two: either it serves to preserve the political status quo, or it is directed against an emerging political power and seeks to make it more difficult for it to stabilize.

if man is an active, political being, if he is directed, tendentious, how is science possible at all? what is the scientific form of activity? Explaining this is the task of a theory of science that focuses not on concepts such as "facts" and "logical conclusions", but on the concept of method. I have developed the principle. It is a question of where the cut is made. In the system of the theoretical human being, the cut is made between contemplation and activity. The "theoretical human being" is the acknowledging, passively behaving human being. But the moment of contemplation and passivity occurs in both cognition and action. The doer must also understand and assess a situation. The wrong distinction is made when one separates active interest from contemplative disinterest. Practical interest – I refer here to a "printed work" by Albert Holfelder – is characterized by the fact that it is aimed at changing the behavior. Being practically active means changing the world, means touching things, attacking them; theoretical-active interest, on the other hand, leaves things unchanged. But this leaving things unchanged is not identical with being uninterested; anyone who is completely uninterested no longer recognizes.

The fundamental act is: letting the world be. (The term "letting be" in this sense comes from Heidegger.) In comparison with the doer, the observer lets the world be. But it is a misunderstanding of this act if one insinuates an absolute contemplation into this letting-be. This letting be has no relation to the tendency of universality, it does not require the extinction of living interest, it does not demand mortification or asceticism, we are here taking a

look at a great historical context: the scientific subject should withdraw completely from the world like the medieval monk who leaves the world behind in order to consecrate himself entirely to the via contemplativa. The theoretical man is the secularized monk: far from the world in absolute security, he leads a life of asceticism, which, of course, is always in danger of turning into an idyllic life. Such security does not correspond to a life of research driven by great impulses. Science would never have been created in the idyllic corners of a monastery. The monk type of science corresponds to research with a positive orientation, which clings to the individual, which does not find new methods, which does not dare.

Not the complete "letting be" is the prerequisite of science, not absolute contemplation and mortification, but the living, active spirit. It is not to be disputed that the monk type exists and will exist in science, what is disputed is that we can understand the essence of science from this type. It is not a question here of separating two psychological types, but of determining the essence of science from its origin. Only the spirit that has produced science, and that would produce it again if it were lost, only it can be the spirit of science, only he can maintain science on its great course; what science is cannot be determined by any single phenomenon. Its definition must be based on the activity of the scientific genius, just as the definition of science is based on genius. In order to recognize the spirit of science, it is not enough to take just any work or look into a laboratory; what has once been created can be imitated. Thus genius is followed by talent, and the works of talent and even those of the imitator of talent have a certain value. But no one will determine art according to talent, let alone according to the imitator of talent. Likewise, science cannot be determined according to the type of the monk, because this type did not create it. It was created by the type of warrior man, as represented by the Greek in reality and in his ethics.

The German university, which is modeled on Berlin University, is founded on the image of theoretical man, on the concept of universal, absolute knowledge. This university is not being politicized by some today, but has been politicized from the beginning, i.e. it has never been able to be what it pretended to be. Only a university can be politicized if it is based on foundations that do not correspond to the real human being; today we demand the political university: only the political university cannot be "politicized".

The People and the Educated

Radio lecture. 3rd April, 1933.

The division between the educated and the uneducated is even deeper and more disastrous than other divisions in the life of our people. In no other nation is the difference between the educated and the "people" as stark as here. In our country, the educated are not popular; at the same time, however, the educated are considered almost everything. This results in a contradiction, and one of the tasks facing us today is to investigate the question of why being "educated" in our country still means being separate from the people and, in a fatal sense, being something "different" from the others.

I see the deeper reason for this separation in the fact that the archetype of the educated person in our country is the theoretical person, i.e. the essentially passive person who wants to understand everything, who observes everything from a "high vantage point", from a distance – a type that the people simply cannot imagine. For the people only understand the person who is active, who has something in mind; they only understand the active person because they themselves relate to life actively and not contemplatively. The working and fighting man is comprehensible to the people, the merely understanding, the "theoretical" man is not. When our people today cheer a band of men who have been led through difficult struggles to a great victory by an active man of the highest rank, it is a sign that they find themselves in these men and their leader.

The theoretical man, who confronts the people in the form of the educated man, is rejected by the people. This rejection must not be confused with hostility towards science and its representatives. There is no question of such enmity among the

people; it is peculiarly found only[115] among educated people. The people are filled with a dark reverence for science. The scholar and the researcher are popular figures, as can be seen from the fact that they are surrounded by the humor of the people. The educated man, on the other hand, is merely the object of the wit of the educated, not the object of the humor of the people. The people's attitude towards them is not humorous and appreciative, but almost hostile and reserved. They sense something alien in theoretical education, which they have the power to reject but not to fight. The people meet the type of "high and mighty" judge with respectful but suspicious silence. It is shocking to watch the silent defensive struggle of our people, who have remained healthy, against the popular type of purely theoretical man.

In the face of this division, many are still content to say: this is our fate, we have become what we are through humanistic philosophy and education. Such despondency does not seem appropriate to today's situation in life and science. If, at a time of political-legal and economic-social upheaval, long-prepared revolutions are simultaneously taking place in the realm of the spirit, if a new, truer image of man has become visible in the work of contemporary thinkers at the same moment that the German people are treading new political paths, then the scope and depth of the current turning point is also recognizable.

The discovery that German philosophy made following Nietzsche can be described in a single word. It is the discovery that man is a political being. This does not mean that man, among other things, can also behave politically – that would hardly be a discovery; nor does it only mean what Aristotle's old definition already contains, according to which man is a political, i.e. a social being. Rather, the sentence here: man is a political being means as much as: man is by nature active, working, shaping, directed towards something, "tendentious", if you like – at any rate not

essentially being, thinking, understanding, contemplating. There are contemplative natures, there are moments of contemplation in every human life, but man's being cannot be determined according to this. The basic law of this being is a law of activity. Every single person "is" a whole system of actions, and he is nothing more.

It follows that man will always fail if he seeks an absolute location outside the system of action that we call life. There is no place for any human being where he would no longer be a political being, where he would be removed from the struggle. He can only exist as an agent within a system of actions and resistances. Where this basic political character of existence is not recognized, where man is constructed according to a concept of value, the raped reality takes its revenge: man then imagines that he floats above things, he imagines that he can evade taking sides, he fakes a neutral place on which he supposedly stands – and thus falls prey to the will of another who does not surrender to such illusions.

The word political thus serves us here to describe the original character of all human existence; we have a right to use the word in this way because this basic character of man emerges most strongly in the actual political sphere. The sphere of actual political action is therefore not a sphere alongside others, or even subordinate to the sphere of spiritual acts and goods, but it is the central, the actually "human" sphere. This means that man is not a being that "recognizes" values and then "realizes" these values, but rather a being that creates values, that plans and designs, that works and rules, i.e. a political being.

It is not possible to explain here what consequences this insight into the basic political character of man has for the doctrine of cognition. Scientific cognition only becomes fully comprehensible to us through this idea. In the light of it we understand the great importance that is attached to scientific knowledge.

The methods of scientific cognition, in the deeper sense of the word, are the experimental arrangements and guiding points of view, the hypotheses and anticipations. Even a scientific procedure is nothing other than a system of actions. Here we merely want to subject the idea of the theoretical man in his political form, i.e. the false idea of the political man, to a critique by contrasting it with the image of the real political man that is taking shape today.

The political man as we see him today is opposed to the citizen as a manifestation of the theoretical man. Overcoming the seemingly political man in the form of the citizen was probably the greatest and most difficult achievement in the context of the national revolution.

Let us remember that the struggle and the uprising were the work of the people and their leaders, that the educated class as such kept aloof and that only a few individuals from this class took part. It was not so long ago that educated people could say in an official document about a student who had fallen under the Communists' gaze: The student Schaffeld was killed in a political brawl. The people never understood this neutral talk of "political brawls". The people saw and experienced the struggle between the awakening Germany and its merciless enemy, they grew into this struggle, they took sides first internally and finally visibly. Among the Sebildeten, this partisanship was regarded as unseemly until the end. Here one behaved as a "citizen", not as a political person, and being a citizen means being neutrally fine, it means respecting the laws, no matter how they are, how they are interpreted and applied.

This seemingly political person without partisanship is still a danger among us. Even today, some people only see the splendor of these days and think they can continue their existence in the glimmer of the new at least retrospectively makes it clear that no

SA. man, no Hitler Youth and no student has been the victim of a "political brawl" in recent years, but that each of them has set an example for us as a political person, he does not have the right to raise his hand in honor of Germany and sing the song of liberation.

There is a contrast between those who stand up for the honor of their people and those who, with civic distance, do what corresponds to their interests and an additional "attitude"! For the citizen, political action is something that is added to the rest of their being, which is completely independent of politics. It can also be absent, indeed it is good if it is absent, because, as is well known, politics corrupts character. One can only have character as a private citizen. Only as a private citizen does the citizen believe he can preserve his innocence; when a person begins to act, so he thinks, then he is already entangled in guilt, because then he becomes "one-sided", tendentious. Only when a person has a fixed position outside the guilt-ridden political reality is he fully human, fully spiritual. And even if we do not succeed in taking up such a position, we should at least strive for it. In this striving, man, who believes himself to be above the hulls, naturally falls prey to politics – either without suspecting it, or else he consciously engages in politics with a guilty conscience. The false doctrine that man is originally a spiritual, i.e. a non-political being who recognizes and "realizes" values, necessarily leads to a contradiction in practice, in that the seemingly non-political man proves to be highly political against his will. In the recent past, this has manifested itself in the fact that the non-partisan citizen has practically helped the parties of the left to rule.

The civic ideology is based on a false conception of what spirit is. It is not the person who has to do with spiritual goods, who somehow experiences or contemplates spiritual values, who is spiritual, but the one who truly dedicates his entire being to a great

goal.

The citizen can never understand what action is because of his descent from the theoretical man. He thinks that every action must be preceded by deliberation, and that this deliberation must take all the longer, the more widespread the consequences of his decision. He therefore cannot understand the political partisanship of the young person, who, it is believed, must lack the prerequisites for a correct opinion. First comes the reflective and superior judging mind, then the decision, the decision, the commitment. In other words: the commitment does not come. The young political person has no sense for the assertion that he must "first of all" acquire the mental tools that will enable him to "somehow" (but of course correctly!) decide later. From the outset, he sees himself as a member of his people and therefore as political. His mistrust of the attempt to postpone the decision is invincible, for he senses that decision and commitment never arise from considerations, that considerations are rather a sign that he lacks the ability to commit himself. In this instinctive realization, the young person encounters the insights of the people, who also only trust those from whom they expect unreserved commitment and unreserved loyalty. In this agreement between the youth and the people, the hope for a unity of the people is founded, which no longer recognizes the contrast of values between the educated and the uneducated in the old way.

The intellectual-political situation, which incidentally cannot be attributed to a mere "generation problem", could therefore be characterized as follows: The youth and the people today have a deeper and more correct image of man than the educated classes.

It is not irrelevant whether one has a correct or incorrect image of man. The idea of an apolitical person, which does not correspond to the context of life as it actually is, the consequences of the contradiction in which the action of a pure, theoretical

person in relation to reality must not be underestimated in their significance for our entire public life. The apparent depoliticization of our existence is not a gain, but a loss, because it is always a loss when man obscures the fundamental points of his existence. Not deluding oneself is a condition of greatness. The insight into the basic political character of man is the sign of a promising beginning.

In the storms of these years, the ro. century was born. It will be the age of political man. As always in such turning points, the lament will be heard that everything is now coming to an end. But only those who cannot get away from the fiction of the purely theoretical man, who do not see the enormous possibilities that man has as a political being, will agree with this lament. Of course, some things are lost in the upheaval. But let's ask the counter question: what has the fiction of the theoretical human being cost us? No less than the truthfulness of our entire private and public existence. Under the rule of this fiction, the necessities of life of our people have been forgotten, the living, fighting man has been turned into a man of second rank, the gulf between the people and the educated has been torn open, instinct has been ostracized and the sense for the real orders of our existence has been destroyed. People have become accustomed to regarding the active man as egoistic simply because he is active, while the reserved man, the man who merely contemplates and enjoys, is regarded as purer and more spiritual simply because he behaves passively in accordance with the ideal of the theoretical man. This valuation of the passive and the active man, as it were, as the superior and the inferior, has a truly paralyzing effect. The people are closer to the truth and reality with their appreciation of the active person. Our task is not to erect an ideal of the educated that contradicts that of the people, but to set the standards of the educated, not to lose greatness. Culture consists in the fact that standards of greatness exist and are used. The standard of the "educated

person", according to which the value of the individual is measured by the extent to which he participates in the "spiritual goods", can never become a popular one, because only a small number can ever participate in these goods. A democratization of education is impossible. Therefore, historical education must never be made a general standard. All such attempts only create anew the opposition between the educated and the uneducated. We want to revere learning and science as they have been revered by all the great peoples of world history. This does not mean, however, that we want to maintain the type of the educated as a general standard. It is not true that the passive, neutral person who always wants to be "above it" is better than the active one! It is precisely the person who wants to avoid the alleged guilt of action who is guilty, because he violates the basic law of our existence.

The contrast between a passive-theoretical and an active-political person must be replaced by a distinction that applies to all areas of action – both scientific and artistic as well as political. The horizon of action, the breadth of the sphere in which action takes place, is decisive. There are theoretical egoists as well as political ones, for an egoist is anyone whose radius of action extends only to the periphery of his empirical existence. The egoist is not the person who acts, who throws himself into the political fray, but the person without a broad horizon, regardless of whether he is occupied with books or with practical tasks. The measure of greatness, however, which is denoted by the terms horizon of action and commitment, is applied independently of all historical education to every individual who transcends the boundaries that merely empirical care of existence draws around him. The political man with a broad horizon of action – that is the goal of future education. This goal applies to all e. Our horizon is called Germany; the SA. man lives in it, the village man lives in it, the schoolmaster as well as the university teacher. A Nation is where there is a common standard of greatness, a people is where

there is a standard of greatness that applies to all. It must not be the case that the highest concept of value can only be applied to a small circle, but is without validity for all others. Not two separate circles side by side, which have nothing to do with each other, but in concentric circles one people, consisting of active human beings, and the purity of the commitment, the breadth of the horizon alone is ultimately decisive! The people do not understand that there should be two kinds of people; but they do understand that there is a hierarchy.

These days we are often reminded of the saying that we are supposed to be a nation of poets and thinkers. What is meant is not that we have produced great poets and philosophers, but that we are a nation of dreamers and theoretical people. Those who look deeper have always disputed this, they have called us a nation of soldiers. The soldier neither dreams nor contemplates, he is the type of active person, so we would be a nation of activists. That we are such is also proven by our attitude to the world of work. But especially in view of German soldierly activism, the question is permissible: Can a nation of soldiers ever become a nation of political people? Political activity is of a completely different kind than soldierly activity; the political man is not built up from soldierly virtues alone. We were a soldierly people even in times of political impotence and discord, on what do we base the assertion that German political activism is being born from the soldierly activism of the German today?

Nothing is more difficult than recognizing the symbolic content of what we ourselves are experiencing at the moment. However, we can read from the major events what is really happening to us and within us. The political events of this year can only be judged correctly if we see them in the context of the world war. The collapsed system was based on the world war as a political event, i.e. on the acknowledgement of defeat.

The new Germany is based on the military event of the war, it is based on the reality of the great war as the culmination of German activity. The German would become a political man the moment he learned to use the tremendous energies he had shown as a soldier as a politician. It was not the granting of universal suffrage that made us a political people, we became one in the fire of the World War and in the embers of political will that were kindled by this fire.

The day in Potsdam cannot be compared with the day in Versailles 1871. The people experienced and understood it! The act of state in Versailles of 1871 never entered the people's imagination. The 18th January 1871 remained a holiday for the authorities and the educated, people celebrated the day of victory, Victory Day, with ancient symbols. The political deed, in the accomplishment of which our great statesman was obstructed from all sides, had not become a popular experience. It is the last symbolic expression of the fate of disempowerment and division that has haunted us through the centuries since the end of the great Germanic laissez-faire politics.

Only now did our people understand the union of military and statesmanlike greatness in Frederick. That is why the Day of Potsdam was more than a state action: the German people themselves moved to where the founder of the Reich is buried. For the activist, in whom soldier and statesman are united, is the spiritual founder of the Reich.

Anyone who does not want to understand the Day of Potsdam, anyone who still talks today the way people talked in the year 1913 is denying the German revolution that began with the world war, is denying the sacrifice of those who fell for a greater and freer Germany. The Day of Potsdam gave form and language to the silent experience of the great war. In the image of the great king, the German people recognized themselves, and in this recognition

they equipped themselves for the tasks of the future.

Inaugural Lecture in Berlin

Held on 10th May, 1933.

1.

The revolution, which was festively crowned by the Day of Potsdam and the Day of National Labor, will only slowly take hold in two districts. One is the one in which we find ourselves here, the other is that of the economy. The political revolution in the narrower sense is almost complete, while the spiritual and social revolution is still in its infancy. The spiritual revolution will be completed by the youth; the executors of the social revolution are the peasants and workers. Alongside the peasant and the worker, the student stands today as a revolutionary element.

So the student today is not where you would expect him to be. He does not stand with the educated, he stands with the people, and not just "inwardly", mentally like any "good patriot", but as a real person with the real people, and he feels closer to the SA. man than to any representative of the academic professions who has passed through the university of the past. The student has a new image of the German university. He is not yet able to give voice to this image, and yet he must measure the present against this image. This is the difficulty of his situation. He expects his teachers to lend word and form to the invisible standard in him, and he ultimately measures them only by whether they are able to do so. If they are unable to do so, he turns away from them in shame and anger and pain, and incidents occur on the university floor which until recently would have been categorized as riots, scandals, incidents, or "lapses", "exaggerations", "lopsidedness", "intemperance", etc. But if the student did not become active, he would be unfaithful to his revolutionary mission, then this would be nothing other than a sign that he was not in holy earnest about

the image of a new university. For that is the peculiarity of the images of our soul, that they demand commitment from us. At a certain height there is only one step from the sublime to the ridiculous, and when a man commits himself completely, the spectator cannot know whether this is the highest seriousness and historical deed or mere "racket". Only those whose soul resonates, who carry the image of what is to come and the unconditional obligation within themselves, know.

If the student attacks and rejects the university as a whole in this extreme situation, it does not mean that he rejects everything that happens here. It only means that he is going the whole hog, that he wants to change the face of the university, but it does not mean that he wants to abolish academic work. Gentlemen! I trust that you have not left because you fear the rigors of academic work, but only because you no longer find any meaning in this work, because you only want to do this work in a school that corresponds to your idea of the greatness and unity of the German people. The quiet, tenacious work, the knowledge and the rooting that is still at home in German universities is, I know, respected by you. You were just political people enough not to let the reference to this work hold you back from the historically necessary deed. Because this deed, the change in the face of our university, had to happen. And here lies the ultimate reason for the Lonflikt: if you were repeatedly asked to recognize the silent work, then this demand ultimately concealed the idea that there was no need for a more profound change in the face of our university. The conflict must have come to a climax with the outbreak of the revolution, for now the wish and hope arose in many of its teachers that things would now return to the way they were before the year 1918. But history knows no going back – neither to the year 1918 nor to the year 1818, in which Hegel opened his lectures at this point.

It is impossible that the German university today can still live on ideas that were formed at a time when there was not yet a German state. When the University of Berlin was founded, there was a Prussian state, but it was no longer the state of Frederick the Great. The foundations on which the new university was built in Prussia between 1810 and 1818 were considered unshakeable. I see in the idealism of Fichte and Hegel one of the bold thrusts of the German spirit against every externally imposed constraint, an outbreak of that Ghibellinism which is so deep in our blood, and which is the terror of every priestly rule. But it is not German, it is not Ghibelline, to dwell on one thought. Fichte would no longer speak today as it is written in his speeches to the German nation; today we bow with respect and reverence to the men who created the University of Berlin, but we take other paths out of the same Ghibelline spirit that drove them.

The systematic critique of the idealistic tradition is part of our future work. Today I would like to emphasize just one point. Those who these days believe they have to defend the freedom of the spirit against us sometimes refer to the philosophy of German idealism, which was, after all, a philosophy of the spirit. But when Fichte and Hegel demanded freedom, they did not demand freedom for every opinion, not even for every well-founded opinion. They demanded freedom for their philosophy, for their thought, which for them was the absolute thought. Fichte's university plan stipulated that every student had to be initiated into Fichte's philosophy. The philosopher thus practically determined who became a civil servant and in what spirit he had to think as a civil servant. According to Fichte's plan, power was placed in the hands of freedom, and the state in the hands of the philosopher, as Max Lenz expressed it here in his speech on taking up the rectorship in the year. The imperial thinker Fichte wanted exactly the opposite of what today is considered idealistic or even Fichtian. – Not his plan, but Schleiermacher's plan was realized

by Wilhelm von Humboldt. Schleiermacher wants nothing to do with Eight's philosophical absolutism. His plan sets two poles: science and the state, teaching and the will of the state, spirit and power. Between them is Lamps, but overcoming power is the task, peace is the goal, admittedly a goal in the infinitely distant future. – One can call this Schleiermacherian solution realistic compared to Fichte's, because it recognizes power. But it is only a pseudo-realism, because the recognition of power is immediately withdrawn again and the "overcoming" of power is set as the goal.

The word for such a distant goal as the overcoming of power is idea. Even in Hegel's philosophy of absolute spirit, the idea remains that a reality can never be appropriate to the idea. Only the process, the becoming, a logical sequence of phenomena is appropriate to the idea. Even the philosophy of concrete idealism lacks the notion of the symbol as the exhaustive representation of an idea. In a recent lecture by eminent academics, there was talk of "guidance by spirit and idea". The men who wrote and signed this rally described the university of the past as "political". But a university which, even in the year of revolution, only speaks of leadership by spirit and idea, not of leadership by Adolf Hitler and Horst Wessel, is not political. This is not a personal failure; it is a system of thought reaching its limits. In many cases, we have not encountered incompetent or malicious people in the struggle of recent years, but a system of thought based on unimaginative idealism. Adolf Hitler's followers know the symbol, the representation of the idea in a person, in a flag. The Führerprinzip and the symbols of National Socialism redefined the concept of the idea. This is not a dispute over words. It is not at all indifferent whether one says: Hitler or: the idea. Wherever one says "spirit" and "idea" per se, we may infer the philosophy of imageless idealism, the philosophy that believes that the idea itself is more than a person, more than a realization. Until recently, one could

still hear: it means Heil Deutschland, not Heil Hitler. The more general term: Germany meant more than the individual term: Hitler, and it was biased and narrow-minded not to say "Heil Deutschland". As if, when we say Heil Hitler, we don't mean Heil Germany! But we mean it concretely, we mean it clearly, we mean it politically. Hitler is no less than the idea – he is more than the idea, because he is real.

The inadequacy between the National Socialist student body and the followers of imageless idealism is based on the fact that National Socialism can no longer be understood from the intellectual positions of the past. It is truly revolutionary, it is something new. It cannot be intellectually justified with the concepts of the Eighth. Hitler united the real German people into a single entity. Fichte did not have the real human being in mind, but the human being as the representative of reason, the absolute human being; he did not start from the real German, but he called the absolute human being the German. Our concept of man is not an absolute one, but a historical, realistic one. It is in the concept of man that he belongs to a certain race, a certain ethnic group. I will have to show that we therefore do not understand man "naturalistically".

The real disaster of the nineteenth century was that the humanist philosophy and the silent philosophy of the soldiers of the Prussian General Staff did not coincide. Almost at the same time as the Berlin University, the system of general conscription came into being. The new university system and the new military system should have been based on the same idea of education. This did not happen. In the army the man was educated, at the university man was educated. The Prussian general staff educated soldiers, the university produced educated people. The theoretical man whom it brought up knew the spiritual goods of his nation, but he knew nothing of the earth and of the hard toil of everyday

life, he was alien to the peasant and the worker, he considered himself an absolute ego in arrogant contempt of the people, of the mother who had given birth to him. The fighting man, the political man, the "soldier", the peasant and the worker were distant and inaccessible to this educated man who only "understood". This theoretical man, this educated man, lived in an atmosphere of unreality. He had the ideal of self-perfection above him, for that is what "education" means in the ultimate sense, the ideal of the harmonious personality; he had forgotten the political character of man and the world. The students protested passionately against this individualism of the philosophy of education. They objected: "But we are not individualists at all! we mean the community, we want to be part of the community, we condemn the doctrine of the absolute right of the individual to live out his or her personality, and so on. But national community means something other than solidarity in attitude and will, who defines this attitude, this will? who directs the individuals, who defines the goal concretely? Patriotic sentiment is not in doubt, but you cannot fight and seize power with patriotic sentiment. This requires an unconditional commitment to concrete symbols. Only such a commitment is political, i.e. effective. Mere sentiment achieves nothing; we always want to presuppose sentiment in the words of the old Vischer: morality is always self-evident. Only when this is presupposed does the problem begin.

Education to become a soldier does not count on conviction. That is too thin a concept for them. This education addresses the whole person, the whole race, it knows no general ideal, but only highly concrete demands (beginning with the physical) – but it demands that these demands be fulfilled one hundred percent. The idealistic attitude of pedagogy, on the other hand, places an infinite task before man – but when it comes to the standard of fulfillment, it remains silent. It has no such standard; it leaves the

judgment of itself to the individual. It disdains the concept of type, the concept of forming according to a type, which is connected with the leader principle. In contradiction with itself, it then produces a type, the type of the educated. In a word, we can say here what National Socialism means spiritually: the replacement of the educated by the type of the soldier. This type was the product of an educational system that was inconsistent and at odds with itself: it wanted to produce individualities and produced neutrally behaving mediocrities. The new type is wanted: it corresponds to the new unity of the people.

As long as the educated, i.e. the theoretical man was considered the highest value, the soldier had to appear as uneducated, as unspiritual. The pacifist propaganda of recent years could only spread so unrestrainedly because the soldierly type had no fixed place in our intellectual system. The peculiar spirituality of the soldier, soldiering as a way of life, was not recognized. The army was only seen as a means in the service of politics. Only unofficially was it known as the real school of male education. The battles of the world war were fought by those who were educated by the system of the Prussian General Staff. Just as the Reich was not founded by the 48, but by Bismarck and Moltke, so the spiritual power that enabled us to fight through the world war was not developed by the neo-humanist-idealist philosophy, but by the immanent philosophy of our soldierly education.

We have found the name of the political soldier for the type of person we have in mind. The newly founded chair, which I hereby take possession of, bears the title: for political pedagogy. This could create the impression, at least among those who do not understand our symbols, that the door should be opened to general politicization, that the separation of tasks, the separation of the spheres of competence of the politician, the soldier and the scientist should be abolished.

When I present a "politics", it is not with the intention of politicizing or calling for politicization. I will replace the new humanistic image of man with the true image of political man, I will redefine the relationship between theory and practice, I will describe the orders of life in which we really live, I will convey my insights, but I will not dabble in politics. My task is to paint a picture of the political, i.e. the real human being, not to engage in lectern politics. Politics can only be done by those who are responsible for it. There is certainly a philosophy and science of politics, but not a scientific politics and just as little a political science. Thought must answer to thought.

But thought is not something timeless. It struggles to come to light in us as temporal beings. In the thoughts themselves, the ages confront each other, and each age has the task of expressing itself as purely as possible. A struggle takes place between the ages, and the great periods of thought struggles coincide with the great periods of political revolutions. I consider it one of my tasks to describe this deep, difficult to recognize connection between philosophy and politics as clearly as possible. This task is not to justify the politics of the day, but to recognize the political condition in which we live by virtue of the power of destiny.

On October 22, Hegel opened his lectures here with a reference to the political events of the near past. "The world spirit," he said, "so preoccupied with reality and torn outwards, was prevented from turning inwards and upon itself and from becoming more conscious in its own to enjoy their native homeland. Now that this storm of reality has been broken and the German nation in general has saved its nationality, the basis of all living life, the time has come for the free realm of thought to flourish independently in the state alongside the reign of the real world."We share the belief in the power of philosophy that speaks from Hegel's speech; but it is not least the fate of Hegel himself

that reminds us that the "storm of reality" never ceases, that man always remains political, that there is no realm of absolute thought detached from time. Hegel believes in a realm of absolute thought – but reality forced him to take a political stand, and he took a stand against the youth of his time. That was not taking sides with the absolute spirit, that was taking sides with the Restoration that had begun with the Viennese congress; today we cannot stand before the academic youth with the glorious pathos of thought of a Fichte and a Hegel. The image of man that we have is more broken, but truer. Our endeavor will be not to put ourselves in contradiction to our reality. We take part in politics, in the fate of our people and our fatherland, we know of no place of contemplation from which one could stand above this fate – but we will justify and prove this reality of ours in the light of thought.

2.

At the university, we are accustomed to judging every person and every phenomenon by the extent to which they have mastered the word, how far they have reached the word. Only that which has been logically asserted, that which has been formed, in short that which has become word and concept, has the right to exist here. The service of the word ultimately leads to a delicate and subtle, to an "aesthetic" attitude and finally to the fact that man loses the sense for that which still does not have form, what has not yet come to word, but what may have form, that he loses the sense for the original, for the chaos that will give birth to a star.

The word is eloquent, it interprets itself and the object. The symbol is of a different kind. The symbol is silent, its understanding is immediate, where the original relationship to it is missing, no interpretation helps. The mind is unable to grasp it,

only the heart finds its way to it. But that is not why the symbol is unspiritual. It is capable of being interpreted by the spirit, indeed it demands it, and the most difficult work of the spirit is nothing other than the interpretation of symbols.

In place of the traditional opposition of spiritual and non-spiritual, we must set the more correct opposition: symbol and word. This contrast illuminates the present for us: we are united in the symbols – we are not yet united in the word, what stands in our way is not ill will, but the old word, the word that is no longer appropriate to the present symbols. That's what makes the shredded state so troublesome: that we have to clear away the old word at every moment, that we are in danger of misunderstanding each other at every moment because we don't yet have the word that belongs to us. All efforts to understand each other are in vain if we are not firmly rooted in the world of the symbol, from which alone we can get advice, in which alone we really understand each other; today we no longer understand each other if we continue in the realm of existing words, we talk away about reality if we do not immerse ourselves again and again in the world of the symbol. That is the greatest event of this time: that in the midst of an epoch in which the word had become worthless, the symbol arose and brought us together. those who were not seized by the power of the symbol heard only "empty words", i.e. what they were used to, who thought that everything was "agitation". But in doing so he was only transferring the signature of the time onto something, what this time had already overcome in the deepest sense. It was simply not possible to reach an understanding of National Socialism beyond the word, because our time is a time of the empowerment of the word. All the lectures and debates could not hide the fact that the possibilities of understanding through the word had become ever more limited. The decline of the linguistic form of expression, which has so often been lamented, is only a symptom. This decline cannot be halted by tightening the

regulations for the German essay. Rather, the word must be reborn. From the symbols in which we understand ourselves, the poetic and philosophical word will emerge anew, in which we will then understand ourselves spiritually in a new, more delicate, more differentiated, more diverse way. The path of culture leads from the symbol to the word. A people has a culture when it understands itself in a common language. The mere existence of a common language is not enough; we have experienced, painfully experienced, that it is possible to talk past each other in a common language. The path of culture is the path to the word, but the real word, which unites people and does not divide them, only flourishes where the symbol is alive.

The whole nation is called upon to interpret the symbols, to find the word. The free struggle of the forces is unleashed. Of course, this is not the supposedly free struggle of the forces, the laissez faire, laissez aller of liberalism, because the precondition is that there is unity in a symbol. This is the decisive precondition that liberalism had overlooked. But assuming this wordless unity, the struggle of forces for the truest and deepest interpretation of what is happening here and now takes place. The word cannot and will not be decreed by administrative means. With the symbol, the word is not yet there, it must be created anew, fought for anew, and we have the possibility and the courage to release this struggle, since we are certain of unity in the symbol.

There are two dangers: from those who think they have the word and from those who revile the word, anyone who thinks they already have the word today is a reactionary. Let us be on our guard, let us not be tempted to borrow from the word of the past, let us not tire of struggling for the word that is appropriate to us, what was German and great in the past, let us revere it, let us study the word of the past, but this reverence does not release us from the duty to create something again that is German and great. We

cannot and do not want to go back – we want to move forward, even in the spiritual, we are not romantics, we take the path to the word, and the path to the word is the path to classicism, we do not allow ourselves to be confused with those who pretend to despise the spirit and the word, we are not irrationalists, we do not indulge in feelings. I did not begin with the contrast between feeling and word, or heart and head, etc., but with the contrast between symbol and word. The symbol, however, is already a formed thing compared to the feeling. It does not yet have the form of the spirit, it has its own form, but it has a form, it is not just an external sign of flowing inwardness. You can live and die for a symbol, it is a reality, not a mere sign.

The symbol never belongs to an individual, it belongs to a community, a we. This "we" is not a "we" of the emotional union of personalities, it is not a subsequent "we", but an original one. In the symbol, the individual and the community are one. The symbol is inexhaustible, in it both the individual and the community recognize themselves. It is the real we, which vibrates in a common rhythm, that is reflected in the symbols.

And this we, like the symbol itself as a reality, is also a power. The real word, the word that still has power, carries this power in fief from the symbol. Between the wordless power of the pure original symbol and the powerless word of the civilizational state, there a culture moves away. It does not move between unspirit and spirit. For the wordless power of the symbol is not identical with mute power. The symbol is mute, but mute only compared to the word, just as it is "formless" compared to the spiritual form. But this muteness and this formlessness are not the darkness of naked power, but the solemn muteness of the origin.

If you don't understand the commonality in the flag and salute, you don't understand the whole thing. Then we are accused of wanting to make a "special view" obligatory for everyone, then we

are accused of wanting to be tyrannical and of denying humanity. But when we are accused of not achieving diversity, we ask them how they intend to achieve unity? We have not attempted to achieve unity by decree. We reply to those who understand humanity to mean the political and spiritual organization of all that is human: we are not human. For we know that there can be no coexistence of people on a higher than merely economic basis without the concentration of these people around the symbol appropriate to them. This symbol accomplishes a separation, it determines what is right and wrong, what is true and untrue. The symbol limits, it excludes, it is a symbol only for those who understand it for what it is and whom it fills with enthusiasm. This is our concept of humanity: humanity is where people believe in a symbol and are committed to it, where a symbol inspires and carries them away to create and act. For us, humanity is not a concept of expansion, but a concept that points to a certain altitude. A nation is not "human" when it tolerates all races, when it allows foreigners to rule over it politically and spiritually, but it is human when it endeavors with all its strength to bring itself into a humanly great form. In the way of toleration it would only increase chaos; and even individual, high-level cultural achievements cannot make this path acceptable. Every nation has the task of reorganizing the world in its own journey. No nation can have this task taken from it by another. And by virtue of this mission, it excludes those from its great expenditures who cannot participate in its symbols for the deepest reason.

There are two ways in which the symbols of a people are interpreted: the deed and the word. The doers interpret what is German through deed, we teachers through word. Deed and word, politician and teacher do not coincide. That would result in the dilettantism of the deed and the dilettantism of the word. It is not possible for them to coincide. For each of them, the researcher and the teacher as well as the doer, if he understands his office

correctly, is related to the whole. He who relates to the whole in his own way does not need it in another. Or, to put it in the words of a witty Englishman: you cannot enter paradise in two ways at the same time. Everyone should relate to the whole in his own way, politicizes the teacher, then irresponsible talk arises, teaches the bureaucracy, then a prescribed attitude arises.

Humanistic idealism believed in a common ground without a symbol. It started with the concept, we recognized that it is useless to agree in word and concept if there is no agreement in the symbol, we recognized that an educational system can only be fruitful if it is based on an educational system. We do not exclude breadth, but we do exclude false universality. For it is disastrous to go into the wide world if there is no unity. Only where there is a type, a fixed system of habits, an educational system that begins with the body, only then does the vastness of the spiritual world open up without harm to man. The idealistic-humanistic philosophy of education, which has condemned this education to the type of "one-sidedness", thought it was close to the Greeks. It has supported the demand for universal education precisely by referring to the Greeks. But it was precisely the Greeks who did not educate harmonious individuals. Look at their greatest educational book, Plato's State: it deals with types, not individualities. We contrast versatility with unity, harmony with strength, refinement with simplicity, complicated inwardness with certainty of attitude. We owe much to the men who have led us back to the Greeks by way of philology, the understanding of the word, education. But now we are going to the Greeks ourselves, and we have the certainty of coming closer to them than we ever were if we educate ourselves according to the law of our own nature.

If the life that lies ahead of us will be a life in the state, a political life, then that too is Greek. The modern humanistic

image of the Greeks was determined by art and science; our modern image of the Greeks is determined by the polis. This polis cannot be a model for us, but it can serve as an example that freedom can only flourish where there is unity in symbols.

A new era is beginning. The epoch of the Middle Ages, the epoch of soul ties and soul guidance is behind us. We do not recognize a power that is spiritual and political at the same time, we do not have a pope but a leader, anyone who cannot live and die with us will not be burned as a heretic. He remains unmolested if he does not attack us. But behind us also lies the era of the modern age, the era of freedom of conscience, of individualism. We do not leave it up to the individual to attack and reject the symbols in which our unity is revealed. They are now going out to burn books in which a spirit foreign to us has used the German word to fight us. Heretics are not burned at the stake you are building. The political opponent is not a heretic, we face him in battle, he receives the honor of battle. What we dismiss today are toxins that have accumulated in the time of false tolerance. It is our task to make the German spirit in us so powerful that such substances can no longer accumulate, we must not rely on prohibitions. We must overcome the un-German spirit from within ourselves. The world age that lies before us, the political world age, the world age of socialism, will not be a world age of Caesaro-Papism. The German university will never become the intellectual instrument of a will that lies outside itself. It has its own relation to the whole. Politics and spirit are united in the symbols, but separated in the organs. We are free in the interpretation of symbols.

University and State

After lectures given to the student bodies in Munich and Göttingen, May and June 1933.

What is the state of the German university at the moment? The question is more difficult to answer than is generally assumed. One assumes that the university has a certain place in the intellectual and political struggles of our time, in a positive or negative sense. It has none! The university teachers who took a firm stand in favor of the Weimar system were only ever exceptions. The majority of German university teachers upheld tradition. Only from this fact can one understand the two characteristic moments of today's situation: firstly, the confusion and helplessness. It was believed that now was the moment for the undivided resumption of the old tradition. And it turns out that the moment is revolutionary, that the youth carries within itself the image of a new university. Perplexity and confusion are the consequences: if we judge from the supporting idea, then there is no German university at this moment. – The second moment is related to this: the tragic situation of the professors. They no longer understand their time, they regard what is an expression of a necessary event as coincidence and arbitrariness. Leadership has now passed to the student body. They are stormily demanding the integration of the university into the state. They may not see the difficulty of the task, but they recognize the importance of the moment. The university is old, the state is young, and not only this state is young, but every state, because the wheel turns faster in the realm of action than in the realm of learning. A school can live on tradition for a long time and still be good; a state that lives only on tradition will perish.

In its first phase, the university was supported by the church.

It was not organized according to sciences, but according to professions: theology, law and medicine. The Faculty of Philosophy was only of a preparatory nature. – In the late Middle Ages, the territorial state seized control of the university over the professions; the sovereign needed theologians, lawyers and doctors. In the meantime, humanism had arrived and the philosophical faculty, the faculty of philologists and rhetors, grew in importance. In the absolute state of the Enlightenment, the ruler reached the height of his power; at the same time, science fought the great struggle for liberation in the faculties of law and philosophy. Finally, philosophy takes center stage in the cosmos of the sciences. It allies itself with the philological-historical method, and today, across the old four faculties, there are in reality only two faculties: the historical or humanities faculty and the natural sciences faculty, because the historical-critical method has also become fundamental for the theologian and the jurist.

This unification, which went hand in hand with the growth of the philosophical faculty, was linked to the independence of science. In the age of constitutional monarchy, "autonomous" science itself took the place previously occupied by the church and then the sovereign. A kind of equilibrium was established between science and the state, between the college of professors and the ministry, which found expression in the appointment procedure.

Today we are experiencing the transition from "autonomous" science and education to politics. The state, no longer a constitutional monarchy or "republic", but a real people's state, is emerging before us with a completely new power. The university is faced with the problem of whether it can be fundamentally political. It is its life question, there is no evasion. It is better, if nothing else can be done, to despair here than to talk about a new "deepening". We know from the century that almost a hundred years to the minute after Goethe's death, we do not yet know

much about these 20. But we do know one thing: it will be the century of politics, will the political man still be able to have a scientific university? – That is the question.

Under the influence of the University of Berlin (founded 1810), German universities became the strongest strongholds of liberalism in Europe in the course of the 19th century. century, German universities became the strongest strongholds of liberalism in Europe. The university, founded on the idea of "absolute knowledge", is today in a state of crisis. It should not be assumed that this crisis would be eliminated as soon as the demand is fulfilled, which is (rightly) insisted upon today: the university must also integrate itself into the life process of the people. It goes without saying that a German university freed from the prejudices of liberalism will, for example, give a different place to German prehistory and racial doctrine than the "humanistically" founded university. But the fate of the university depends on what idea of science it is based on. The university's life is in danger if it rejects not only the liberal conception of science as a whole, but also science itself out of a justified aversion to humanistic illusions.

The principles of academic freedom and the special German principle of combining research and teaching are not dependent in their essence and validity on the world view of liberalism. "Liberal" is merely the identification of freedom and tolerance. (The personal question remains completely aside here. The solution to this question must be provided by the constitution of the state. There is no doubt that the German university, as an institution of the state, can only grant the right to teach to German citizens because of the importance it has for the life process of the people). Scientific research is anything but "tolerant". In all essential questions, science is intolerant, regardless of its immanent principle of literalism, For example, it is opposed to all priestly dogmatism. Science derives its character

from its spirit, which is a spirit of independence and masculine courage, i.e. a heroic spirit.

But how is this intolerance, this claim to independence and truth of science compatible with the state's claim to absoluteness? A nationalization of science, that is, a transformation of professors and students into functionaries and scholarship holders, destroys life in science, no matter under what title it takes place, but whoever thinks only in the form of the alternative: "freedom" (in the liberal sense) or "nationalization" of science, is still dependent on liberalist thinking, even then, or especially then, when he answers in an anti-liberal sense. Although science and the state both claim to be unconditional, they can "in fact" exist together, provided that the spirit of science is akin to that of the state. Liberalism has emasculated science; it has turned research and teaching into a harmless, neutral "occupation". The expression of this turn towards the harmless is scientific positivism, which today threatens to suffocate the universities and has almost driven the male youth away from them. The positivist flattening is perfectly compatible with the practice of political quietism. It agrees with a theory of knowledge which reduces science merely to the activity of the intellect. It has come to the point where one thinks that intellect and scientific spirit are the same thing. Intellectualism, however, only occurs where the spirit of science has died. Intellect is a conditio sine qua non, not the conditio per quam of science.

It is not the scientification of the mind, but rather the liberalization of science that is the cause of the crisis. Anyone who wants to imitate Nietzsche today in criticizing "science" is forgetting Nietzsche's words: "I want to make it so that it takes a heroic mood to surrender to science." Science is not an achievement of the superficial intellect, but a creation of reason founded in the depths of heroic enthusiasm. The "sobriety" of science is not to be understood as the lazy cowardice of positivist

leaners, but as the strict discipline that enthusiasm for the truth imposes on itself.

A generation, which carries the heroic image of the state in its soul, will reject the doctrines of "irrationalism" born of despair and choose the heroic rationalism of science as its ally. Once this alliance has been consummated in the souls, then the real union of state and science in the same heroic spirit has become a solvable problem. The spirit of true science is turned towards the state. The young generation will not want to turn the sword of this spirit once again into a toy of humanistic "education" – but it must not turn it into a mere hammer or sickle either.

The assertion that science is independent is not to be confused with the liberal thesis of the "autonomy" of science. The liberal view of science forms part of the liberal philosophy of culture. According to this view, the realm of culture is an autonomous realm, divided into autonomous subject areas such as economics, law, science, etc., which is separated from the realm of nature, which is somehow "below" it. Culture and spirit are conceived here as free-floating, without a location. For the assertion that all culture is bound to blood and soil, to race and ethnicity, the philosophy of autonomous cultural areas always had only a pitying smile; it leads to strange facial distortions when this smile is also "brought into line" today.

The doctrine of the autonomy of the sciences only makes sense within a doctrine of the autonomy of man and culture. When we speak of the independence of science, on the other hand, we do not have in mind the product of a free-floating intellect or of a man per se, but rather the independent science within the system of national culture. One commits a fallacy if one thinks that the liquidation of the concept of an "autonomous" culture means the abolition of the independence of science. It only means the abolition of the concept of supposedly autonomous science. The

system of our national culture requires independent science as an integrating component. Line so-called autonomous science has no place in this system, nor does the nationalization of the mind.

Science as we know it is a creation of a Germanic sense of independence. With sure instinct, Nietzsche rediscovered the bold Nordic spirit of pre-Socratic philosophy – an act as significant as Winckelmann's exploration of Greek marble art. Line another discovery is yet to come: the Mediterraneanized science of the Greeks was overcome in the 7th century by a new application of the Nordic spirit through modern science. Descartes, Galileo and Keppler were not epigones and destroyers, but new creators of science from the bold, enterprising spirit of the peoples of the North.

As soon as it was born, modern science came into conflict with the spiritual power that had dominated the West until then, with the total cultural power of the priestly church. This dispute has not yet been settled; it is bound to flare up again the moment science recalls its origins. The supposedly autonomous science in the system of the supposedly autonomous culture has finally gotten along all too well with this spiritual power. The atrophy of this science into a mindless enterprise is ultimately partly due to the fact that the big and dangerous questions were banned because spiritual powers foreign to science only allowed harmless solitary investigations. The independence of scientific research slumbered in the securitas of positivism; where the heroic certitudo stirred, it was ostracized or secreted. This is the meaning of Nietzsche's fate.

The moment we establish a national educational system, the idea of science must also shine before us in new splendor. This idea belongs to us, it is born from the innermost substance of our race. The university of the future will be political because it is founded on the political character of science, science that is

political in itself, insofar as it will always oppose other spiritual powers, and insofar as it enters into a necessary relationship with the independent state through this law of its nature.

All genuine science is based on knowledge, and this knowledge justifies itself. Science therefore does not receive its meaning and justification from something that is not science, from a "belief" apart from it. All knowledge is ultimately man's knowledge of himself in the world. This is the knowledge of the most dangerous position that exists in the context of things, a knowledge that only the courageous can endure. For what is science in the final analysis but a high way of enduring the uncertainty of human existence?

It is important to regain the seriousness of science, to get rid of the Alexandrian mood in which science is only understood as something that exists and has been handed down. Once science is there, then everyone can think about it with the bare intellect. The danger arises of a frivolous relationship to a good bought at great sacrifice. We will only get out of this Alexandrinism if we recognize the enormous task of independent science in this century.

The academic is not a priest of truth who serves the "spirit in itself" in the temple of education; but neither is the university an office that imparts only technical training for certain professions; it is the camp of science, a nursery of that masculine-serious and at the same time cheerful spirit peculiar to the northern peoples. wherever men come together in the camp, there is laughter and exuberance, there is mockery and jesting on the ground of comradely fidelity. That the place of science is something other than a laboratory and a seminar, that it is a place where the youth of our people come together for pure common activity, a place of life and spirit – that is the insight on which the university of the future must be founded.

Perhaps it was the fundamental error of the past to think that science was a matter of age, and that the state was also only a matter of age. This opinion belonged to the Alexandrinism of the past epoch. As if science could not be grasped in all its depth by young minds! There is a wisdom of age in the scientist as in the statesman. But it is precisely these "wise men" who are young and revolutionary into old age. They have nothing in common with the "old age" that habitually pats youth on the back: "Leave it, young man, you don't understand that yet. Oh this "not yet" – as if the deeper understanding would always really follow! The enthusiasm with which the young soul tackles a problem is something quite different from a little "mood". It is the source from which science itself originates. All respect for him who masters scientific technique, all respect for toil and labor – you, my young friends, shall not be spared them – but a little resignation, a little weariness and faint-heartedness in connection with technical virtuosity, that is not the wisdom of age! neither in the domain of science, nor in the domain of the state. The youth who is "ripe" enough in his enthusiasm to be the first to die for his fatherland must at no time be excluded from the living state. This "youthful spirit" cannot be called upon only when it is needed and then sent "home" again. This spirit has been called by the Great War, it has presented itself, and it has not gone home again. It has understood that the state is more than a technical apparatus for providing for a population, it has understood that "state" is the highest word for the interpretation that a people gives to its historical situation. The German Jungmannschaft, which feels called to be the first to be fine when it counts, also feels called by virtue of the sacred right of youth to watch over the inner greatness of the state.

Not all peoples hold the same position as we do. There is a strange correspondence between the myth of Siegfried and the myth of Achilles. Between us and the Greeks, of whom the

Egyptians, the ancient priestly people, said that they remained eternally children, there is an even more intimate bond than that which is forged by the study of language: we understand each other in the young. I dare say that it was not least the common veneration of male youthful enthusiasm that led us back to the Greeks through Winckelmann and Nietzsche.

The literature of no other people knows such a series of pure youthful characters as ours. Siegfried comes to life again in Wolfram von Eschenbach's naive fool Parzival. He reappears in Hölderlin's and Jean Paul's magnificent young form, in Nietzsche's anachronistic meditations. This German youth, of whom the other peoples hardly know anything, this youth of Langemarck, who just before the war – profound coincidence! or rather no coincidence! – had rediscovered Hölderlin's late hymns, the German university of the post-war period wanted to turn him back into a "student" who first had to learn. Ia, this young man wants to learn, but he wants to learn what science was for Plato and Nietzsche, not positivist surrender to the "course of the world".

The scientific spirit, quite unlike the artistic spirit, urges unification, the male corporation. The scientific "academy" is almost as old as Western science itself. It means more than a mere workshop community or an association of purpose, it is a genuine community, an association of equals within a tradition, a union of men, united by a common service, united by a common method. In the field of science, the master-disciple relationship has an greater sense than in the realm of art. artistry does not summarize, it isolates. The value of artistic student performance ultimately lies in originality, despite the importance of the student body. There are hardly any artistic tasks within modern culture that can be solved by joining forces. In the scientific field, on the other hand, where method prevails, there is the possibility of joining forces to

solve common tasks. The spirit of camaraderie lives in a scientific school. It is deeply symbolic that Plato's main philosophical and educational work deals simultaneously with the nature of science and the nature of the warlike state.

The university must be renewed as a community in the spirit of camaraderie. As German university teachers, we will have to ask ourselves the question every day: what will have become of the young men in twenty years' time? Will they have become pensioners, "owners" of matter or of the spirit, embittered, idlers, busybodies, functionaries of some power – or will they have remained alive^ will they have become men who have retained the enthusiasm of their youth? We will have to focus our attention not on the "diversity of individualities" but on the purity of the type. The unity of the people appears in the unity of leadership and rule, the unity of rule appears psychologically in the unity of the type. All great ages have educated types; we need not worry about individuality; it will assert itself all the more surely the less it is deliberately cultivated. ' "Science and Education" is written above the gate of the new German university, and no longer: "To the educated citizen". The soldierly and socialist spirit of Potsdam is combined with the masculine spirit of science. And here, at the university, the date of March 21 means that we feel closer to the heroic spirit of Frederick the Great than to the indulgent spirit of Wilhelm von Humboldt.

The Political Student

Lecture, held before the student body.
Charlottenburg, 26th June 1933.

Only those who understand the historical situation can understand the political student. Only those who have an idea that today it is not about individual changes and reforms, but that a new epoch has dawned, understand the claim contained in the word political student. For the political student is the political person at the university of the 20th Century. The 18th century knew the subject; the 19th century knew the citizen; the 20th century knows the political man. Just as the concept of the subject was fought against in the nineteenth century, so the young fight against the concept of the citizen today. The political student of our day is completely unknown where he is taken for an excited little patriot and expected that the political fever in him will subside. Some seriously believe that students understand the politicization of the university to mean something like civic education at the university. Yes, there are even those who fight this idea by pointing out that such lessons only have a place at secondary school! Not to mention those who carry out atrocity propaganda in their own way by dismissing the political student as a man of violence and violence.

One is a political person by birth and by upbringing. One is a member of the German community of destiny, a comrade of the people, and one is a leader or follower within the context of state action. The national state, which is built according to the leader principle, does not consist of individual citizens who somehow work together, but of fellow nationals who are grouped around the leader. This state is not created from one day to the next by changing of the written constitution; its construction is the task

of one or more generations. For it only exists when leaders and followers from all areas have come into the right relationship with each other. It is by no means already in place when the citizen suddenly calls the Reich Chancellor Führer and expresses his unrestricted trust in him with the words: Hilter will do it – and cherishes the silent hope that in this way everything will go on as before and will perhaps one day be as it was before the war. But National Socialism does not mean restoration! The National Socialist movement was born out of the concept of a new German state, out of the image of a new order that was formed in the soul of an individual in the moment of deepest shame. A National Socialist is someone who carries the image of this new order within him and aligns everything he does with this image. The National Socialist state is not made from above, but built from below. It can only be built up by political people, i.e. those who, in their own place and in their own way, out of their own interpretation and responsibility, fulfill the mission that the Führer has received from fate and which he passes on to them.

The political man, the German man under destiny, is a dynamic concept, completely different from the static concept of the citizen; the young man who is seized by the greatness and power of German destiny can already be a political man; the young man, on the other hand, could not be a citizen. One became a citizen to the extent that one grew into that static system called bourgeois society by fulfilling professional duties and founding a family and, which was the main thing, thus integrating oneself into the system of property relations. From the point of view of the society of citizens, the student simply belongs to the part of the people that still has no income, and his claim to be a political person is ridiculous, since he has not even become a citizen. One understands this does not mean that the young political person does not want to become a citizen. He has an original relationship to his people and to the state, not just a

relationship mediated by family and profession. Even more: he knows that only he who relates directly and unmediatedly to the whole stands alone in the right relationship to the state, how easily the individual can be crushed by too much concern in family and profession and made unfit for the view of the whole. The political person faces the individual task with a view to the whole. Anyone who has dealings with young people today will sometimes be struck by the aplomb with which they solve their tasks. This does not reflect the arrogance of the "young generation", but is a consequence of their political orientation. For political people, all tasks become simple, which is not to say that they become "easy". The complexity of modern life is based on its lack of scale. The political man brings into the confused bourgeois world the standard of his aims. This objective can already be grasped by young people in all its greatness and purity. The image of the new state that hovers before the young soul is also capable of being a standard, indeed, it is eminently suitable.

The citizen does not understand the universal meaning that the word political has for the younger generation. For them, politics is the word for a narrow range of actions with which they have nothing to do and want nothing to do. "Politics" is a matter for politicians, a matter for a certain profession; anyone who does not belong to this profession, he believes, is politicized! The citizen does not dare to admit that man is fundamentally a political being, that his own existence is also political through and through. Political behavior is not added to other human behaviors, it is not a behavior that he may or may not have, but it is the basic behavior. The citizen, in particular, does not realize that his participation in the wealth of the people as a whole is guaranteed to him by property or income, is already a political issue. He worships the "autonomous" subject area "economy" like an idol. There are other such idols: the profession, the economy, the law, "culture". For the liberal philosophy of culture, the whole of

culture consists of autonomous subject areas; when arguments are made today against the political man, then it is done with the terms of liberal philosophy of culture, all of which do not refer to the real concrete, i.e. the political man, but to a fictitious, "theoretical" man. This theoretical man is characterized by the fact that his actions are guided by the norms of autonomous subject areas. He knows no other authority than these norms, he always behaves "objectively", political behavior lies outside this objectivity and appears as "unobjective". There is a reverence for the abstract profession that is completely detached from politics: fulfill the duties of your profession as best you can, take care of yourself and your family, and you serve the whole, "when the rose adorns itself, it also adorns the garden." This is based on the belief in harmony, which comes naturally. The younger generation, unprotected against the hardships of post-war life, can no longer share this belief in harmony. They no longer understand the liberal carelessness towards the whole. It has recognized the primacy of politics, the universal meaning of the political, it has realized that every decision leads back to political decisions, and that only those who can make political decisions from the image of the future state are able to serve our people in all important positions of the state. It has parted with the dream that a political attitude must be "slowly" gained from the factual areas of culture, because it has observed that in this way one sinks into objectivity and becomes useless for the struggle of one's own people.

This young political generation is in the process of recognizing even more. In the first rush of the movement, the relative right of the "autonomous subject areas" may sometimes have been too little respected. Today, young people already know how to develop the realization that creative work, even within the autonomous subject areas, can only be done by those who have a decision, a standard. The opposition between the "autonomous subject areas" and "politics" is already being overcome by young

people themselves. The political attitude is understood as the source of productivity in the individual subject areas, insofar as it alone is able to protect against the hopeless proliferation of details, against specialization, and establishes a norm above all norms.

If a student today refuses to submit to the political norm, refuses to take part in a work or military sports camp, for example, because he would be wasting time on his studies, then he is showing that he has understood nothing of what is happening around him. He can only waste his time on abstract, directionless studies if he has become a political student, if he has learned to approach his studies with a concrete objective, then he will gain an infinite amount of time for these studies, because then he knows what he needs – and what he doesn't need. Passing an exam is only a concrete objective if it means more than acquiring a certificate of eligibility – and this is only the case if the studies were already concretely oriented.

The problem of politics as an autonomous subject area is at its most acute when it comes to science. The subordination of other subject areas to politics may be understandable where practical questions are concerned. Science, however, cannot simply be subordinated; it has its own law, its own freedom. Its development appears to take place completely independently of the movements of time. So, one concludes, time should be kept away from science and the university should merely be a place of "quiet research". Science, one continues, comes from ancient times and continues through the present into the future. This development is taking place by itself, so to speak, and we have enough to do if we want to keep up with the progress of science. The problems have their own logic, and if the problems have not matured, then all the effort and movement will be of no use.

No one with insight can doubt that something important is being said here. The state of a science is something objectively

given; working scientifically means not least not ignoring the state of science. Science is not possible without tradition, without school, without discipline. Chemical discoveries are not made in the air. However, the problem, the direction in which knowledge urges, is not already contained in the current state of science. If there is no such urge, no moment of direction, then science freezes into itself. There is then ultimately still a state of science, but no longer any science. Science has lost its relationship to an original questioning and knowing, it dissolves into "subjects", the details of which can hardly be mastered even by experts.

This state of affairs is well known and much lamented. In the past, attempts were still made from time to time to rediscover the lost unity of meaning, to achieve "synthesis". Attempts were made to counteract specialization by somehow returning to "totality". But it turned out that this attempt never led anywhere, that an immanent synthesis within the specialized science could not be achieved from within the science itself. The tendency towards specialization proved to be stronger than all attempts at synthesis. – Now that attempts at synthesis have ceased, there is complete resignation; no one knows where the development will lead. The only thing that everyone agrees on is the conviction that science is at rest within itself. No one wants to admit that a movement that has its origins outside science and academia could also reshape science and academia. The dogma of autonomy cannot be shaken. The dignity of science is believed in the university, and yet only defends the science of a dying age. For it is not true that science floats "autonomously" above the times. The state of science is independent of the present, a result of the past; but science itself, living science, if it is to be more than a business, is not independent of the present. What we want to know depends on the present, on our interests, and without this living drive for knowledge, as mere tradition, there is no true science; we must distinguish between the idea of science, that is, the idea of

knowledge, the state of science, and real science as it is created anew by each generation out of its idea of science and on the condition of the given state. The character of the respective real science results from the tradition in connection with the demands that are made on science from the idea of science. The only danger threatening science is that no more demands are made on it. The other danger, that the idea of science is lost altogether, I do not consider acute among us Germans. For us it is self-evident that knowledge and knowing have their goal in themselves. Science cannot tolerate any foreign authority in its fields. But this does not mean that universities are autonomous. At universities, research comes into contact with the times and its tasks. Those who believe they are defending the autonomy of the university today are in fact defending a state of undemandingness, defending themselves against the demands that the times make on science, that is, against those demands that can give new life to old science.

One difficulty, of course, lies in the fact that life today is political life, that the person who approaches science with claims is a political person. But only from the humanistic view of man as an apolitical being can one recognize an insurmountable difficulty here and see it as a new situation. Certainly, the situation is new for us Germans. But it only depends on the size and range of the demands that are made; the fact that it is the political man who makes these demands does not in itself justify the impossibility of a solution, if man goes the whole hog – and the political man goes the whole hog – then something great will emerge for science in a scientifically inclined people such as we are. In any case, nothing will come of it if we simply refuse to go the whole hog in the name of tradition.

The political student goes all out. Today it looks as if he is hostile to science. But he is not hostile to science, but only to its present state, to satisfaction with the present state. The

maintenance of tradition requires renunciation; but with this renunciation science is not yet given. The absolutization of tradition, the opinion that science will continue of its own accord, produces the enterprise. In opposition to this enterprise the political student asserts the right of life, and he does not thereby destroy science, but acts in anticipation of a new epoch.

Science cannot renew itself by itself. There can be no answers unless questions are asked. The political student learns to ask essential questions, and only then will he learn to give essential answers. A new generation is growing up, a generation that no longer sends clueless mules to university, but young, educated fighters who know what is important. Not in order to make a career in bourgeois society, but what matters in the great struggle for the destiny of our people.

The Soldier of Today

Lecture, held at the Defense Science Working Group.
Berlin, 12th June 1933.

Some say that there is no such thing as a soldier of today. There is only one soldier, and he is the same, whether he is the soldier of Frederick the Great, the soldier of the Wars of Liberation, the soldier of Moltke or the soldier of the Great War. A soldier is a soldier. The soldier of today is the soldier of yesterday. Time has no influence on his nature, the soldier is timeless. Technology and tactics change – the soldier is always the same. – But that is a serious misconception. The war is not composed externally of the activity of a timeless soldier per se and a technique that changes with the progress of chemistry, but it is always a closed historical phenomenon, a figure, and so the soldier is always a different one, a figure. Every time, says Clausewitz, has its own lore. Every era, I add, also has its own soldier. War is not an isolated event. Wars are declared, undertaken and carried out by states for the purpose of self-preservation or self-assertion. War is in the service of historical objectives and can only be understood in terms of the state. War is and remains subordinate to politics. "It certainly has its own grammar, but not its own logic." The grammar of the law is subject to the logic of the state. Following on from this Clausewitz quote, I will try to show that the grammar of military training, the training for the war, presupposes the logic of military education.

Military training is something other than a general training for the war, military education is not military training plus civics. Military training can include the most heterogeneous elements. In this combination, the highest triumph of purely "military" training lies in the welding of the most diverse elements into a

body that acts uniformly on command. For this training, the individual is merely "material" that does not carry its own law, its own will, material that is brought into a form by the hardest grasp. In military training, the term "human material" is used. This word is inappropriate for military education. For this education only takes place where there is a community and an idea that fulfills and enlivens this community. However, such a community is no longer "material".

The defenders of the timeless soldier will say: it is precisely material that we have to deal with. Our subordinates must not know their own will, the subordinates' own will overrides the command system. The command system, however, is the most vulnerable point of the army, the closed command system must be maintained at all costs, if the command cannot be sure that every order will be carried through and obeyed, then the army is not weakened or diminished, but it is no longer there at all. In the words of Treitschke: "If the army had a will of its own, all political security would cease." From this the conclusion is drawn that the cultivation of soldierly virtues, that soldierly education must take place without reference to politics. The security of the state, it seems, demands absolute neutrality, the willlessness of the army.

The soldier of today is the political soldier. That does not mean the expatiating, the politicizing soldier. The politicizing soldier is the individual man who forms his own opinion and who, in this way, may eventually come to refuse to carry out an order he receives on the basis of independent opinions. The politicizing soldier signifies the end, the dissolution of the army. – By the "political soldier", however, we do not mean the individual man with his own opinion, but a type: the historical figure of the soldier of today. Under the political soldier we understand the soldier who not only obeys, but who also knows whom he obeys; who not only fights, but also knows what he is fighting for. Again, this is

not understood in an individualistic way: who thinks about the nature of his superiors, but who feels himself to be a soldier of a concretely represented idea, a historical mission. – Anyone who is responsible for the military training of the army for the war at any point, and who feels this responsibility in all its gravity, is easily tempted to think only "militarily" and to ignore the questions that the man silently and silently asks him every day: from whom does the closed command system receive its orders? He is, as it were, overwhelmed by the abundance of purely military problems, the tasks of the day and the hour occupy him completely, and the thought arises: no matter what the distant meaning and purpose of the whole thing is – "things have to be done". The political problem, the question of who is ultimately in command, is thus put on the back burner; military positivism emerges. Characteristic of this positivism is the alienation from the man. The man thinks simply and straight, he cannot leave the question of who commands in limbo. And with this question of who commands, or in whose name command is given, he is political.

This fact should not be overlooked, especially by those who still knew the old army. The soldier of the old army was by no means apolitical. He was committed to the person of the supreme warlord. The head of the army and the head of the state were one; the monarch was both the state and the army. The army was at the same time the state, and whoever served in the army, whoever had paid allegiance to the king, at the same time served a concrete political state, at the same time served the idea that was embodied in the monarch.

In a certain sense, however, the soldier in the monarchy was "apolitical". He stood beyond the parties because the person of the monarch was above all parties. The soldier was therefore both political and "apolitical" (in the party sense). State and politics were not a problem for members of the army as long as they paid

allegiance to the monarch. Under the protection of this political situation, the army developed into a self-sufficient part of the state, as it were. It was both political and "apolitical" at the same time and could devote itself entirely to military training. Politics was ostracized, it smelled of rebellion, politics was a matter for His Majesty. Accordingly, the instruction lesson spoke of love for the ancestral ruling house and love for the fatherland. As long as the fatherland was represented by the sacred person of the monarch, this was still a political education, an education that admittedly suffered from the alienation that existed between the monarch and the people. After the collapse of the monarchical state, all that remained was the fatherland itself and some thought, and probably still think it today, that one can be a soldier to educate the fatherland itself. But education only takes place under a pictorial idea. The word fatherland, when I do not say who and what the fatherland is, does not yet have a figurative character. Those who believed they could make the transition from the concrete person of the monarch to the general concept of the fatherland also believed they could create the apolitical soldier, the soldier who only served the "fatherland" without asking who represented the fatherland. They came up with the slogan of politicizing the army, which could ultimately be interpreted as follows: the soldier shoots on command – at whom, he will find out five minutes beforehand. But the soldier who has to risk his life wants to know what he is risking his life for. He wants to know where the enemy is, and that means: he wants to have a share in the state, because it is the state that determines who the enemy is.

The replacement of the specific person of the monarch with the general term "fatherland" did not mean the transition from the monarchical army to the army of the people's state, but rather it meant the liberalization of the soldier. This liberalizing necessarily coincides with depoliticizing, because liberalization

means depoliticization, thinking politically means thinking concretely, thinking liberally means thinking in generalities (which is why the liberal always has, at best, an unfortunate love for the concrete nation).

We owe a debt of gratitude to the men who rescued the army during the difficult period after the collapse. This rescue was only possible through a conscious and consistent politicization of the army. In the multi-party state, which even tolerated parties hostile to the army and the state, politicization was simply not possible. It was all the easier to depoliticize the army because it seemed to be merely a continuation of tradition. The old army was also "above" the parties, but it was tied to the person of the monarch and therefore anything but apolitical. Now, on the other hand, the army had to be subordinated to the abstract constitution itself so that it would not be torn apart by the parties. This created a highly difficult and dangerous situation: for political reasons, the army had to be depoliticized. The political reason for this depoliticization remained hidden from liberal thinking, which took the autonomy of the army as something permanent. The army became a thing in itself. But just as there is no such thing as a state in itself, a pseudonymous state, a state without a name and without an image, there is no such thing as an army in itself. The constitution of the state and the constitution of the army are related to each other from their origins. The difficult years that lie behind us represent an exceptional time, an interim period. Only with a people as fundamentally soldierly as ours was it possible to get through this period without damage. Those who orient themselves on this exceptional period and think that the depoliticized army can be a permanent state for a large nation are mistaken. Those who think so translate that the new form of the soldier is already here, the form that corresponds to the people's state. The transition from monarchy to the people's state does not take place overnight, it does not take place through the adoption

of a new constitution. It was only in the inner hulls of the last ;4 years that our young national state was formed. The army could not and was not allowed to participate in these hulls. It has accompanied them with growing inner participation. Now the people's state has become a reality, and with it the army is also changing. It is no longer a mere formal instrument, it is filled with will and spirit, it enters into a living relationship with the state.

The participation of the army in the life and goals of the state is indispensable. With timeless militarism and timeless morality, an army cannot be kept fit and ready for action in the long run. No army can exist without fundamental political convictions. And by fundamental political convictions I mean the army's attachment to concrete political goals, to a leader. The thought alone: "The fatherland must somehow be defended" is not enough in the long run. There is no defense per se, but only a defense within a certain political horizon. This horizon cannot remain undefined; the concrete state cannot be replaced by a mere written constitution. The lack of great goals also hollows out a militarily high-quality army from within. The concern is understandable that the grammar of the military system could be thrown into disarray by politics. But even more serious is the concern that the cultivation of grammar for its own sake, the forgetting of political logic, can lead to nothing.

So there is no avoiding the problem of politicization: escaping into flawless operation, escaping into positivism only means slowing down the end. It is not possible without a world view, without clear, concrete political principles. The soldier who dies for the fatherland also wants to know what the fatherland is. With the help of positivism, we have saved ourselves from the dangerous interim period. Now, however, we are faced with a new task. The untouchable person of the monarch used to conceal the political problem, as it were. Piety, with the feeling with which one looked

up to the person of the monarch was mixed with an uncertain respect for the impersonal, general "state system", and this unclear mixture replaced and complicated all thinking about the state and political education. The person of the monarch gave the soldier a certain guarantee, it was concrete. If the person of the monarch is replaced by the constitution that the free people give themselves, then not a mere change but a profound change has taken place. For the abstract, written constitution offers the soldier no guarantee whatsoever; it depends on who handles it, who and what "stands behind it", i.e. the constitution must be concretized, and this concretization also means the politicization of the soldier. Knowledge of the written constitution and "civic education" are not enough. Rather, the soldier must be seized by the decisive basic tendencies of the state. One cannot believe, for example, that the question of whether socialism or not can be kept away from the army in the long run.

The political soldier as a type means that the army as a whole is politicized, filled with a political idea. The army can never take part in the politics of the day; but it cannot escape the great historical swell that grips a nation. It is up to its leaders to distinguish the small swell from the great wave. The army does not have to surrender to the moment, but it cannot abstract from the historical moment. The transition from the monarchy to the people's state has been completed; an intermediate state lies behind us. Only now, after the people's state has taken shape, can the soldier also take shape. The resignation of the men who saved the army during the dangerous interim period is not an accidental event caused by personal circumstances, but an event of symbolic significance.

We all experienced August. That was when the political soldier was born. Back then, the people looked their leaders silently in the eye and said: I am ready – where am I going? The fact that there

was no answer for four years was one of the reasons for the collapse. The political and intellectual revolution that began in August ;g)4 and that has taken shape in symbols and people this year will also reshape the soldier.

Alongside the soldier of the army and tradition, there is today the non-traditional soldier of the revolution, the SA man. He is not militarily trained – not only because the law imposed on us forbids it; he is also different from the soldier of the army in his attitude, his style, his language. He is closer to the people, he is a part of the people themselves, not a military, but a politically mobilized people. Notwithstanding this difference, the soldier of the revolution and the soldier of the army must not be strangers to each other. It is necessary for them to have a common denominator. And this denominator is the political soldier. The problem cannot be solved if the relationship between the army and the SA is viewed from the perspective of the army and the militia. This military-technical approach is inappropriate to the subject matter. It may be necessary in itself to ask the question of the combat value of militia-like troops. Here, however, it is necessary to ask the question of the comprehensive national system of organization, in which both the army soldier and the SA man have their place.

And not just these two! The military education system must encompass every German, no matter who he is, no matter where he works. Everyone is a political soldier who has gone through this educational system; the army soldier differs from the others in that he has received special training.

By this I meant the complete transformation of our educational system, which we are already in the midst of. We will only fulfill the law of our nature if we make the type of soldier the goal of our education. The soldier would therefore no longer be the result of a purely technical-military upbringing, but the other way round:

the young man brought up as a soldier receives the completion of this upbringing when he joins the army, the technical-military training is added. But even before that, he is educated in the attitude of the political soldier. The army remains a closed body; but the educational principle of the army is no longer something isolated, but something general, common. Now, for example, there can no longer be the disastrous divide between officer and academics, between general staff and university, as there was in the past. Military training is based on a general education to become a soldier as a specialized training just like other specialized training. Education to become a soldier will necessarily have to make use of certain military forms, but it will not be "military" in the technical sense.

The political soldier – that is the man of our people, no matter where he stands, who knows what it is all about. The political soldier is not only produced by the army, he is the prerequisite of the army, when we have all found the soldierly lifestyle that suits us, then the army will be nothing alien among us. It will be self-contained, with its own tradition and its own tasks, and yet at the same time it will be integrated into the rhythm of national-historical life. Then there will no longer be a doctor per se, but only a doctor who knows he is responsible for the generational context of the German people, there will no longer be a judge per se, but only a judge whose supreme law is the honor and justice of the German people, and there will no longer be a soldier per se, who merely stands in an abstract system of command, but only a soldier who, standing in the midst of the strictest military system of command, at the same time feels supported and knows of the historical objectives of the state in which the will of his people, directed towards permanence and greatness, manifests itself.

Notes

The contracts have been reprinted from the manuscript with a few abridgements and deletions due to the need to avoid repetition. The only exception is the composite piece no. 5.

General Preliminary Remarks on the Presentations Under 1-3

"We have never been "militaristic" in the sense that our opponents used to accuse us of being, i.e. more heavily armed than the others. The more soldierly a nation lives, the stricter it keeps its youth, the less militaristic it will be. Militarism goes very well with completely non-soldierly ways of life. The German way of life, however, is the soldierly way. I therefore define militarism as the degeneration of native soldiering under the influence of bourgeois ways of life.

The contrast between "man" and "woman" is not to be understood as a psychological one. We are not making a psychological comparison between "the" man and "the" woman, but are talking about two historical cultures, one of which is essentially determined by the man belonging to it, the other essentially by the woman belonging to it. It is therefore not denied that the one cannot also have brave men, the other also graceful women. But we want to talk seriously about a German woman. The belief in "the" woman of European culture is a fatal error. When the lie of bourgeois culture has fallen away from us, and not before, the German woman will also have the attitude appropriate to our state of life. The emancipation of man from bourgeois society, which is taking place in the Confederation, will necessarily be followed by the "true" emancipation of the woman.

I generally use the word "Männerbund" as a collective term

even where the jünglingsbund is actually meant, as it seems inappropriate to me to use the word man in the sense of the term "manhood".

In my opinion, boys should be left to their own devices as much as possible up to the age of 14. It is not at all necessary to premature political education. When the stage of the romance of fire and travel has been passed in free swing, the stricter discipline and training that then begins will only be properly felt and appreciated the strange phenomenon of the over-aged youth leader who cannot find his way to the state, to the camaraderie of service, and is consumed in fruitless efforts to keep his people together.

The crisis in the relationship to the union necessarily occurs as soon as the young man seriously considers founding a family. The contrast of lifestyles denied by bourgeois culture, which Heinrich Schurtz's incomparable book: Altersklassen und Männerbünde has made accessible to us, then asserts itself with full force. The tension will always remain, but no solution is possible on the basis of the previous illusions. In accordance with her nature, woman must always be the guardian of those associations on which the life of the sex and of the sexes is based, while man strives for an existence that "unites like with like to a heightened development of power and a heightened consciousness of life". I would add to these beautiful words by Heinrich Schurtz the excellent folkloristic sentence that immediately follows. "Here lies a deep, hardly bridgeable antagonism between man and woman, which can express itself in tragic conflicts, but also permeates the hustle and bustle of everyday life and in Germany mainly occurs in the eternal discord between the public house and family life, reaching the peak of petty comedy in the fight for the house key." (Age Groups and Men's Societies, Berlin 1902. s. 21.)

The "public house" represents a degeneration of the male

association, characterized by the fact that this "association" no longer bears the image of the youth. The reign of the joke is the most striking proof of this. The task of the future is to create a covenant that retains the image of youth even at the stage of manhood. Such alliances would re-establish the connection between the older, politically and intellectually leading class and the youth, which is still "cut off" today by the social cross-connections.

1. The Meaning of the Great War

An attentive observer will not be able to miss the fact that the historico-philosophical keynote for this first version of the lecture has been repeatedly adapted and distorted, and for years it has appeared in the issues of a magazine published under the title "Wilderland." For better or worse, I must state that the manuscript of this lecture was submitted to the editor of "Widerstand" in October 1929.

On p. 11 see E. Lantorowicz, "Kaiser Friedrich der Zweite," Berlin 1927.

On p. 28 see p. de Lagarde, "Deutsche Schriften," vol. I, Munich 1924, pp. 137.

2. The Academic Fraternity

On p. 30, dissolution of the Reichstag: On 18th July 1930, the German Reichstag was dissolved. This was followed by the election of 14th September 1930, in which the National Socialists entered the Reichstag with 107 deputies.

On p. 34 see Fr. Nietzsche, Morgenröte, Aph. 149.

On p. 39 see Th. Mann in the speech "Von Deutscher

Republik" (now "Bemühungen") ed. 1st Aug. Berlin 1925, p. 180 ff.

3. The Meaning and Structure of German Physical Education

Two treaties are combined here under this title, the first of which was held under the title "Philosophy and Physical Exercise", the second under the title "Meaning and Structure of German Physical Exercise".

The second lecture was printed in the V. L. Rundschau (Journal of the Association of Gymnastics Schools at German Universities, dated 1 August 1932.)

On p. 48 see Fichte, "System der Sittenlehre," Medicus edition, vol. II. p. 610.

4. The State of Intellectual History in the Mirror of Mathematics and Physics

Held under the title: "The intellectual-historical situation and the individual sciences."

On p. 77 see A. Fraenkel, "Die heutigen Gegensätze in der Grundlegung der Mathematik," in: Erkenntnis Bd. I, issue 2-4, p. 227, p. 228.

On p. 87, Relativity theory saves the absolute system: My colleague Bieberbach draws my attention to the following: This view, if it is correct, makes it appear explainable that the attempts to derive quantum theory from the theory of relativity must fail.

H. Reichenbach, Kausalität und Wahrscheinlichkeit, in: Erkenntnis, vol. I, issue 2-4, pp. 177.

On p. 88 see H. Reichenbach, in: Abhandlungen d. Bayr.

Akademie d. Wissenschaften (math.-naturwiss. Klasse) 1925.

On p. 89 see M. Born, "Über den Sinn der physikalischen Theorien," in: Die Naturwissenschaften 1929, issue 7, p. 118.

R. Larnap, a. a. O., p. 12.

5. The Theoretical and the Political Man

First held before the Hamburg student body on 20th February 1933.

Printed in the Dresdner Hochschulblatt of 15th March 1933. Also in the Sächsische Schulzeitung Ig. 101 No. 5 (17), from 20th May 1933 and in the Höherm Schule im Freistaat Sachsen, special issue of 20th April 1933.

On p. 109 f. see "Mitteilungen des Verbandes der deutschen Hochschulen" from February 1933, p. 17.

6. The People and the Educated

Delivered on April 3 on the Berlin Radio Program, reprinted in the "Politischen Erziehung", Volume I, Issue 1 (July 1933).

For S., see Mitteilungen des Verbandes der deutschen Hochschulen of February ;yss, p. 4.

7. Inaugural Lecture in Berlin

Reprinted in the V. C. Rundschau, June 1933.

On p. 126. The sentence reads verbatim: "The German way and German law, self-discipline and service, freedom and obedience, guidance by spirit and idea are our moral guiding

stars." S. Declaration of the Board of the Association of German Universities of 2nd May 1933.

On p. 130 f. f. Hegel, "Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences" ("Lasso" edition), p. LXXIII.

8. University and State

These ideas were developed by me several times in free lectures to students, first at the conference of the main committee of the German student body in Blankenburg on 26 June 1932. They then formed the basis of the lectures I gave in the summer semester in Munich and Göttingen in the widest academic context. The text is composed of the transcripts for the last two lectures mentioned. The section p. 141 "Under the influence..." to p. 143 "... zu einer Sichel machen" is a reprint of a contribution to the Akademische Korrespondenz (12th April 1933).

9. The "Political" Student

The original title was: "The political student at the technical university."

Reprinted in the journal "Der Deutsche Student", Volume I, Issue l (August 1933).

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